Last edited Tue Nov 17, 2015, 02:10 PM - Edit history (2)
Ironically, ISIS initially got its main infusion of training, arms, and funding in the period 2005-2010 from the U.S. who armed the Sunni tribes in Anbar province, the "Awakening," or "Sons of Iraq" against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and as a Sunni militia to counter the Shi'ia-dominated Baghdad government and Army. These Awakening groups, led by remnants of Saddam's Officer Corps who had been released from US imprisonment, along with their old AQI adversaries, allied with an infusion of Libyan militants after the overthrown of Gadaffi, would go on to provide the bulk of ISIS military leadership and manpower in Syria.
After the Coalition withdrawal in 2011, Iraqi Sunni groups came under the sponsorship of the Gulf States which aided al-Nusra, an explicitly Jihadist militia allied with al-Qaeda, that operated across the MENA area under the sponsorship of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. In April 2013, the head of AQI announced that Al Qaeda was operating in Syria and changed the group’s name to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Thus, Sunni militias the US created in Iraq were submerged into the main Jihadist militias in Syria who were joined by Libyan fighters who had overthrown Gadaffi bringing with them much of the heavy weaponry of the former Libyan Army. The US and France, along with Turkey, were involved in coordinating the Syrian opposition militias that by 2012 were increasing dominated by foreign groups and money, most of them armed, financed and instructed by Qatar. A resurrected al-Qaeda operated within al-Nusra, fighting the Assad regime and the Shi'te population in Syria, carrying out a number of major bombings in Damascus and other Shi'ite and Christian areas across Syria. By 2013, Al-Nusra utterly dominated the Syrian opposition.
These efforts to overthrow the Syrian regime by Qatar and the Gulf States were aided by several western countries, including the US and France. By 2013, this unlikely coalition of US/NATO/GCC sponsored militias were dominated by al-Nusra, which in 2014 openly merged with ISIS and declared a "Caliphate" in eastern Syria and Anbar Province.
Below is an extract of an article from Stanford University, and probably the best short history of the modern origins of ISIS: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1
The local resistance to AQI contributed to the Anbar Awakening, a movement of Sunnis in the Anbar Province to cooperate with U.S. forces in the region against the insurgency. [50][51] The Awakening paved the way for U.S. and Iraqi security operations that made it difficult for AQI to maintain its level of attacks, ultimately diminishing its capacity by the end of 2007. As a result, AQI was unable to continue providing security or enforcing its extreme interpretations of Islamic law in the areas where it operated, and struggled to maintain territory. [52]
By early 2008, coalition and local security forces had killed 2,400 AQI members and taken 8,800 prisoner. [53] By spring 2009, the U.S. was funding around 100,000 local Sunnis to fight AQI. [54] The local fighters carried out a campaign against the group, assassinating members and warning others not to work with the group. [55] By June, 2010, AQI had lost stable communication with AQ leadership, and 36 of AQI’s 42 leaders had been killed or captured. [56] [57] Through 2011, Coalition forces continued to coordinate efforts with tribal security forces, killing the majority of AQI’s leadership and leaving it in general disarray. [58]
Both Masri and Baghdadi were killed in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid on April 18, 2010. After the April raid, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (not to be confused with the deceased, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi) assumed control of an AQI severely weakened by local backlash and coalition and local security forces. [59] AQI continued to struggle to maintain relevance through 2011, when Coalition forces withdrew.
Expansion under Baghdadi: January 2012-Present
The December 2011 Coalition withdrawal signaled the end of AQI’s decline. Throughout 2012, with the group facing less pressure and security, the number of AQI attacks increased significantly. [60] [61] In 2012 and 2013, Baghdadi led two separate terror campaigns in Iraq: in 2012, the “Breaking Walls” campaign targeted the Maliki government and prioritized freeing members from prison; one year later, the “Soldier’s Harvest” campaign shifted the target to Iraqi security forces. [62] [63]
The absence of foreign security wasn’t the only force that expedited AQI’s return to prominence; local political tensions also played an important role. In December 2012, Sunnis in Iraq began protesting the policies of the Shiite Maliki government in Anbar province. When Iraqi security forces invaded protest camps, Sunni attacks against Shiite targets increased; the civilian death toll in 2013 was double that of 2012. When Iraqi security forces proceeded to attempt to clear a protest camp in Ramadi at the end of 2013, a local uprising drove the security forces out of much of Anbar Province, paving the way for later AQI expansion. [64]
Meanwhile, AQI used the ongoing Syrian Civil War as a training ground and tool for expansion. In April 2013, Baghdadi announced AQI operations in Syria and changed the group’s name to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He also claimed that AQI had created al-Nusra in Syria, and that that the two groups were now merged into one. Both al-Nusra leadership and Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri disputed the merger. [65] [66] Zawahiri dictated that ISIS should limit its operations to Iraq. [67] On June 14, Baghdadi publicly rejected Zawahiri’s statement. [68] [69] ISIS continued to operate in Syria, often clashing with other Islamist groups and ignoring calls for mediation. Attempts at reconciliation with Al Qaeda leadership failed, and AQ officially renounced any connection with ISIS in February 2014. [70]
Despite ISIS’s split from AQ, it grew in size and power as it carried out military offensives in Syria and Iraq. It fought against the governments of Iraq and Syria, tribal groups and militias in Iraq, the Kurdish pesh merga, and various rebel groups in Syria. ISIS made large territorial gains beginning in January 2014, when it first defeated Iraqi forces and took control of Fallujah. The following March, it seized Mosul. [71] The funds seized through these invasions, combined with income from foreign donors and from criminal activities such as smuggling and extortion of local businesses, gave ISIS an estimated $2 billion in assets. [72] As of September 2014, experts estimated that ISIS’s oil revenues alone brought in between $1 million and $2 million per day. [73]
On June 29, 2014, after significant territorial gains in Iraq and Syria, the group again changed its name, this time to the “Islamic State” (IS), declaring a Caliphate and naming its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the Caliph. It called upon all Muslims to declare allegiance to the new Caliphate. [74] In addition to IS, it continues to be known as ISIS/ISIL globally.
) came along. Did they just change their name like PNAC did to the Foreign Policy Initiative? Or did some al-Qaeda people jump ship? 
= new reply since forum marked as read
