History of the filibuster

[eridani]

Has an interesting graph, too.

http://www.american.com/archive/2008/march-april-magazine-contents/our-broken-senate/article_print

From its earliest incarnation, the filibuster was generally reserved for issues of great national importance, employed by one or more senators who were passionate enough about something that they would bring the entire body to a halt. The civil rights issue fit this pattern exactly: Southern senators led lengthy filibusters on voting rights and civil rights bills during the 1950s and 1960s, effectively killing them all until President Lyndon Johnson was able to overcome the procedural hurdle in 1965. In each case, the drama was palpable as the Senate moved to round-the-clock sessions—aides wheeling cots into the antechambers—to try to break the filibuster.

But after the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the filibuster began to change as Senate leaders tried to make their colleagues’ lives easier and move the agenda along; no longer would there be days or weeks of round-the-clock sessions, but instead simple votes periodically on cloture motions to get to the number to break the log-jam, while other business carried on as usual.

As so often happens, the unintended consequences of a well-intentioned move took over; instead of expediting business, the change in practice meant an increase in filibusters because it became so much easier to raise the bar to 60 or more, with no 12- or 24-hour marathon speeches required.

Still, formal filibuster actions—meaning actual cloture motions to shut off debate—remained relatively rare. Often, Senate leaders would either find ways to accommodate objections or quietly shelve bills or nominations that would have trouble getting to 60. In the 1970s, the average number of cloture motions filed in a given month was less than two; it moved to around three a month in the 1990s. This Congress, we are on track for two or more a week. The number of cloture motions filed in 1993, the first year of the Clinton presidency, was 20. It was 21 in 1995, the first year of the newly Republican Senate. As of the end of the first session of the 110th Congress, there were 60 cloture motions, nearing an all-time record.

Placing a hold has morphed into a process where any individual can block something or someone indefinitely or permanently—and often anonymously.What makes this Congress different? The most interesting change is GOP strategy. Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell (KY) has threatened filibuster on a wide range of issues, in part to force Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) to negotiate with his party and in part just to gum up the works. Republicans have invoked filibusters or used other delaying tactics on controversial issues like Medicare prescription drugs, the war in Iraq, and domestic surveillance—and on non-controversial issues like ethics reform and electronic campaign disclosure.

To be sure, Majority Leader Reid has been more confrontational than accommodating, frequently trying to short-circuit this process by invoking cloture at the start. But Republicans have been able to derail the process repeatedly by denying unanimous consent to move forward and by requiring cloture. To supersede the tactics on even a consensus measure, Reid often has to go through three separate cloture battles, each one allowing a lot of debate, including 30 hours of it even after cloture is invoked.