As ties with the West suffer, Russia embraces its own 'East'

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KAZAN, Russia — Rustam Batrov, the 37-year-old, baby-faced deputy mufti of Tatarstan, is warm and engaging as he describes the renaissance of his faith in the republic, one of the traditional centers of Russian Islam. More than 1,500 mosques have been built in Tatarstan since the collapse of communism, Muslim holidays are now state holidays, and the government supports Islamic studies.

But when the conversation turns to the conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine, and the sanctions that have slowed Russia’s economy, Batrov’s voice rises. “Yes, we’re suffering. But for a Russian it’s his soul that’s important,” he says, brandishing last year’s model of the iPhone. “Of course I’d like to buy an iPhone 6, and I don’t have the money. But never mind — we’re right, we’re doing something great, we’re not giving up. It’s like what we had in the Soviet Union — that we’re a world power, that we’re saving the world, we’re helping developing countries, internationalism.”

An enthusiastic embrace of Russian, much less Soviet, power may seem unlikely coming from a Muslim cleric. Historically, Muslims have been at best tolerated, and often persecuted, in Russia, where either Orthodox Christianity or socialist atheism has been the state ideology. And today, President Vladimir Putin’s political dominance and Russia’s newly assertive foreign policy have been in large part driven by Russian nationalism as Putin has tried to defend the rights of Russia-identifying people in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

But there is another, countervailing trend that also has been gaining momentum: the government’s embrace of its multinational identity, in particular its Muslim heritage. And many of the country’s Muslim leaders, in turn, have taken the opportunity to position themselves as allies of the regime by defending traditional values against the decadence of the West.

http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/8/6/as-ties-with-the-west-suffer-russia-embraces-its-own-east.html

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1. Communism was an international movement, but Russia forgot the lessons.

Nowadays, Russia believes the Soviet Union was some kind of russian empire. At least in its beginning it was not. Communism started out as an international grass-roots-movement, back when Lenin and Trotsky called the shots. But when Stalin took over, Communism became more and more imperial.

Now, the Soviet-Union is just a tool in Russia to incite patriotism and nostalgia.

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2. In the shadow of Ukraine: seven years on from Russian-Georgian war

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Europe and the west drew very few lessons from the conflict. Saakashvili's mistake in participating in the Russian policy of escalation served as a major fig-leave for the west to restore “business as usual” policy with Russia. The very limited Russian information operation were effective in influencing Western (particularly German) public opinion, which soon tilted towards the Russian version of the events. Lines of Russian disinformation even penetrated the EU's own final report, which overplayed the significance of US support and military assistance to Georgia. Russia learned its lessons, however, its information operations were dramatically increased for the 2014 campaign in Ukraine, albeit with much less effectiveness than in 2008.

In order not to repeat the Georgian experience Western governments advised Ukraine to not put up meaningful military resistance against Russian moves in Crimea (although at the time Ukraine the dire state of her armed forces gave her few options). But restraint in Crimea only meant that Russia started another war in the Donbas. As in Georgia, Russia used its own interpretation of the ceasefire agreement to create facts on the ground to its own advantage. In both conflicts, the West simply did not know how to equalise Russian escalation dominance.

Ukraine is, compared to Georgia, much more capable militarily. Further Russian military advances would not remove Ukraine from the political map of Europe – at least not quickly. But that's not necessarily true for Georgia. With Russian troops having increased their capabilities and operational tempo significantly after 2008, a renewed Russian-Georgian war would probably be fatal for Georgia. In both countries, the West has no clear concept of how to deal with the respective, long-term EU and NATO membership aspirations of these countries. While after Georgia the West became cautious not to be caught up in regional military struggles, both conflicts show that refraining from meaningful support will be interpreted as an opportunity to escalate in Moscow. Short of formal EU membership, the association agreements provide some framework for developing closer relations between the EU, Georgia and Ukraine respectively. But in the dimension of hard security, European foreign policy has a void that Russia knows to exploit skilfully.

http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_in_the_shadow_of_ukraine_seven_years_on_from_russian_3086

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3. France looking for warship buyers after cancelling Mistral deal with Russia

For sale: two state-of-the-art warships. One finished, fitted out and in good sailing order. The second: half-finished. Never used. No owners (careful or otherwise).

France is looking for a buyer for two Mistral helicopter carriers after cancelling a controversial €1.2bn (£840m) deal with Russia.

The official announcement that the ships would not be delivered came on Wednesday after talks between the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and his French counterpart, François Hollande.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/france-russia-mistral-warships-deal-cancelled

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6. Russian Hawks Win in Failed Warship Deal

The saga of the two Mistral helicopter carriers France built for Russia, but refused to hand over because of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, is finally over. The net result is that a French shipyard has been saved at the French taxpayer's expense, while Russian taxpayers will pay to retool the country's wharves so the country can build more of its own warships.

The Kremlin said Wednesday night that Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Francois Hollande have agreed to terminate the 2011 contract; that Russia has already received compensation for its expenses; and that it is preparing to dismantle Russian equipment installed on the ships. Russia, according to the statement, considers "the Mistral matter fully settled."

The Kremlin didn't say how much France paid to break its contract, the subject of months of back-and-forth, but the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that "more than 1.1 billion euros" ($1.2 billion) has landed in the Russian government's account. This fits with French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian's statement that the compensation was less than the contract's initial 1.2 billion euro price tag.

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-08-06/russian-hawks-win-failed-mistral-warship-deal

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4. Could a Ukraine-style crisis happen in Kazakhstan?

Although the spotlight has been focused almost exclusively on Russia’s relations with the West, the crisis in Ukraine has had an unsettling impact throughout the post-Soviet space. This has been true even in Central Asia where, despite occasional blips, close and friendly ties with Moscow have remained the norm since the break up of the Soviet Union. In a region described as the “pivot of history’, where great power rivalry has often been a cause of conflict and tension, governments are sensitive to anything that might upset the existing balance of relations. This is already having an effect in fostering new alignments and complicating plans for Eurasian integration under Russian leadership.

The fallout from Ukraine poses a particular challenge for Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asian republic, which for the last two decades has pursued arguably the most nuanced and successful foreign policy of all the former Soviet states. Kazakhstan shares a 6467km border with Russia and counts a large number of ethnic Russians among its population – nearly a quarter of the total. Its response to the Ukraine crisis has reflected these existential realities. Not wanting either to antagonise Moscow or allow a precedent for border revisions to become established, President Nazarbayev expressed

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South Asia is another region of growing interest with Kazakhstan strongly supporting India and Pakistan’s accession to the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.The visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, to Kazakhstan and neighbouring countries earlier this month shows that the desire for closer bilateral ties is shared. Modi’s decision to re-focus Indian foreign policy towards the “extended neighbourhood” reflects an awareness of Central Asia’s rising importance and a determination not to lose out. In addition to securing a new deal to supply uranium for India’s expanding civil nuclear programme, Modi arrived in Astana with a trade delegation representing sectors like IT and pharmaceuticals where an expansion of trade is anticipated.

Kazakhstan has more diplomatic options than most countries and plays them with considerable skill. That’s the main reason why the Ukraine scenario is unlikely to be reprised in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s leaders will take care to ensure that they remain on friendly terms with Russia, not least in order to balance relations with China. Yet Eurasian integration is destined to stop short of the point where Russian hopes of reclaiming an exclusive leadership role can be realised and Vladimir Putin knows that forcing the issue would cause a breach with China, a country whose good will he needs to offset Russia’s isolation from the West. Such has been Kazakhstan’s success in using interdependence to carve out a strong and independent place for itself as a regional power. Given its starting point twenty-five years ago as the backwater of a fragmenting empire, it’s a significant achievement.

http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/08/could-ukraine-style-crisis-happen-kazakhstan

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5. . nt