Russia vs. Turkey in the Mideast (II)
As I was saying, Russia’s reaction to the downing of its fighter-bomber by the Turkish Air Force (24 November 2015) was lightning fast and extremely harsh. Labelling the action “a stab in the back,” Russian authorities adopted a series of economic sanctions that ranged from suspending Turkish imports to abandoning plans for the construction of the South Stream pipeline, and from the drastic curtailment of Russian tourism in Turkey to enhancing the support offered to the Assad regime in order for it to regain control of areas in northern Syria, namely on the Turkish border (the offensive launched on January 29 toward opposition-controlled Aleppo). In the last ten days a spike in Russian air forces’ actions in support of Syrian government forces was noticed in this area, resulting in the takeover of cities there, including the almost complete severing of supply routes from Turkey (with the exception of a single border crossing point). In fact, in this context, Assad’s opponents left the Geneva talks between the representatives of the forces involved in the Syrian civil war, talks taking place under UN aegis.
Turkey’s fears that its goals in the Syrian file will not be attained grew with the shaping up of an agreement between Russia and the US, as well as other Western powers (see the ‘Signals of US-Russia reset’ editorials on the rapprochement between Washington and Moscow, published in the February 4 and February 5 issues of ‘Nine O’Clock’). From this perspective, France joining the war against Daesh after the Paris terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015, as well as the continuity of this so far trenchant position, has catalyzed the West’s rapprochement with Russia. The West has become determined to put an end to the ambiguity of the situation in Syria, which was concisely expressed, as previously cited, albeit subsequently edulcorated by American Vice President John Biden in October 2014.
For Ankara, the situation has become increasingly precarious, once the tension with Russia grew, and the chances of remaining a far-reaching player in Syria through control over her northern area have diminished. The attempts of Turkish leader Erdogan to schedule a personal meeting with Russian President Putin in order to re-warm mutual relations were rejected by the latter (first in Davos, in the third week of January 2016, as well as recently). This must have been understood in Ankara as being much more than just simple diplomatic impoliteness. Namely a signal of marked hostility if not underestimation of Turkey’s geopolitical weight in Syria, based in Kremlin on possible agreements with other major actors, most likely the US. Subsequent to the Turkish leader’s recent request for a meeting with Putin on February 2 – which coincided with an offensive launched by Assad’s forces in northern Syria, backed by Russian air forces, at the border with Turkey and the cutting off of Turkey’s links with anti-government forces in Syria – Moscow answered trenchantly through silence.
As ‘The Moscow Times’ wrote two days after this episode: “It was the second time Erdogan has been rebuffed by Putin following Turkey’s downing of a Russian military jet in November. Instead of talking, Putin has accused Turkey of stabbing Russia in the back and supporting terrorists in Syria.”
http://www.nineoclock.ro/russia-vs-turkey-in-the-mideast-ii/
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