South Carolina voting machines miscounted hundreds of ballots, report finds

[diva77]

https://statescoop.com/south-carolina-voting-machines-miscounted-hundreds-of-ballots-report-finds/
Written by Benjamin Freed
Jan 7, 2019 | STATESCOOP

An analysis of South Carolina’s voting equipment found that state election officials miscounted hundreds of ballots during the primary and general elections in 2018 because of “continued software deficiencies.”

Conducted on behalf of the League of Women Voters by Duncan Buell, a computer science professor at the University of South Carolina, the study published last week found that in one primary race, voting machines in one precinct double counted 148 votes. During the general election in another precinct, more than 400 votes were awarded in the wrong county board race.

In both instances, Buell found, the improperly counted voters were logged by the South Carolina State Election Commission as official results. Neither case involved enough votes to swing the outcome of an election, but Buell told StateScoop the incidents demonstrate the state continues to use poorly designed software that poll workers, many of whom are volunteers working long shifts, struggle to operate correctly.
SNIP
“We’ve learned there’s such a thing as too much technology,” he said. “And the solution is to go back to the technology that works best. If we go back to hand-marked paper, that’ll take a lot of the complexity out.”

Chris Wlaschin, ES&S’ vice president for security, told StateScoop the company is reviewing Buell’s report. Last August, Wlaschin told CyberScoop that ES&S has vetted researchers test its equipment “alert us to vulnerabilities so that we can patch them and get certified if we need to.”

But Buell said he is not convinced ES&S’s software is up to snuff, pointing to the errors his report calls out.

“It calls into question the process, and some of it really is a software quality control issue,” he said. “I would not let my students get away with these kinds of errors.”
SNIP

[elleng]

1. "continued software deficiencies."

[diva77]

2. yet another euphemism for malicious code!!

[TheFarseer]

3. Fill in the circle next to the candidate you want

Then a scantron machine counts it and it can be verified by human counters later. This is not hard. It's only hard, i suspect, if someone who contributed to your campaign has an expensive high tech voting system to sell you.

[exboyfil]

7. You are right, there is literally no argument

against a scantron machine. So long as the ballot box is sealed and custody is maintained, it is the best option for securing the actual intent of the voters.

The technology is familiar to virtually anyone given it has been used in public schools for at least forty years.

I cannot understand how touchscreen voting got its nose into the tent (except as you said by the profit motive which also combines with the fact that those who count the votes control the election - our elections are controlled by the makers of voting machines).

[diva77]

9. please check out my response to TheFarseer's post #3

https://www.democraticunderground.com/100211676385#post8

[diva77]

8. unfortunately, optical scanners contain code which can easily be altered

for example...

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/magazine/the-myth-of-the-hacker-proof-voting-machine.html

The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine
By Kim Zetter

Feb. 21, 2018
SNIP

A secure voting machine should prevent untrusted or unsigned software from being installed on it. But last year when Stauffer and colleagues examined an optical-scan machine that ES&S submitted to California for testing and certification, they discovered the system wasn’t authenticating code during installation or wasn’t doing it properly. They were able to modify legitimate ES&S election software and reinstall it on the machine unsigned. Although they conducted their test with physical access to the machines, because California machines don’t have embedded modems, Stauffer says an adversary with remote access through the modem would theoretically be able to do the same. Their rogue modification was designed to erase all election data from the machine at the close of an election. A ‘‘capable-enough adversary,’’ says Stauffer, might potentially go much further, with an update that would ‘‘make a candidate more favorable than the other.’’

Douglas W. Jones, a computer-science professor at the University of Iowa, has examined multiple voting systems for state and local election officials over the years. ‘‘Nothing I know about the machines would defend against’’ an attack where a hacker altered voting software.. ‘‘So this is a vulnerability that should be taken quite seriously.’’

SNIP

[TheFarseer]

10. Well that sucks

But at least there would be a paper trail

[diva77]

11. Yes, a handmarked paper ballot is a good thing!

[albacore]

4. "Comrade... are you haffing problems with softwares...?"

"Maybe I help you with problem...you like? We make good friends.. yes?"

[Botany]

5. I might be wrong for the 1st time in my life but S. Carolina is a classic example of election ....

... by rigged voting machines, central tabulators, gerrymandering, voter suppression,
and God only knows what else. South Carolina is 35 % black and 11% (and growing)
Hispanic.

BTW the "back doors" programed into the ES&S machines are not mistakes.

[GoCubsGo]

6. I'm shocked! Shocked, I tell you!

I'm surprised that those hunks of junk even register votes, at all. Sometimes you have to practically pound on the touch screen to get the keyboard to work properly for write-ins.

[Hermit-The-Prog]

12. paper can be counted by HUMAN BEINGS

Hand counting too slow? That just means your precincts are too big. Divide 'em up until people can count the paper and the public can watch the counting.

[diva77]

13. +1,000,000 This!!! Hand counting turns out to be very efficient at the precinct level. It's also

the method used for investigating challenges to paper ballot results (when an honest investigation is conducted).