War and the Afghan Shepherd
Posted: 07/24/2013 11:29 am
Ward Carroll.
Editor, Military.com
I saw the war in Afghanistan from myriad points of view while embedded with the U.S. military in the spring of 2010. Inside the walls and barbed wire that surrounds the major bases at places like Kabul and Bagram and Kandahar I talked to generals seated in front of banks of screens in command centers as big as NASA's mission control. I listened to two- and three-stars (and even a four-star in the form of the soon-to-be-fired Gen. Stanley McChrystal) speak in jargon strings about "intel fusion" and "sig acts" (short for "significant activities," a way the military measures progress in a war without battle lines).
And at forward operating bases ("FOBs"
closer to the fighting -- places like FOB Salerno and FOB Sharana -- I was briefed by colonels in front of smaller banks of screens who used the same jargon as their bosses in their attempts to convince me that there was a sound plan in progress.
The technology at the disposal of the International Security and Assistance Force -- the official name for the coalition side in Afghanistan -- was impressive, but it struck me at the same time as disproportionate in its scale. An American Army squad would radio about hearing a rifle shot of unknown origin, and the ISAF machine would spring into action, sending attack helicopters, drones, and jet fighters to the scene in short order. A single act of Afghan teen angst yielded several million dollars of American military response.
The results of these kinds of efforts took the form of after-action reports, data points added to the profusion of information that told -- depending on one's interpretation -- of imminent victory or an un-ending stalemate. The senior military officers seemed to see both at the same time, allowing that they had frustrations while remaining bullish on the notion of a favorable outcome.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ward-carroll/war-and-the-afghan-shephe_b_3640643.html
