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interesting article on separatist-thugs in eastern Ukraine
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/18/broken-ukraine/Continued violence between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine is dashing hopes about last month’s Minsk II cease-fire agreement. February’s terrorist attacks in Kharkiv, Ukraine, and the continued threat of a separatist assault on the strategic port city of Mariupol suggest no real pause in violence anytime soon. But that might not be eastern Ukraine’s biggest problem: the region is now broken. The rise of an ungoverned, violent Donbass—which had a prewar population of six million—is likely to be one of the war’s most important lasting legacies. This grim reality is a problem that few in the West are ready to acknowledge, let alone confront.
The human costs of fighting are obvious: at least 1.5 million people—one out of four residents—have fled the region. Over 6,000 people have been killed according to official numbers, but actual numbers are likely higher. Local infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools, power stations, sewers, water pipes, and apartment buildings are damaged or have been turned into rubble. Legitimate economic activity in Donbass, once an industrial powerhouse, slowed to a halt as workers fled, electricity supplies became sporadic, and violence made the shipment of goods to Russian and Ukrainian markets impossible. Instability and the rise of criminal groups in the region scared off investors, who are not likely to return. A vast humanitarian crisis is growing, and painfully few resources are being directed toward fixing it.
. . .
As the International Crisis Group noted late last year, separatist groups demonstrated serious divisions during the signing of the Minsk I agreement—some recognizing the need for peace as a precondition for building a functioning state on the territory they hold, others pushing to escalate the crisis in order to expand their territory and continue to work toward building Novorossiya. For their part, criminal and militant groups, although united formally against the Ukrainian state, truly desire to reap the spoils of war. The commanders of these groups are not unlike warlords seen in the Balkans, Georgia, and Tajikistan; they have little incentive to build a peace that weakens their power over the small dominions of land they now control through brute force, corrupt patronage systems, and threats against local populations. Militia commanders have been accused of a wide variety of criminal behavior, including kidnapping, theft, drug trafficking, smuggling rackets, and summary executions. Akhmetov’s business empire in eastern Ukraine has taken a hit from these groups, and some of his assets being threatened with expropriation by separatists. In response, Akhmetov established a private militia of his own, consisting of steelworkers and coal miners who patrol Mariupol, a city frequently under separatist attack that is home to a significant number of the oligarch’s business interests.
Since then, many separatist leaders have actively sought to undermine the September and February Minsk agreements because of the negative impact that peace could have on their war profiteering and dreams of expansion. Some separatists involved in taking Debaltseve publicly rejected Minsk II and have made repeated claims that a larger buffer zone between the city and Ukrainian government–controlled areas is needed. Others have called to push farther westward, a worrying sign that they plan to advance deeper into Ukrainian government–held territory regardless of what Moscow tells them to do. Although Putin himself has not been negotiating in good faith, the actions of his proxies make it unclear if his doing so would swiftly end this conflict.
The human costs of fighting are obvious: at least 1.5 million people—one out of four residents—have fled the region. Over 6,000 people have been killed according to official numbers, but actual numbers are likely higher. Local infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools, power stations, sewers, water pipes, and apartment buildings are damaged or have been turned into rubble. Legitimate economic activity in Donbass, once an industrial powerhouse, slowed to a halt as workers fled, electricity supplies became sporadic, and violence made the shipment of goods to Russian and Ukrainian markets impossible. Instability and the rise of criminal groups in the region scared off investors, who are not likely to return. A vast humanitarian crisis is growing, and painfully few resources are being directed toward fixing it.
. . .
As the International Crisis Group noted late last year, separatist groups demonstrated serious divisions during the signing of the Minsk I agreement—some recognizing the need for peace as a precondition for building a functioning state on the territory they hold, others pushing to escalate the crisis in order to expand their territory and continue to work toward building Novorossiya. For their part, criminal and militant groups, although united formally against the Ukrainian state, truly desire to reap the spoils of war. The commanders of these groups are not unlike warlords seen in the Balkans, Georgia, and Tajikistan; they have little incentive to build a peace that weakens their power over the small dominions of land they now control through brute force, corrupt patronage systems, and threats against local populations. Militia commanders have been accused of a wide variety of criminal behavior, including kidnapping, theft, drug trafficking, smuggling rackets, and summary executions. Akhmetov’s business empire in eastern Ukraine has taken a hit from these groups, and some of his assets being threatened with expropriation by separatists. In response, Akhmetov established a private militia of his own, consisting of steelworkers and coal miners who patrol Mariupol, a city frequently under separatist attack that is home to a significant number of the oligarch’s business interests.
Since then, many separatist leaders have actively sought to undermine the September and February Minsk agreements because of the negative impact that peace could have on their war profiteering and dreams of expansion. Some separatists involved in taking Debaltseve publicly rejected Minsk II and have made repeated claims that a larger buffer zone between the city and Ukrainian government–controlled areas is needed. Others have called to push farther westward, a worrying sign that they plan to advance deeper into Ukrainian government–held territory regardless of what Moscow tells them to do. Although Putin himself has not been negotiating in good faith, the actions of his proxies make it unclear if his doing so would swiftly end this conflict.
About the author:
SENIOR ASSOCIATE, RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, Carnegie Endowment for Peace
Paul Stronski is a senior associate in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, where his research focuses on the relationship between Russia and neighboring countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
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