Welcome to DU!
The truly grassroots left-of-center political community where regular people, not algorithms, drive the discussions and set the standards.
Join the community:
Create a free account
Support DU (and get rid of ads!):
Become a Star Member
Latest Breaking News
General Discussion
The DU Lounge
All Forums
Issue Forums
Culture Forums
Alliance Forums
Region Forums
Support Forums
Help & Search
STOCK MARKET WATCH -- Monday, 2 March 2015
[font size=3]STOCK MARKET WATCH, Monday, 2 March 2015[font color=black][/font]
SMW for 27 February 2015
AT THE CLOSING BELL ON 27 February 2015
[center][font color=red]
Dow Jones 18,132.70
S&P 500 2,104.50
Nasdaq 4,963.53 -24.36 (-0.49%)
[font color=green]10 Year 1.99% -0.02 (-1.00%)
30 Year 2.59% -0.03 (-1.15%) [font color=black]
[center][/font]
[HR width=85%]
[font size=2]Market Conditions During Trading Hours[/font]
[center]
(click on link for latest updates)
Market Updates
[/center]
[font size=2]Euro, Yen, Loonie, Silver and Gold[center]
[/center]
[center]
[/center]
[/center]
[HR width=95%]
[font color=black][font size=2]Handy Links - Market Data and News:[/font][/font]
[center]
Economic Calendar
Marketwatch Data
Bloomberg Economic News
Yahoo Finance
Google Finance
Bank Tracker
Credit Union Tracker
Daily Job Cuts
[/center]
[font color=black][font size=2]Handy Links - Economic Blogs:[/font][/font]
[center]
The Big Picture
Financial Sense
Calculated Risk
Naked Capitalism
Credit Writedowns
Brad DeLong
Bonddad
Atrios
goldmansachs666
The Stand-Up Economist
The Automatic Earth
Wall Street on Parade
[/center]
[font color=black][font size=2]Handy Links - Essential Reading:[/font][/font]
[center]
Matt Taibi: Secret and Lies of the Bailout
[/center]
[font color=black][font size=2]Handy Links - Government Issues:[/font][/font]
[center]
LegitGov
Open Government
Earmark Database
USA spending.gov
[/center][font color=black][font size=2]Handy Links - Videos:[/font][/font]
[center]
Charlie Rose talks with Roubini
Charlie Rose talks with Krugman
William Black: This Economic Disaster
Bill Moyers with Kevin Drum and David Corn
[/center]
[div]
[font color=red]Partial List of Financial Sector Officials Convicted since 1/20/09 [/font][font color=red]
2/2/12 David Higgs and Salmaan Siddiqui, Credit Suisse, plead guilty to conspiracy involving valuation of MBS
3/6/12 Allen Stanford, former Caribbean billionaire and general schmuck, convicted on 13 of 14 counts in $2.2B Ponzi scheme, faces 20+ years in prison
6/4/12 Matthew Kluger, lawyer, sentenced to 12 years in prison, along with co-conspirator stock trader Garrett Bauer (9 years) and co-conspirator Kenneth Robinson (not yet sentenced) for 17 year insider trading scheme.
6/14/12 Allen Stanford sentenced to 110 years without parole.
6/15/12 Rajat Gupta, former Goldman Sachs director, found guilty of insider trading. Could face a decade in prison when sentenced later this year.
6/22/12 Timothy S. Durham, 49, former CEO of Fair Financial Company, convicted of one count conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud, 10 counts of wire fraud, and one count of securities fraud.
6/22/12 James F. Cochran, 56, former chairman of the board of Fair, convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud, one count of securities fraud, and six counts of wire fraud.
6/22/12 Rick D. Snow, 48, former CFO of Fair, convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud, one count of securities fraud, and three counts of wire fraud.
7/13/12 Russell Wassendorf Sr., CEO of collapsed brokerage firm Peregrine Financial Group Inc. arrested and charged with lying to regulators after admitting to authorities he embezzled "millions of dollars" and forged bank statements for "nearly twenty years."
8/22/12 Doug Whitman, Whitman Capital LLC hedge fund founder, convicted of insider trading following a trial in which he spent more than two days on the stand telling jurors he was innocent
10/26/12 UPDATE: Former Goldman Sachs director Rajat Gupta sentenced to two years in federal prison. He will, of course, appeal. . .
11/20/12 Hedge fund manager Matthew Martoma charged with insider trading at SAC Capital Advisors, and prosecutors are looking at Martoma's boss, Steven Cohen, for possible involvement.
02/14/13 Gilbert Lopez, former chief accounting officer of Stanford Financial Group, and former controller Mark Kuhrt sentenced to 20 yrs in prison for their roles in Allen Sanford's $7.2 billion Ponzi scheme.
03/29/13 Michael Sternberg, portfolio mgr at SAC Capital, arrested in NYC, charged with conspiracy and securities fraud. Pled not guilty and freed on $3m bail.
04/04/13 Matthew Marshall Taylor,fmr Goldman Sachs trader arrested, charged by CFTC w/defrauding his employer on $8BN futures bet "by intentionally concealing the true huge size, as well as the risk and potential profits or losses associated."
04/04/13 Matthew Taylor admits guilt, makes plea bargain. Sentencing set for 26 June; faces up to 20 years in prison but will likely only see 3-4 years. Says, "I am truly sorry."
04/11/13 Ex-KPMG LLP partner Scott London charged by federal prosecutors w/passing inside tips to a friend in exchange for cash, jewelry, and concert tickets; expected to plead guilty in May.
08/01/13 Fabrice Tourré convicted on six counts of security fraud, including "aiding and abetting" his former employer, Goldman Sachs
08/14/13 Javier Martin-Artajo and Julien Grout charged with wire fraud, falsifying records, and conspiracy in connection with JP Morgan's "London Whale" trade.
08/19/13 Phillip A. Falcone, manager of hedge fund Harbinger Capital Partners, agrees to admit to "wrongdoing" in market manipulation. Will banned from securities industry for 5 years and pay $18MM in disgorgement and fines.
09/16/13 Javier Martin-Artajo and Julien Grout officially indicted on charges associated with "London Whale" trade.
02/06/14 Matthew Martoma convicted of insider trading while at hedge fund SAC (Stephen A. Cohen) Capital Advisors. Expected sentence 7-10 years.
03/24/14 Annette Bongiorno, Bernard Madoff's secretary; Daniel Bonventre, director of operations for investments; JoAnn Crupi, an account manager; and Jerome O'Hara and George Perez, both computer programmers convicted of conspiracy to defraud clients, securities fraud, and falsifying the books and records.
05/19/14 Credit Suisse, which has an investment bank branch in NYC, agrees to plead guilty and pay appx. $2.6 billion penalties for helping wealthy Americans hide wealth and avoid taxes.
09/08/14 Matthew Martoma, convicted SAC trader, sentenced to 9 years in prison plus forfeiture of $9.3 million, including home and bank accounts
[HR width=95%]
[center]
[font size=3][font color=red]This thread contains opinions and observations. Individuals may post their experiences, inferences and opinions on this thread. However, it should not be construed as advice. It is unethical (and probably illegal) for financial recommendations to be given here.[/font][/font][/font color=red][font color=black]
24 replies
= new reply since forum marked as read
= new reply since forum marked as read
http://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/03/eurozone-fiscal-policy/
The impact of fiscal austerity on the Eurozone as a whole has been immense. In my recent Vox piece, I did a back of the envelope calculation which said that GDP in 2013 might be around 4% lower as a result of cuts in government consumption and investment alone. This seemed to accord with some model based exercises of the impact of austerity as a whole, but others gave larger numbers. We now have another estimate, which can be thought of as a rather more thorough attempt to do what I did in the Vox article. This paper by Sebastian Gechert, Andrew Hughes Hallett and Ansgar Rannenberg uses multipliers and applies them to the fiscal changes that have occurred in the Eurozone from 2011. Apart from the later start date, the first difference compared to my back of the envelope calculation is that they include all fiscal changes, and not just government consumption and investment. As a large part of the fiscal consolidation in the Eurozone has involved reducing fiscal transfers, this is important. The second, and more interesting, difference is that rather than pluck a multiplier out of the air, as I did, they use a meta analysis of empirical studies by Gechert that I have previously linked to. The studies on which this meta analysis is based are not ideal from my personal point of view (more on this later), but what it does show is that fiscal multipliers are larger in depressed economies. Applying these ‘meta multipliers’ to the Eurozone fiscal consolidation implies that GDP was 7.7% lower by 2013 as a result. These numbers are more in the ballpark of the Rannenberg et al paper that I have discussed before.
All these estimates point to huge losses, which monetary policy has neither been willing or able to counteract. Yet the speed at which those in charge of the Eurozone begin to realise the mistake that they have made is painfully slow. Take this recent Vox piece by Marco Buti and Nicolas Carnot. Thankfully they ignore all the Eurozone’s tortuous and sometimes contradictory rules, and just look at two numbers: a measure of ‘economic conditions’ (like the output gap), and a measure of the fiscal gap, which is the difference between the actual primary balance and what it needs to be to get debt falling gradually. They argue that policy needs to balance the need to reduce both gaps. Looking at these two numbers, they conclude that Germany is overachieving on fiscal adjustment and has a need to increase activity, but although France and Spain also need to increase demand they have a long way to go to eliminate the fiscal gap, so this should dominate. The conclusion is that Germany should go for fiscal stimulus, but “moderate consolidation appears warranted in both France and Spain”. Overall “the Eurozone should conduct a close-to-neutral fiscal stance”.
Let’s deal with that last conclusion first. The mistake there is simple. When monetary policy is stuck at the Zero Lower Bound, it is crazy to balance the output gap with what is your main instrument for correcting that gap, which is fiscal policy. Getting the fiscal gap right is important in the longer term, but in the short term it is the means by which you get the output gap to zero. As the studies mentioned at the beginning of this post show, the current recession is the result of trying to correct the fiscal gap at completely the wrong time. The right policy is to get the output gap to zero, so interest rates can rise above the ZLB, and then you deal with the deficit. Readers of this blog and the blogs of others must be sick and tired of seeing us make this same point over and over again, but the logic has yet to get through to where it matters. The same principles apply to countries within the Eurozone, except with an additional complication of within Eurozone competitiveness. If a country is too competitive relative to the rest of the Eurozone, it needs to run a positive output gap for a time to generate the inflation that will correct that position, and vice versa. For that reason Germany needs a large positive output gap at the moment (compared to an estimated actual negative gap), and therefore a much more expansionary fiscal policy – not because it is overachieving on debt adjustment. France and Spain now look roughly OK in terms of competitiveness relative to the average (see chart below, and assuming that entry rates in 2000 were appropriate), so there we need fiscal expansion to close the output gap.
So at both the aggregate and individual country level, the inappropriate bias towards fiscal contraction that caused huge losses in the Eurozone in the past continues to operate. Which means, unfortunately, that the needless waste of resources caused by austerity continues to get larger by the day.
The impact of fiscal austerity on the Eurozone as a whole has been immense. In my recent Vox piece, I did a back of the envelope calculation which said that GDP in 2013 might be around 4% lower as a result of cuts in government consumption and investment alone. This seemed to accord with some model based exercises of the impact of austerity as a whole, but others gave larger numbers. We now have another estimate, which can be thought of as a rather more thorough attempt to do what I did in the Vox article. This paper by Sebastian Gechert, Andrew Hughes Hallett and Ansgar Rannenberg uses multipliers and applies them to the fiscal changes that have occurred in the Eurozone from 2011. Apart from the later start date, the first difference compared to my back of the envelope calculation is that they include all fiscal changes, and not just government consumption and investment. As a large part of the fiscal consolidation in the Eurozone has involved reducing fiscal transfers, this is important. The second, and more interesting, difference is that rather than pluck a multiplier out of the air, as I did, they use a meta analysis of empirical studies by Gechert that I have previously linked to. The studies on which this meta analysis is based are not ideal from my personal point of view (more on this later), but what it does show is that fiscal multipliers are larger in depressed economies. Applying these ‘meta multipliers’ to the Eurozone fiscal consolidation implies that GDP was 7.7% lower by 2013 as a result. These numbers are more in the ballpark of the Rannenberg et al paper that I have discussed before.
All these estimates point to huge losses, which monetary policy has neither been willing or able to counteract. Yet the speed at which those in charge of the Eurozone begin to realise the mistake that they have made is painfully slow. Take this recent Vox piece by Marco Buti and Nicolas Carnot. Thankfully they ignore all the Eurozone’s tortuous and sometimes contradictory rules, and just look at two numbers: a measure of ‘economic conditions’ (like the output gap), and a measure of the fiscal gap, which is the difference between the actual primary balance and what it needs to be to get debt falling gradually. They argue that policy needs to balance the need to reduce both gaps. Looking at these two numbers, they conclude that Germany is overachieving on fiscal adjustment and has a need to increase activity, but although France and Spain also need to increase demand they have a long way to go to eliminate the fiscal gap, so this should dominate. The conclusion is that Germany should go for fiscal stimulus, but “moderate consolidation appears warranted in both France and Spain”. Overall “the Eurozone should conduct a close-to-neutral fiscal stance”.
Let’s deal with that last conclusion first. The mistake there is simple. When monetary policy is stuck at the Zero Lower Bound, it is crazy to balance the output gap with what is your main instrument for correcting that gap, which is fiscal policy. Getting the fiscal gap right is important in the longer term, but in the short term it is the means by which you get the output gap to zero. As the studies mentioned at the beginning of this post show, the current recession is the result of trying to correct the fiscal gap at completely the wrong time. The right policy is to get the output gap to zero, so interest rates can rise above the ZLB, and then you deal with the deficit. Readers of this blog and the blogs of others must be sick and tired of seeing us make this same point over and over again, but the logic has yet to get through to where it matters. The same principles apply to countries within the Eurozone, except with an additional complication of within Eurozone competitiveness. If a country is too competitive relative to the rest of the Eurozone, it needs to run a positive output gap for a time to generate the inflation that will correct that position, and vice versa. For that reason Germany needs a large positive output gap at the moment (compared to an estimated actual negative gap), and therefore a much more expansionary fiscal policy – not because it is overachieving on debt adjustment. France and Spain now look roughly OK in terms of competitiveness relative to the average (see chart below, and assuming that entry rates in 2000 were appropriate), so there we need fiscal expansion to close the output gap.
So at both the aggregate and individual country level, the inappropriate bias towards fiscal contraction that caused huge losses in the Eurozone in the past continues to operate. Which means, unfortunately, that the needless waste of resources caused by austerity continues to get larger by the day.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/03/01/ukraine-unofficially-has-272-percent-inflation/
Ukraine's currency has fallen 70 percent since the start of 2014, and that's pushed it into hyperinflation...
Hyperinflation is always and everywhere a political phenomenon.
It happens after wars or revolutions, when governments have to print the money they need because there's not much of an economy left to tax—which brings us to Ukraine. It had a revolution, it has a war now, and it's all but broke. Inflation is officially 28.5 percent, but, according to Johns Hopkins professor Steve Hanke, it's really more like 272 percent. And that's only going to get worse as long as Ukraine's currency does.
It's hard to overstate how challenged Ukraine is. Its economy has actually shrunk since communism ended in 1991. Or since 1992. Or even 1993. That's because communism never really did end. Ukraine just traded party bosses for oligarchs. Sure, it privatized companies and introduced markets, but Ukraine didn't shed its Soviet-era corruption or inefficiency. There was barely any rule of law, tax rates had to be jacked up to make up for all the wink-wink, nod-nod tax evasion, and, as a result, even more of the economy entered the shadows. The IMF estimates that Ukraine's underground—and non-tax-paying—economy is as much as 50 percent of GDP.
Now Ukraine's not-so-cold war with Russia is destroying the little that's left. It's not just that Ukraine has lost the factories in the rebel-held east that make up a quarter of its industrial capacity. It's that it can't afford to fight a war against what is still its biggest trading partner—Russia. The only way for Ukraine to pay its bills is to dip into its reserves. But those have dwindled down to $6.42 billion, only enough for a little more than a month of imports. (Three months worth is considered the absolute least you can get by with). So Ukraine has done what all countries do when they've run out of money: go to the IMF. It's announced a $17.5 billion bailout in return for tough reforms, including cutting energy subsidies for households. But even that won't be enough to stop Ukraine from defaulting on its debt—or, if you're feeling more polite, restructuring its bonds. Those have already fallen to less than 50 cents on the dollar in anticipation of the nonpayment to come.
In short, Ukraine doesn't have any foreign currency and doesn't have the ability to earn any more. And that means there's nothing left to support the value of its currency, the hryvnia—so it doesn't have much anymore. Ukraine had been pegging it at 8 per dollar before the war began, but was then forced to let it slide down to 16 per dollar, where it tried to re-peg the hryvnia. This failed. Ukraine didn't have the dollars to prop up its currency for very long, and when it belatedly admitted this, the hryvnia collapsed. Then it collapsed some more after the latest peace deal fell apart. So Ukraine's central bank has done the only thing it could do: everything. It made its capital controls even stricter, banned currency trading, then reversed the ban on currency trading but begun intervening directly. It's worked a little. Well, at least the hryvnia has rebounded from a low of 33.5 to now 27.2 per dollar. But that, as you can see above, is still a 70 percent fall from the start of 2014.
When a currency is dying like this, it's hard for the inflation statistics to keep up. But, as Hanke explains, we can use the exchange rate to figure out how much prices are really going up. There are a few ways to think about why this is, but the most intuitive is that a cheaper currency means higher import prices, which spills over to the rest. In any case, this tells us that Ukraine's annual inflation is already 272 percent, and, even worse, is picking up speed. Indeed, its monthly inflation rate is 64.5 percent—which translates to 39,000 percent inflation over a year—more than enough to qualify it for "hyperinflation" status.
The good news, if there is any, is that the IMF money should stabilize Ukraine's currency, and with it their inflation. The not-so-good news, though, is that even with this money Ukraine will still have to do a lot of austerity. And the bad news is that it will have to really raise rates, knee-capping growth even more, to rein in the inflation it already has. (Higher rates should also mean a higher hryvnia, but that may not be the case, as Paul Krugman explains, if they hurt the economy so much that foreign currency debts are harder to pay back). Everything that would save Ukraine's currency, in other words, would make its economy worse in the short-term. But it can't have a decent economy in any term if it doesn't stop its currency's free fall. So even if everything goes right, Ukraine's in for a lot of pain.
There are no good choices when you're bankrupt.
Ukraine's currency has fallen 70 percent since the start of 2014, and that's pushed it into hyperinflation...
Hyperinflation is always and everywhere a political phenomenon.
It happens after wars or revolutions, when governments have to print the money they need because there's not much of an economy left to tax—which brings us to Ukraine. It had a revolution, it has a war now, and it's all but broke. Inflation is officially 28.5 percent, but, according to Johns Hopkins professor Steve Hanke, it's really more like 272 percent. And that's only going to get worse as long as Ukraine's currency does.
It's hard to overstate how challenged Ukraine is. Its economy has actually shrunk since communism ended in 1991. Or since 1992. Or even 1993. That's because communism never really did end. Ukraine just traded party bosses for oligarchs. Sure, it privatized companies and introduced markets, but Ukraine didn't shed its Soviet-era corruption or inefficiency. There was barely any rule of law, tax rates had to be jacked up to make up for all the wink-wink, nod-nod tax evasion, and, as a result, even more of the economy entered the shadows. The IMF estimates that Ukraine's underground—and non-tax-paying—economy is as much as 50 percent of GDP.
Now Ukraine's not-so-cold war with Russia is destroying the little that's left. It's not just that Ukraine has lost the factories in the rebel-held east that make up a quarter of its industrial capacity. It's that it can't afford to fight a war against what is still its biggest trading partner—Russia. The only way for Ukraine to pay its bills is to dip into its reserves. But those have dwindled down to $6.42 billion, only enough for a little more than a month of imports. (Three months worth is considered the absolute least you can get by with). So Ukraine has done what all countries do when they've run out of money: go to the IMF. It's announced a $17.5 billion bailout in return for tough reforms, including cutting energy subsidies for households. But even that won't be enough to stop Ukraine from defaulting on its debt—or, if you're feeling more polite, restructuring its bonds. Those have already fallen to less than 50 cents on the dollar in anticipation of the nonpayment to come.
In short, Ukraine doesn't have any foreign currency and doesn't have the ability to earn any more. And that means there's nothing left to support the value of its currency, the hryvnia—so it doesn't have much anymore. Ukraine had been pegging it at 8 per dollar before the war began, but was then forced to let it slide down to 16 per dollar, where it tried to re-peg the hryvnia. This failed. Ukraine didn't have the dollars to prop up its currency for very long, and when it belatedly admitted this, the hryvnia collapsed. Then it collapsed some more after the latest peace deal fell apart. So Ukraine's central bank has done the only thing it could do: everything. It made its capital controls even stricter, banned currency trading, then reversed the ban on currency trading but begun intervening directly. It's worked a little. Well, at least the hryvnia has rebounded from a low of 33.5 to now 27.2 per dollar. But that, as you can see above, is still a 70 percent fall from the start of 2014.
When a currency is dying like this, it's hard for the inflation statistics to keep up. But, as Hanke explains, we can use the exchange rate to figure out how much prices are really going up. There are a few ways to think about why this is, but the most intuitive is that a cheaper currency means higher import prices, which spills over to the rest. In any case, this tells us that Ukraine's annual inflation is already 272 percent, and, even worse, is picking up speed. Indeed, its monthly inflation rate is 64.5 percent—which translates to 39,000 percent inflation over a year—more than enough to qualify it for "hyperinflation" status.
The good news, if there is any, is that the IMF money should stabilize Ukraine's currency, and with it their inflation. The not-so-good news, though, is that even with this money Ukraine will still have to do a lot of austerity. And the bad news is that it will have to really raise rates, knee-capping growth even more, to rein in the inflation it already has. (Higher rates should also mean a higher hryvnia, but that may not be the case, as Paul Krugman explains, if they hurt the economy so much that foreign currency debts are harder to pay back). Everything that would save Ukraine's currency, in other words, would make its economy worse in the short-term. But it can't have a decent economy in any term if it doesn't stop its currency's free fall. So even if everything goes right, Ukraine's in for a lot of pain.
There are no good choices when you're bankrupt.
