Foreign Affairs
Related: About this forumAddressing fault-lines within the Saudi-led coalition
As the weeklong truce in Yemen coincides with the wrapping up of the scheduled peace talks, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition should take a moment to examine emerging fault-lines within its ranks, which have become particularly evident in the most recent offensive on Taiz.
Outside the Gulf, coalition members have been finding it increasingly difficult to garner public support for the war, making the deployment of coordinated and organised troops particularly challenging.
Additionally, serious consideration should be given to the attitudes of some coalition partners, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, towards the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) - represented in Yemen by the al-Islah party.
Symbolic value
Taiz city is highly symbolic. It was the first city in Yemen to rise against Ali Abdullah Saleh during the Arab Spring, with the city's "Freedom Square" becoming an emblem of the revolution.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/12/addressing-fault-lines-saudi-led-coalition-151226080527727.html
KoKo
(84,711 posts)This is from an embedded link in the article that refers back to a March 31 article from Brookings...which I thought was an interesting complement read to this recent article.
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March 31, 2015 10:37am
Saudi Arabias war in Yemen: The moral questions
On Saturday, at the opening of the 26th Arab League Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Saudi Arabias new king, Salman bin Abdulaziz, vowed that the Saudi-led military campaign against Houthi militias in Yemen would continue until the country is stable and safe. Given Yemens various challenges, this means that Operation Decisive Storm will need to go on for a long, long time before its declared objective is achieved.
A stable and safe Yemen is the sort of objective that Saudi Arabia could have pursued six months ago after the Houthis seized control of Sanaa. Now, however, Yemen sits on the brink of civil war, and the Saudi-led intervention does nothing to avert it. The real question is why Saudi Arabia waited so long to actand why it has intervened in this particular fashion.
Depending on where they stand, analysts give a number of potential explanations for Saudi procrastination. The first is one of administrative transition. With the death of King Abdullah, the Kingdom has been more concerned with putting its own house into order than Yemens descent into chaos. A second, related argument suggests that the Yemen file was centralized in the hands of the late Crown Prince Sultan until 2011, only to be divided between the Ministry of the Interior under Muhammad bin Naif and the intelligence services under a succession of princes. The third argument suggests that the Saudi leadership, led astray by the UAE and Egypt, was distracted by a needless witch hunt of the Muslim Brotherhood and, along with the war against the Islamic State group, this has occupied their full attention. None of these explanations provides a full answer. If the Al Saud, with their immense resources and established antagonism toward Iran, could not see the Houthi threat looming, then all should worry about the future stability of the region.
It is high time for Saudi Arabia to take a more holistic view of what is going on in Yemen, and for the GCC to recognize the strategic importance of addressing the country as a development problem, not just a security problem. Were only a fraction of the billions spent containing Yementhrough walls, weapons, surveillance, soldiers, and now a bombing campaigninstead used to create employment opportunities and improve the countrys decrepit infrastructure, Riyadh and the rest of the GCC would have far less to worry about.
In justifying its intervention, Saudi is quick to point out that its actions are in response to the appeal of internationally-recognized Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and that its air campaign has received the unequivocal support of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Nevertheless, the nature of such a campaign means that as the Saudis and their allies run out of obvious military targets, it is inevitable that mistakes will be madeas was the case on Monday morning with the killing of 21 in an air strike that struck a IDP camp in the northern Yemeni region of Haradhand the number of civilian causalities will rise, causing people, both in Yemen and elsewhere, to start questioning the morality of the war.
King Salman and his son Mohammad may have secured the required legal cover, but they will certainly find it much more difficult to justify the war morally. The following are some of the moral questions that the Saudis need to face up to if the intervention is not to lead to a protracted war that bleeds the two countries physically, socially, and economically.
Continued at......
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/31-saudi-arabia-war-in-yemen-barakat
bemildred
(90,061 posts)It is interesting to compare and contrast the situations in Syria and Yemen, there are ironies, both involve bombing campaigns by outside forces invited in by the "legitimate" government, but the legitimacy of popular support on the ground is inverted, or just muddled in the case of Yemen.