http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120027737099687613.html?mod=googlenews_wsj<snip>
The authors of the Iran report -- career officials in the intelligence and diplomatic corps -- are among the same people who were on the losing side of the Iraq and Iran debates during the first Bush term. In 2002, some argued that Iraq didn't have an active nuclear-weapons program. They were sidelined by the more-hawkish foreign-policy strategists on the Bush team.
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Hundreds of officials were involved and thousands of documents were drawn upon in this report, according to the DNI, making it impossible for any official to overly sway it. Intelligence sources were vetted and questioned in ways they weren't ahead of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Thomas Fingar, 62 years old, is one of the lead architects of the Iran report. A veteran State Department official, Mr. Fingar helped lead the office that argued in 2002 that evidence of Iraq's nuclear program was faulty. He is now a senior official at the DNI.
Of the backlash against the report, Mr. Fingar says, "A lot of it is just nonsense. The idea that this thing was written by a bunch of nonprofessional renegades or refugees is just silly."
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In 2002, Mr. Fingar vigorously quizzed his analysts' assumptions on Iraq, according to people who took part in the process. He particularly liked running "red teaming" exercises where competing groups sought to expose flaws in the bureau's judgments. Mr. Fingar told top State Department officials, including former Secretary of State Colin Powell, what his analysts had concluded: Saddam Hussein didn't have an active nuclear-weapons program. In particular, they disputed evidence cited by the White House relating to Iraq's purchase of aluminum tubes, purportedly for use in making weapons-grade nuclear fuel.
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The result was that the White House was essentially locked out of the process. This marked a big change from the years leading up to the Iraq war, when Mr. Cheney and his top aide, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, made repeated visits to Langley to query analysts about their findings on Iraq's weapons capabilities.
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People in Vice President Cheney's office saw the Dec. 3 announcement as a death blow to their Iran policy. The report's authors "knew how to pull the rug out from under us," says a long-time aide to the vice president, referring to the way the key judgments were presented.