Environment & Energy
Related: About this forumClimate negotiations relying on 'dangerous' thresholds to avoid catastrophe will not succeed
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2012-10/uog-cnr101512.phpContact: Karin Backteman
karin.backteman@economics.gu.se
46-317-862-595
University of Gothenburg
[font size=5]Climate negotiations relying on 'dangerous' thresholds to avoid catastrophe will not succeed[/font]
[font size=3]The identified critical threshold for dangerous climate change saying that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius seems not to have helped the climate negotiations so far. New research from the University of Gothenburg and Columbia University shows that negotiations based on such a threshold fail because its value is determined by Nature and is inherently uncertain. Climate negotiators should therefore focus on other collective strategies.
Presenting their results in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), Astrid Dannenberg, Postdoc researcher at the Environmental Economics Unit, University of Gothenburg and Columbia University, and Professor Scott Barrett, Columbia University, explain the paradox of why countries would agree to a collective goal, aimed at reducing the risk of climate catastrophe, but act as if they were blind to this risk.
If the critical threshold for climate catastrophe could be identified with scientific certainty, their research suggests that countries very likely would propose a collective target certain to avoid catastrophe, would pledge to contribute their fair share to the global effort, and would act so as to fulfill their promises. However, if there is scientific uncertainty about the climate threshold, countries are very likely to do less collectively than is needed to avert catastrophe. Dannenberg and Barrett, who provide experimental evidence, grounded in a new analytical framework, show that failure of negotiations is practically certain, because the climate threshold is determined by Nature, and uncertainty about its value is substantially irreducible.
"Climate negotiations are more complex that the game played by the participants in our experiment. The basic incentive problem, however, is the same and our research shows that scientific uncertainty about the dangerous threshold changes behavior dramatically," Dannenberg says.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1208417109
[font size=4]Abstract[/font]
[font size=3]How does uncertainty about dangerous climate change affect the prospects for international cooperation? Climate negotiations usually are depicted as a prisoners dilemma game; collectively, countries are better off reducing their emissions, but self-interest impels them to keep on emitting. We provide experimental evidence, grounded in an analytical framework, showing that the fear of crossing a dangerous threshold can turn climate negotiations into a coordination game, making collective action to avoid a dangerous threshold virtually assured. These results are robust to uncertainty about the impact of crossing a threshold, but uncertainty about the location of the threshold turns the game back into a prisoners dilemma, causing cooperation to collapse. Our research explains the paradox of why countries would agree to a collective goal, aimed at reducing the risk of catastrophe, but act as if they were blind to this risk.
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GliderGuider
(21,088 posts)And it neatly explains why the denialistas are all about scientific uncertainty.
Thanks!
OKIsItJustMe
(19,938 posts)It seems obvious in retrospect.
pscot
(21,024 posts)he'll stop when he hits the ground; interesting but unhelpful.
OKIsItJustMe
(19,938 posts)Understanding the problem is the first task in addressing the problem.
[font size=4]Discussion[/font]
[font size=3]There is universal agreement among countries that global emissions should be limited so as to prevent dangerous interference with the climate system. Our research strongly suggests that if a threshold for catastrophic climate change could be identified with certainty, free-riding behavior would be disciplined; countries very likely would propose a collective target certain to avoid catastrophe, would pledge to contribute their fair share to the global effort, and would act so as to fulfill their promises. Scientists have endeavored to support this negotiation strategy by identifying a red line for collective action, but thresholds for abrupt and catastrophic climate change are inherently uncertain. Our research suggests that, under these circumstances, countries are very likely to propose to do less collectively than is needed to avert catastrophe, pledge to contribute less than their fair share of the amount proposed, and end up contributing even less than their pledge. The climate change game is a prisoners dilemma, but not for the reasons usually given. What makes it a prisoners dilemma is not just the need for collective action but uncertainty about the threshold for dangerous climate change.
Our analysis is consistent with how the climate negotiations have played out so far. Concern about climate thresholds has reinforced the need to limit emissions so as to reduce, if not eliminate, the risk of dangerous interference, without having any noticeable effect on how countries behave. As in our experiment, countries have pledged to do less than is needed to meet their stated collective goals. We will not know until 2020 if the Copenhagen Accord pledges will be met, but if our experimental results are a reliable guide, countries may end up emitting more than they pledgedwith potentially profound and possibly irreversible consequences.
Our research thus underscores the need to pursue alternative negotiation strategies for transforming the prisoners dilemma. Collective action can succeed, we have shown, when the underlying prisoners dilemma game is transformed into a coordination game. Although threshold uncertainty spoils this transformation, previous research shows that strategic treaty design can bring about a similar transformation. One way is by the use of trade restrictions against nonparticipating countries. If the loss from the trade restrictions exceeds the gains from free riding, every country will want to participate in a treaty, so long as each is assured that others will participate; this is how the Montreal Protocol enforced restrictions on the production and consumption of chlorofluorocarbons to protect the ozone layer (3). Another way to make abatement a coordination game is by the use of technology standards when these exhibit network externalitiesthat is, when the returns to each country of adopting a standard increase with the number of other countries that adopt the standard (30); this is how the MARPOL treaty limited releases of oil into the sea by tankers (3). Climate change is a more complex challenge, but our research suggests that strategies like these will be more successful than relying exclusively on the fear of dangerous climate change.
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CRH
(1,553 posts)is to demonstrate beyond a doubt to the competitive economies whether they be nation states or global corporate industrial, that killing the host kills the profit. Without a working environment supporting a working and willing consumer, there is no profit immediate or future, to be realized.
Good luck in providing incentives to cease and desist production of hydrocarbons, without buying out their value or otherwise providing an alternate wealth stream in clean energy.
The human condition seems content to cut off the nose to spite the face.
GliderGuider
(21,088 posts)If we run out of environment we can substitute it with something else, like technology...
We have forgotten that Mother Nature is our one and only host. And it's not in the short-term interests of the 1% to remind us of that inconvenient truth.
Not to mention that the whole human experiment is now so inextricably dependent on cheap fossil fuels that wishes for substitutes amount to pipe dreams.
OKIsItJustMe
(19,938 posts)Forget about trying to scare people, we really didnt scare people out of using CFCs, and dont try to persuade the corporations of anything.
There wasnt a long campaign to establish what a safe level of CFCs was. It all happened pretty quickly, despite opposition from the CFC manufacturers. Essentially, we said, Look, theres a problem. We need to do this, and we need to do it now.
It seemed like overnight, aerosol cans vanished to be replaced by pump bottles.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montreal_Protocol#History
Also in 1985, 20 nations, including most of the major CFC producers, signed the Vienna Convention, which established a framework for negotiating international regulations on ozone-depleting substances. After the discovery of the ozone hole it only took 18 months to reach a binding agreement in Montreal.
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