An American Army Division needs in excess of 3,000 tons of supplies per day

[Panaconda]

Taliban Could Defeat NATO in 30 Days

Logistics is the Achilles heel of Western forces

Sunday 12 September 2010, by Matthew Nasuti

...

Western military supplies (other than ammunition, weapons, communications gear and some spare parts, which apparently are all air-lifted) filter into Afghanistan through a small number of mountain passes and then are internally redistributed through a poorly constructed and insecure “ring road” system. On June 20, 2009, Major-General Michael Tucker, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of ISAF in Kabul, told Philip Smucker of the Asia Times (for his story Afghanistan’s Road to Somewhere), that:
“Security in Afghanistan is ultimately defined by our ability to build and defend the ring road.”

He was correct and the Taliban know it. As seen in the daily military incident reports, the Taliban have spent years practicing and perfecting their road interdiction tactics. NATO and American forces do not possess the manpower to patrol 3,000+ kilometers of primary roads. In contrast, the Taliban possess the capacity to cut, block and disrupt this road system. The bridges, overpasses, tunnels and passes are especially vulnerable to sabotage during the winter months.

In 1761, the “father” of Afghanistan, the great Pashtun leader Ahmed Khan Abdali/Ahmed Shah Durrani defeated the Maratha army at Panipat, in Haryana State, about 120 kilometers north of New Delhi. He succeeded for two reasons. First, he was able to bring together a number of disaffected groups (Pashtuns, Balochi, Sindhi, Jats and Rajputs), which is exactly what the Taliban is doing. Second, he understood that he could not launch a conventional attack on fortified Maratha positions. The Maratha army was armed with French heavy rifled artillery and all the other components and equipment of a modern 18th century army. It was a heavy, road-bound force. The Pashtun forces, on the other hand, were mainly light cavalry. Ahmed Shah Durrani decided on a siege strategy and was successful in cutting the Maratha supply lines for two months. In January 1761, the Maratha had had enough and left their fortified bases only to suffer defeat at the hands of the Pashtun and their allies. This battle, and its tactics and strategy are well known to Taliban leaders. It may be the model for their future efforts.

The paradox for NATO and the Americans is that in September, 2010, they will have deployed the largest number of troops they ever had in Afghanistan, and yet that is when they are the most vulnerable, as the supply needs for this huge force are potentially crippling.

...

http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article28491

1942: A German Panzer Division needed from 30-70 tons of supplies per day.

1968: A North Vietnamese Army Division needed less than 10 tons of supplies per day.

2010: An American Army Division needs in excess of 3,000 tons of supplies per day.

[Fumesucker]

1. A logistics tail that stretches halfway around the world is an expensive and vulnerable one..

The Soviet Union had a far shorter logistics tail in Afghanistan than does the USA and they still got their asses handed to them.

[xchrom]

2. recommend

[msongs]

3. supplies to provide burger king and KFC and support for war profiteer civilians weigh alot nt

[Lurks Often]

4. You mean essentially the same

logistics tail we've had for the past 8 years? I don't seem to remember the Taliban significantly disrupting the logistics tail in the past 8 years, so I don't see why it would be more vulnerable now.

[JVS]

5. I don't seem to remember us winning in the past 8 years either.

[Lurks Often]

6. My point was that the

logistics tail is no more vulnerable now then when we started 8 years ago.

[Lurks Often]

7. My point was that the

logistics tail is no more vulnerable now then when we started 8 years ago.

[LawnKorn]

8. Winning wars depends on logistics however, winning is not an American objective in Afghanistan

The two decades the United States has spent in Iraq and Afghanistan were for the sole purpose of disrupting the oil supplies in such a way that China could not gain access to Middle East crude. Our continued meandering treks in the countryside of Afghanistan are political in nature, carried out by the military. No crude oil pipelines can be constructed across Afghanistan as long as there is a conflict.

A secondary benefit brought to you by the Bush Administration, is a two trillion dollar gravy train for defense contractors who manufacture and deliver war materials to the region where they are consumed necessitating the manufacture of more war materials to the region where they they are consumed necessitating ... ad infinitum. There are powerful forces at work that do not want to see and end to the war. There are powerful forces at work that want to see as much material delivered to the troops at the front lines as possible. With a never ending war, Performance Based Logistics never had it so good.

One aspect (of many) the Kabul Press article fails to address is the difference in war fighting performance the supplies provide. There is a real world comparison between the 10 tons per day for the North Vietnamese -vs- the 3000 (5000+) tons per day for the Americans. It happened 42 years ago when 6000 American Marines (somewhat less than a division) defended a position in Vietnam against 30,000 North Vietnamese Army Regulars (roughly three divisions). For 77 days the Marines were supplied entirely by air and repeatedly repelled assaults that included tanks. The North Vietnamese failed to take Khe Sanh, and sustained casualties to 30% of their attacking force.

[blindpig]

9. kick

The logistic tail is always the point of vulnerability in conflicts of regular vs irregular forces. It's not just the effectiveness of supply, it is the expense. Normally, that is, in the present situation where the vendors of military supply own the government expense is a 'win' and normal logic is turned on it's head.

[maryf]

10. Thanks for the kick, I would have missed this

and it's an important article. I guess this makes another kick!