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Not really convincing, at least to those who understand the argument.
In the 1990s I was reading the newspaper ("Ocean Breeze," a little paper out of Santa Monica) when the entire red-lining kerfuffle broke. It was claimed that lenders had redlined, in fact if not in maps, certain minority-majority areas. It was a Big Deal. There were hearings. There were threats of invetigations.
The response was that the redlining was emergent, not imposed: That poor people tended to live in certain areas, poor people have crappy credit scores, and people with crappy credit scores have trouble getting house loans. It was a political football, and even the repubs hopped on the train as it left the station.
The result was that more loans were made. The subprime loan industry was born. Banks were reluctant, but went along with it--community advisory groups pushed it, because disproportionate impact is prima facie evidence of intent to discriminate. The arguments against its being discrimination didn't change, so the same argument kept winning and the same train left the station many, many times.
The problem was that banks had trouble with large portfolios of subprime loans. Freddie and Fanny started to buy them.
This wasn't enough. They were soon glutted. So under Clinton, after some laws were rewritten, the first CDO was authorized and issued to relieve the glut of subprime loans. It wasn't a huge glut. But a glut it was. And Clinton was proud of the change in the laws. It served a political end: It reduced discrimination. It was a Good Thing.
It's been said that tools find uses and uses find tools. I've only seen it said in the context of language--given synonyms, they differentiate meanings; given a speaker's need to express an idea, words already in use will be pressed into service. Same with financial tools.
CDOs, hmm? What a nifty way to clean out mortgage portfolios so as to make money? You offload the loans and can extend more loans. It was a nice way to let small banks write a *lot* of subprime mortgages. But it was an even nicer way to let a large bank write a hell of a lot of mortgages of any kind. In fact, since you could offload the mortgages quickly, there was more of a motivation to substitute quantity of loans written for the quality of the loan grantee.
This made a (home) ownership society possible. Everybody--black, white, brown, red, green with purple polka dots--could get a home loan. * may not have been smart enough to know how it would end, he might not have known how it began. But he knew that the train had left the station, that people liked having the train out of the station, and so he made sure he, too, was on the train.
It began with a good-hearted attempt to overcome pernicious (non-) redlining in Chicago and other urban areas. But step by step, what seemed not only reasonable but morally virtuous and even necessary to cure a non-problem became an ideological end which evolved into a greed-based profit-seeking end and ended up the toxic CDO boondoggle. The argument against it was the argument that eventually won the day: If you aren't credit-worthy you shouldn't have a home loan. It was the argument that lost in 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002... 2007. It only won when the train had crashed into a schoolbus, killing most on board. There were lots of opportunities to stop it, but the "good guys" were behind it all the way until it crashed, with the "bad guys" pushing right along with them after it became possible to offload the questionable loans under Clinton.
I thought this argument should have won in 1996. Then again, what did I know? I had the same sinking feeling when I heard Carter talk about how wonder the post-industrial economy would be, once we got rid of all those nasty dirty manufacturing jobs, and I was only 18 at the time.
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