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Related: Editorials & Other Articles, Issue Forums, Alliance Forums, Region ForumsThe Tales We Tell to Cope With Unwinnable Wars
http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/30370-the-tales-we-tell-to-cope-with-unwinnable-warsHaunting the pretense for Vietnam was a conflation of American ideals and American security interests. The two are not the same. For some, that was one of the lessons of the war in Vietnam without popular support and strategic clarity, foreign adventurism is doomed to failure. And if that was the lesson, then Vietnam was unwinnable. Imposing our own desired political structure on a sovereign nation of people whose culture was completely alien to policy makers didnt offer the chance of victory.
But not everyone learned the same lesson. As David Corbett writes, But for the Reagan administration, Vietnam had a different resonance. They saw that war as a critical failure of American will, and believed that victory had been prevented because troops had not been given permission to win. They also believed that this circumspection about the use of military force was undermining American power, and was inviting Soviet aggression around the globe The frustrating thing about counterfactuals is that they cant be disproven. Would the Vietnamese, North and South, have joined hands and decided to take up a parliamentary-style government and capitalist economy if we had killed 100,000 more civilians? I dont think so. But I cant prove it.
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When the guys I served with in Iraq wanted to go Nam, they were asking for permission to do whatever it took to win the war and help their buddies make it home. Any understanding of the real history of Vietnam had been obscured under the fog of political posturing and pop culture bombast. Its more reassuring to believe that you can win, and arent being allowed to than to confront the fact that elected officials have trapped you in an unwinnable war.
Whats troubling is that we are now seeing the pattern repeat itself in the way we remember the war in Iraq. It makes little difference if you blame failure on Bushs tactical choices or Obamas withdrawal. Both positions imply that the war could have been won. Theres no critique of the efficacy of nation building, of sending massive armies to foreign countries and restructuring them by force. Another irrefutable counterfactual: It might have worked, if only
You have to wonder if decades from now, young Americans hunkered down in some far-flung corner of the world will find themselves wishing they could go Iraq on the enemy.
Tierra_y_Libertad
(50,414 posts)occasionally.
We've had war for millenniums. All of them fought for "just cause" on both sides. You'd think justice would reign by now.
False advertising about their efficacy?
eridani
(51,907 posts)If we redefine "winning" as converting all battlefields to radioactive parking lots, then of course we can win. Establishing military control of a functioning society is quite another matter.
Tierra_y_Libertad
(50,414 posts)Romulox
(25,960 posts)reddread
(6,896 posts)IV drip of Grenada started the reversal, with some Panamanian overthrow and a few nudges to that old press freedom bugaboo
good as new
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_Syndrome
HereSince1628
(36,063 posts)Demi-logic and emotion both seem to be capable of leading to the same place.
Because of probability, in a fair gambling game, if you play enough rounds you'll probably get a winner -IF- you keep gambling long enough. This leads to the demi-logic (as in half-logic) that if each bet is bigger you can recoup all that's been lost along the way in that final jackpot. The gambler goes from betting the grocery money to betting the farm, in an attempt to be struck by winning probability. Of course, that process is constrained by an ultimately finite capacity to ante-up for the next round with its independent likelihood of success just as bad as every previous spin of the wheel or deal of the cards.
Escalation in war works more of less the same way, each day of stalemate, each setback, each major defeat are met with another bigger gambit. Victory demands escalation. And, honestly war isn't a simple form of gambling, superior logistics and greater/more effective 'kinetics' can change the odds. There is a real belief that each escalation improves the chances, if only the fetters can be broken that hold us back...which leads to the notion that we never actually lose at the hands of the enemy, we lose because we haven't got the will to make the next escalation.
Additionally, there is more than demi-logic involved. There is also honor and shame. Gamblers can't face their spouses and families. Nations cannot, either. The investment of precious lives and treasures cannot be allowed to go for naught. No one wants to devalue the loss of life of their 'brave heroes'. To make those lost lives have value, the earlier bad bets must be redeemed. This is the sunk-cost fallacy ... we're in too deep to quit, in for a dime in for a dollar, with nothing to end the escalation other than bankruptcy if probability doesn't strike like lightening.
The shame of wasting a hundred casualties is hoped to be countered by risking a thousand more, and the next thousand casualties appeals for more thousands at risk.
Being trapped in the cycle of defending the investment, the sunk-costs, continues until a clever person can figure out a way to make all the bleeding and dying look as though it's been offset by a jackpot. Peace with honor. Vietnamization, Iraqifying, Handing over the reins of freedom.
It goes on and on. And I have no doubt that decades from now young Americans hunkered down in some distant place will be watching American politicians being convinced by military leaders commit to greater escalation, not to defend Freedom, or The AMERICAN WAY, but to defend against the shame and humiliation of being left responsible for losing those sunk-costs.