ATTENTION......Next UP On MSNBC.... REV AL to Talk About TAGG ROMNEYS VOTING MACHINES...

[rsmith6621]

[Kelvin Mace]

1. Well, they aren't Tagg Romney's machines

that is a stretch:

http://www.snopes.com/politics/romney/votingmachines.asp

The problem is that the majority of the board of H-I are major Romney donors.

As I have posted on a few occasions, the threat is not in diddling the software, it is in vote suppression.

[avaistheone1]

2. There is both a history of software diddling and voter suppression in this country.

I take both threats seriously. Both can and have fraudulently tilted elections.

[Kelvin Mace]

3. Screwing with the software is harder than

most people think. Voter suppression is easier and less likely to land you in jail if you are caught.

[Wilms]

4. Screwing with the ballot definition files is easy.

There's no need to attack the machine on a deeper level.

This is old news.

[Kelvin Mace]

7. Again, that involves TS systems

H-I uses OpScan in Ohio.

[Wilms]

9. NOT just touchscreens!

Come on, Kelvin. I thought you knew this.

The Ballot Definition File that election officials "program" can be set up, intenionally or even accidently to credit votes to the wrong candidate. It's not just a touchscreen thing. I believe there even are some Diebold touchscreens and scanners that use the same BDF.


BDFs are unique for each election and define all the races and candidates for each precinct. BDFs tell the voting machine software how to interpret a voter's touches on a screen or marks on an optical scan ballot (including absentee ballots)(and Mail-In ballots--Wilms), how to record those selections as votes, and how to combine them into the final tally.

http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1573&Itemid=26

[Kelvin Mace]

10. Yes' but you still have a paper ballot to check the count against

In NC this is the law.

TS systems are more dangerous in that there is no ballot to check against. The H-I systems have paper ballots.

Now, if the Dems lose and are too stupid to demand a hand count...

As i have said, it is far safer to screw with machine allocation and suppress the vote than to risk tampering with the code. Why should someone risk hard time when they can't be prosecuted for a "judgment call"?

Occam's Razor.

[Kelvin Mace]

11. Just to clarify

You are correct about BDFs, they are used for tallying in OpScan.

But, the only way to use them with a low chance of getting caught is by switching SOME votes. Drastic changes have a higher chance of getting caught. Paradoxically, if you make a subtle change and go for a narrow win, you will trigger a recount which means more scrutiny and again, a greater chance of detection.

If i own a voting machine company and wish to collude with partisan ( read "crooked&quot election officials, the safest thing to do is short key precincts of machines. This results in long lines, more opportunity for astro-turf poll vigilantes to "challenge" votes making it more likely people won't be able to vote. Short of someone confessing to the crime, it would be impossible to prove criminal intent.

Getting caught buggering the machine code can't be explained away, you will go to jail. Shorting machines is the "perfect" crime.

[Wilms]

12. Most states have weak recount and audit laws.

That reduces the risk of fraudsters getting caught. And that a BDF can be accidently screwed up, no one is going to jail. Did anyone go to jail in the case of BDF screw-ups that got caught as listed in the article I linked? I don't think so.

And I wasn't aware that voting machine company owners could collude with election officials to short areas machines. And I'm still not. What did I miss?

[Kelvin Mace]

13. Voting machine officials can

no more legally collude with partisan election office than voting machine execs can rig voting machines. However, one is way lower risk than the other.

Yes, BDFs can be "accidentally" screwed up (or accidentally screwed up) but the same problems arise. If the vote deviates to far from historical norms, then Dems will demand a manual recount. If the vote is too close, a recount is automatic.

People are looking for the best case scenario for GOP chicanery and it is manipulating the machine allocation, not by manipulating the machine code or count.

My opinions are not based on hypothetical scenarios, but on real world observations in the precincts. I would certainly defer to any tech or programmer with expertise in H-I machines who has worked the polls in Ohio.

I am not trying to be difficult here, I am just trying to point out the most likely angle of attack.

[Wilms]

14. Dems will demand a recount?

Ha!

And that's assuming "demanding" will produce one. Read the law first. What state are we talking about?

No doubt various denial of service attack schemes, if you will, would be employed. That starts with registration fraud. But why would one discount the possibility that the machine counts would be fussed with?

They're ALL likely angles of attack.

[Kelvin Mace]

15. I cannot give the Dems

a spine, I can only tell them what to be alert for. I can only recount my own experience in the field, looking at actual machines in my own state and extrapolating. In North Carolina we saw the dangers and enacted laws to account for them. This option was available to every other state in the union and some acted on it and some didn't. If we could do it, everyone could do it. If it didn't get done who is to blame?

People are obsessing over this issue all the time, but I would really have preferred to see less hand-wringing and more actual involvement in the legislative process since this issue came up in 2002.

[Wilms]

16. All well and good, Kelvin.

But walking into the forum and saying things like, "Dems can demand a recount" really doesn't help. Because in 45+ of 50 states, it just ain't so. This is DU, not NCDU.

In 2002, the whole world revolved around getting rid of DREs but replacing them with Optical Scan. Outta the fire and into the pan. It gave us people like Bo Lipari aiding abetting in the retirement of levers all the while whistling about paper ballots and recountability. The very first state-wide use of the scanners gave us a turn-over of the state legislators to the repubs in a tight race where a recount was DENIED. The court ACKNOWLEDGED that the machines showed errors and STILL refused a full recount. Lipari: Nowhere to be found.

[Kelvin Mace]

17. Yet somehow

despite all this skullduggery, the Dems won in 2008?

I don't understand how in 45 out of 50 states recounts are not allowed since almost all states have provisions for recounts and courts can order them.

Again, can't give Dems spines.

And no, this is not NCDU, but if people spend a fraction of their time working in their counties and states to chaneg the laws as we did in NC, the issue would be moot.

If we can address the issue in North Carolina, it can be addressed everywhere.

[Wilms]

21. "have provisions for recounts and courts can order them"?

Read the law first. What does it actually say? What are the required margins? What are the audit protocols. There are few places where elections are REALLY verified. Not spot checks. Not L&A tests. Not running the ballots through a second time. Not fixed audits. But statistical hand counted audits and, if necessary, recounts.

"Courts can order them"? What does that tell you? Sounds like in 2002 everyone forgot 2000, never mind 2004.

[Kelvin Mace]

22. Again

Election laws are state/county affairs. They can be changed far easier than federal law.

Folks can take action or keep waiting for other people to solve their problems. Every election I read the same allegations and arguments i explain how it is in NC and people tell me they don't live in NC, yet somehow we fixed this seven years and three elections ago.

[Wilms]

24. Hey. A lot of people have taken action.

Most would tell you they've only got so far, so far.

So that's where it stands. Now. Machines are vulnerable to attack and accident because they're in sufficiently audited in the main. Verified Voting has feel-good maps showing the states that have "auditing" laws. And most of those wouldn't give you even a ninety percent confidence in the outcome.

[Kelvin Mace]

25. What stopped them?

Most would tell you they've only got so far.

I have seen lots of web sites, groups, non-profits, etc, pushing for federal laws, but damn little at county and local level.

For areas with auditing laws you will have to be specific which ones don't pass muster.

Wilms, I am not trying to be difficult here, but you have been around a long while in this fight, and I have seen your efforts. I am not as pessimistic on the issue. Voter suppression worries me a lot more than voting machines. Note that I do worry about voting machines, but far more damage is being done LEGALLY. Claims that the fix is in on voting machines discourages people from voting and that is just not a good thing right now.

[Wilms]

26. Voter suppression is a HUGE problem. No doubt.

I merely refuse to discount voting machines as an attractive point of attack for bad guys. (Nor do I scream "rigged" every time I don't like an outcome.

And I'm not so sure stating the vulnerabilities of voting machines is any more discouraging than mentioning that republicans love voter suppression.

As far as auditing laws go, we have Jersey with a great one...but no paper to count...New Mexico and a few others, but the balance are not statistical and offer insufficient verification. If you don't know this to be true I urge you checking into it. Never mind what VV claims.

[Kelvin Mace]

27. I stopped following groups like vv a while back

Since they do a good job collecting data and telling people what is wrong' but a poor job organizing actual fixes for the problem. I do not ignore e-voting problems. I just see suppression as the greater threat that is being used with effect. I can't cover all angles, so i work against the one doing the most damage. I have already voted absentee (on paper) and will be out on election day countering folks like True the Vote who are operating in NC.

[Zorra]

19. But what are the odds of someone actually "getting caught buggering the machine code"?

When the odds of getting caught are low, and the payoff is worth the risk, criminals will risk jail time to commit crimes.

And I no longer assume that law enforcement personnel are always concerned about investigating enforcing certain laws.

Better, IMO, to just revamp the entire system and maybe base it on the Canadian model.

[Kelvin Mace]

20. Depending on the voting system

Pretty good actually.

[avaistheone1]

5. Votes can be stolen in matter of few minutes from a voting machine. It is verrrrrry easy to do so.

Here are the results of Princeton University's voting machines tests.

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=a8d_1194275446

[Kelvin Mace]

8. I am aware of Diebold's

weaknesses as I am one of the people who helped expose them. I was in the group here at DU that gave the source code to Avi Rubin.



Ohio's machines are not made by Diebold and are not touchscreen units. Optical scan systems have tangible ballots which make them harder to rig.

[AsahinaKimi]

18. did you see this?

http://www.democraticunderground.com/?com=view_post&forum=1017&pid=72068

You don't have to flip a vote, you only need prevent votes to be counted.

[RobertEarl]

23. Oh good found an NC expert

I have been trying to find the results of NC audits of the paper ballots.

Nobody knows a damn thing. Surely you can tell me where to find the findings of the NC audits from 2010?