The Cognitive Neuropsychiatry of Religious Belief and Experience

[Warren Stupidity]

The claim that religious belief is delusional is evaluated using a current cognitive neuropsychiatric model of delusion formation and maintenance. This model explains delusions in terms of the conjunction of two cognitive deficits—the first a neuropsychological deficit giving rise to an anomalous perceptual experience, the second a deficit in the machinery of belief evaluation. It is argued that to provide an account of religious beliefs as delusional within this model, two requirements must be met: 1. Plausible candidates for the first factor must be put forward; and 2. There must exist individuals with aberrant religious perceptions who do not develop deluded beliefs about those experiences. With regard to requirement 1, a range of “neurotheological” research is reviewed. The second stated requirement is addressed via consideration of “mystic atheists”—individuals who have had mystical experiences yet have not adopted religious beliefs as a result. A variety of problematic issues for the above account are tackled. It is concluded that insight into the motivational basis for religious beliefs, when combined with OCCAM ’s principle of scientific parsimony, al-lows a plausible case to be made for religious belief as delusional, provided that a particular construal of belief pathology is adopted.

http://www.academia.edu/4265301/Hallucinating_God_The_Cognitive_Neuropsychiatry_of_Religious_Belief_and_Experience

[Brettongarcia]

1. This article attacks the DSM's implication that religion shouldn't be called "delusion":

"So then, can religious beliefs that are sanctioned by, and prevalent in, society be appropriately con-ceptualized as delusional? If we look to the definition of delusion furnished by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), it is not clear that they can... " But: "DAVIES et al. (2001) argue that any bizarrely implausible belief (i.e., a belief that violates logical, physical or biological principles that are widely known) that is formed and maintained in ways characteristic of (unambiguous) delusions should, for theoretical purposes, be classified as a delusion."

"It would seem that many typical religious beliefs (for example, the belief that an obscure Middle-east-ern virgin gave birth to a child that was simulta-neously God and the incarnate son of God) violate at least as many established logical, physical and biological principles as other beliefs that are unequivocally viewed as being delusional."

[Brettongarcia]

2. Don't forget this article by Dr. Pierre. On the psychiatry of religious delusion. From months ago

http://metamorphosis.democraticunderground.com/1218126327#post153

This article by Pierre confirms the central point here: that after all, the mere fact that many people share what seems to be a delusion, does not make the delusion true.

And? Many things in religion appear to be delusory, by scientific/psychiatric standards.

[rug]

3. Always read the fine print.

Footnote 18:

18 I want to emphasize that this conclusion is possible only under a specific construal of belief pathology the alethic construal. One might object that the manner in which we construe belief pathology is essentially arbitrary, and that applying scientific standards of truth discernment to human belief formation is overly harsh. Thus whereas we might reasonably locate pathology in a science that concluded that God exists on the basis of religious experience, to locate such pathology in an individual who forms reli-gious beliefs on the basis of their personal experience is excessively stringent. There is no space here to further explore this particular can of worms.

There were smaller hedges outside St Lô.