http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=2897919&page=1When asked whether the Bush administration had a failed strategy in Iraq, Cheney pushed back hard, insisting there had been significant progress.
"A failed strategy? Let's see. We didn't fail when we got rid of Saddam," Cheney said. "We didn't fail when we held elections. We didn't fail when we got a constitution written. Those are all success stories." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/31/AR2007013102132_pf.htmlAs with other recent nominees appearing before the Armed Services panel, Casey listed a series of mistakes that he believes have been made in Iraq. While some Bush administration officials still cite Iraq's elections as a great success, for example,
he said that he thinks they "seem to have promoted increased sectarian divisions within the country." http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1592849-3,00.html<snip>
III. THE IMPLOSION
Inter-sect relations, political and personal, began to fray with the approach of Iraq's first post-Saddam election in January 2005. Sunni parties boycotted the poll, allowing a Shi'ite coalition to sweep to power. With an assertiveness that at times bordered on arrogance, the Shi'ite-led government inflamed Sunni resentment. An especially sore point was the mass recruitment into the police and the military of Shi'ite militiamen, some of whom used the immunity of their uniforms to avenge old grudges against Sunnis. Sunni terrorism groups stepped up their bombing campaign, which convinced Shi'ites that the former ruling class was never going to accept its reduced status.
By the time U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad persuaded Sunni parties to take part in a second general election in December 2005, the two sects were some distance apart....
Saddam's execution became another flash point.
Even Sunnis who had little sympathy for Saddam were incensed that the government chose to hang him at the hour of morning prayers on one of the most sacred Muslim holidays (Iraqi Sunnis celebrated the holiday one day before the Shi'ites). The choice seemed to confirm suspicions that Shi'ite political dominance would be a constant humiliation. "It was their way of telling us, 'We're in charge now, and you are so weak that even your holy days have no meaning anymore,'" says media analyst Kadhim al-Mukhdadi. "That morning I gave up hoping that things would get better."