Five North Korean Conventional Military Proposals: Does it Hurt to Ask?
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The A Channel Top Ten graphic above lays out nicely the development of five separate North Korean proposals for scaling back military tension and operations on the Korean peninsula. Most of these appear to impose a greater burden on US and South Korean force dispositions than those of the North, if one considers that whatever denuclearization steps the North is prepared to make, have not yet been made.
The first proposal involved the suspension of joint military exercises by armed forces of the US and South Korea. As described in my previous posts this has been carried out by the alliance as a suspension pending further observations of North Korean good faith performance in the future. This apparently awaits further negotiation and disclosure by the parties of any commitments from the North to be achieved. Pompeo is widely expected to return to the negotiating table with Kim in the near future.
The second proposal is the demilitarizaton of the five South Korean islands near the west coast of North Korea north of Inchon and just inside the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea extending northward to Bek Ryang Do. (Saw Buk Do)
Third is the withdrawal of the US 210th Fire Brigade from the region proximate to the DMZ. This is actually part of a proposed mutual withdrawal of artillery forces from a zone extending to 40 kilometers in either direction from the DMZ.
Fourth was a request from the North for a withdrawal of reconnaissance and air patrol forces from a zone south of the DMZ. This proposal among the others seems the most overreaching inasmuch as these air forces on the southern side are necessary for the so called "kill chain" response to counter North Korean missile, rocket and other forces aimed at South Korean or allied targets. This sort of reconnaissance seems essentially defensive in nature although not necessarily so, and therefore the request is not likely to be practicable.
Fifth is a proposal for a prohibition of deployment of US strategic assets in South Korea. Presumably this would include strategic bombers, ships, submarines and other platforms capable of delivery of nuclear weapons. This has been an issue earlier this year with respect to Foal Eagle and Max Thunder exercises. Recent events suggest that US aircraft carriers and F-22s are regarded as included in this category.
Seems like a lot to ask for under the circumstances where the North hasn't made a substantial reduction in its nuclear arsenal or delivery systems yet. So far what has occurred appears to be the "freeze for a freeze" approach recommended by China and Russia. The North has yet to take the next step in response to US and South Korean concessions on the military exercises. It is unlikely that this situation will remain acceptable for long in the US or South Korea.
The A Channel coverage of these developments suggests, in the instant report, that there is implied a sixth proposal or request from North Korea that US forces withdraw from South Korea. This is not the case thus far. Historically, this was the putative goal of all North Korean policy, to remove the US entirely from the Korean peninsula, but as noted by Robert Carlin and Clint Work at 38north.org, this request hasn't been apparent in recent North Korean proposals and shows a degree of political insight that might be lacking elsewhere (perhaps in the White House) as to the geopolitical constraints that make such a request ill advised, impractical and counterproductive.
