Reagan and Gorbachev Didn’t Tear Down the Berlin Wall

[UglyGreed]

Don’t be fooled by the mainstream narrative: The 1989 revolutions weren’t just byproducts of extraordinary historical circumstances. Change happens when activists seize a moment and escalate.

On November 9, 1989—25 years ago—huge crowds of East Germans descended on the Berlin Wall. The restless citizens were responding to an announcement by authorities suggesting that the government would loosen travel restrictions. In truth, those in charge intended to make only limited alterations in visa requirements. But these intentions quickly became irrelevant. Mass numbers of people flocked to the wall, overwhelming the border guards. Soon, along with allies from the West, the crowds began dismantling the hated barrier for good.

Remarkably, although the fall of the Berlin Wall was an iconic moment, it was just one of the highlights in a flurry of activity that was sweeping through the Soviet Bloc—a series of uprisings that would become known as the revolutions of 1989.

Every so often, we witness a period of mass insurgency that seems to defy the accepted rules of politics: Protests seem to begin popping up everywhere. Organizers see their rallies packed with newcomers who come from far outside their regular network of supporters. Mainstream analysts, taken by surprise, struggle for words. And those in power scramble as the political landscape around them dramatically shifts—sometimes leaving once-entrenched leaders in perilous positions.

If ever there was a time in modern history that exemplified such a moment of peak public activity, it was the second half of 1989.

Although the crowds at the Berlin Wall on November 9 assembled in impromptu fashion, their gathering was not altogether spontaneous. It came after months of growing demonstrations and escalating pressure on the country's Communist Party. Throughout the fall, weekly rallies in Leipzig called for freedom of travel and democratic elections. Demonstrations in that city began with just a few hundred protesters, but they grew exponentially until, by early November, they were attracting as many as a half million people. The contagion reached other cities as well: Mass protests started erupting in Dresden, East Berlin and beyond.

http://inthesetimes.com/article/17332/reagan_and_gorbachev_didnt_tear_down_the_berlin_wall._a_peoples_movement_di

[pampango]

1. Great article, UglyGreed. Although I think Gorbachev's earlier actions had a big impact.

On November 9, 1989—25 years ago—huge crowds of East Germans descended on the Berlin Wall. The restless citizens were responding to an announcement by authorities suggesting that the government would loosen travel restrictions. In truth, those in charge intended to make only limited alterations in visa requirements.

True, but before Gorbachev there were not even "limited alterations in visa requirements" so there would have been no alterations to misunderstand.

That summer, in Poland, the union-based opposition party Solidarity—having led a series of crippling strikes the year before—won a stunning and decisive victory in the country's newly liberalized elections. By autumn, rebellion was in full bloom.

Before Gorbachev the USSR's leadership had focused on repressing Solidarity. His big contribution was allowing "newly liberalized elections" in Poland.

Certainly, the revolutions of 1989 were exceptional in their breadth and impact. Yet, viewed in another way, mass uprisings are a more regular part of our political lives than we often acknowledge. ... The Arab Spring of 2011 is an obvious example, one which evoked memories of Eastern Europe.

True. Mass uprisings are not as rare as we sometimes think.

Looking at the revolutions of 1989, some political scientists hardly discuss popular movements at all. Instead, they focus on economic and geopolitical developments. They stress how the long-term strain caused by competition with the West and the perpetual economic crises in the Eastern Bloc fomented unrest. They highlight Mikhail Gorbachev's signals that the Soviet Union would tolerate reform rather than replicating the Chinese crackdown at Tiananmen. These stances are part of a wider trend: political analysts commonly describe the timing and fortunes of mass uprisings as the product of historic conditions rather then the decisions of citizens themselves.

Analysts in the field of civil resistance do not deny the importance of economic and political context. But they emphasize the interplay of such conditions with the skills of social movement participants—the agency of activists, as reflected in their strategic choices and on-the-ground execution.

Agree. I think Gorbachev helped set the "economic and political context" (his 'signals that the Soviet Union would tolerate reform rather than replicating the Chinese crackdown at Tiananmen') and popular movements took it from there.

I would give Gorbachev 1% of the credit for the 1989 revolutions and the people in the mass uprisings 99% of the credit. Reagan deserves 0%.

[UglyGreed]

2. Your post

only adds to the article, thank you for taking the time to do so. In 1991 My mother was finally able to return to the country she was born in after 50 years or so. It made her very happy to do so. Then after that, my father's sister came to visit us here. It was the only relative we have met on my father's side. Very important time for our family.

[KinMd]

4. What if Putin had been in power then?

[DetlefK]

3. Gorbachev accidentally and unknowingly helped:

1. Glasnost and Perestroika meant that the new soviet regime was out of touch with the hardline Eastern German regime.

2. He was paying a state-visit to Eastern Germany during the initial protests. As it would have looked bad to all those reporters, a violent crackdown was out of question as long as the situation had international attention. And once Gorbachev had left, the protests had become so established that it became difficult to shut them down.




The DDR also had economic problems: They had been cooking the books for at least a decade at this point, covering up irregularities with propaganda.
For example:
I don't remember the details but I read of an anecdote where some high-ranking bureaucrat was tasked to give the Politburo a short rundown of the finances. He compiled it all into a single page, added up the numbers and the result was a negative number. When politician-whose-name-I-forgot saw this, he crossed out the result and wrote a positive number next to it. Problem solved.
For example:
The centrally planned economy produced not enough eggs? "Don't you know that eating eggs is unhealthy?"
They produced too much eggs? Then they pitched them in cooking-shows. "Have an egg more."

And the leadership of DDR had no idea what was going on in their country. I saw a documentary about Erich Honecker, the last head-of-state of the DDR. He and his wife both held powerful positions, but they didn't know what was going on.
They lived in a gated community. They had their own drivers and bodyguards and were totally isolated. They got up early in the morning, were driven to their bureau, worked till late in the evening and then were driven back home.


EDIT: It was similar in Romania: When the protests erupted, Ceausescu thought that he could bribe his way out by raising the state-support paid out to students and such. Look at the footage of his final speech. He is absolutely confused and has no idea what's going on.