Held: The material-support statute, §2339B, is constitutional as applied to the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist organizations.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
The Preamble to the Constitution proclaims that the people of the United States ordained and established that charter of government in part to “provide for the common defense.” As Madison explained, “security against foreign danger is . . . an avowed and essential object of the American Union.” The Federalist No. 41, p. 269 (J. Cookeed. 1961). We hold that, in regulating the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist organizations, Congress has pursued that objective consistent with the limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments. -Justice Roberts
"In sum, these cases require us to consider how to apply the First Amendment where national security interests are at stake. When deciding such cases, courts are aware and must respect the fact that the Constitution entrusts to the Executive and Legislative Branches the power to provide for the national defense, and that it grants particular authority to the President in matters of foreign affairs. Nonetheless, this Court has also made clear that authority and expertise in these matters do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to secure the protection that the Constitution grants to individuals. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 536 (2004) (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check . . . when it comes to the rights of th Nation’s citizens”). In these cases, for the reasons I have stated, I believe the Court has failed to examine the Government’s justifications with sufficient care. It has failed to insist upon specific evidence, rather than general assertion. It has failed to require tailoring of means to fit compelling ends. And ultimately it deprives the individuals before us of the protection that the First Amendment demands.That is why, with respect, I dissent." -Justice Breyer
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1498.pdf