<snip>
Far more remarkable, however, is that the doctrine of corporate personhood, which subsequently became a cornerstone of corporate law, was introduced into this 1886 decision without argument. According to the official case record, Supreme Court Justice Morrison Remick Waite simply pronounced before the beginning of arguement in the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company that
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.
The court reporter duly entered into the summary record of the Court's findings that
The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in section 1 of the Fourteen Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Thus it was that a two-sentence assertion by a single judge elevated corporations to the status of persons under the law, prepared the way for the rise of global corporate rule, and thereby changed the course of history.
The doctrine of corporate personhood creates an interesting legal contradiction. The corporation is owned by its shareholders and is therefore their property. If it is also a legal person, then it is a person owned by others and thus exists in a condition of slavery -- a status explicitly forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. So is a corporation a person illegally held in servitude by its shareholders? Or is it a person who enjoys the rights of personhood that take precedence over the presumed ownership rights of its shareholders? So far as I have been able to determine, this contradiction has not been directly addressed by the courts.
This file is mirrored from:
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/118/394.html http://www.ratical.org/corporations/SCvSPR1886.html<snip>
Editor's notes: There has been much misunderstanding about this Court decision. Despite the issue being raised in arguments, the Justices offered no written opinion on the question of whether corporations should be considered "persons" and enjoy the protections of the 14th Amendment. The Court reporter's notes, however, quoted Chief Justice Waite declaring that, "We all are of the opinion" that the 14th Amendement applies to corporations.
Many people (rightfully) are outraged that a Court reporter could turn the Bill of Rights and 14th Amendment on their heads, which effectively is what occured once Santa Clara was cited as precedent in subsequent cases. However, the fact that the Justices never issued an opinion on "corporate personhood" lost its legal significance once they cited the case.
Court reporter's notes:
The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Under the constitution and laws of California, relating to taxation, fences created upon the line between the roadway of a railroad and the land of coterminous proprietors are not part of "the roadway," to be included by the State Board in its valuation of the property of the corporation, but are "improvements" assessable by the local authorities of the proper county.
An assessment of a tax is invalid, and will not support an action for the recovery of the tax, if, being laid upon different kinds of property as a unit, it includes property not legally assessable, and if the part of the tax assessed upon the latter property cannot be separated from the other part of it.
The State Board of Equalization of California were required by law, to assess the franchise, roadway, &c., of all railroads operated in more than one county and apportion the same to the different counties in proportion to the number of miles of railway in each. They made such assessment of the Southern Pacific Railroad, improperly including therein the fences between the roadway and the coterminous proprietor, and apportioned it and returned it as required to the different counties. In a suit by one of the counties to recover its proportion of the tax levied in accordance with such apportionment and return, the court below, at the trial, found that "said fences were valued at $800 per mile," which was the only finding on the subject; and it did not appear that the county, plaintiff, offered to take judgment for a sum excluding the rate on the value of the fences within the county at that valuation.
Held, (1) That the finding was too vague and indefinite to serve as a basis for estimating the aggregate valuation of the fences included in the assessment, or the amount thereof apportioned to the respective counties; (9) That, under the circumstances, the court could not assume that the State Board included the fences in their assessment at the rate of $800 per mile for every mile of the railroad within the State, counting one or both sides of the roadway; and could no"., after eliminating that amount from the assessment, give judgment for the balance of the tax, if any.
These actions, which were argued together, were brought to recover unpaid' taxes assessed against the several railroad corporations, defendants, under the laws of the State of California. The main - almost the only - questions discussed by counsel in the elaborate arguments related to the constitutionality of the taxes. This court, in its opinion passed by these questions, and decided the cases upon the questions whether under the constitution and laws of California, the fences on the line of the railroads should have been valued and assessed, if at all, by the local officers, or by the State Board of Equalization; whether, on the record, the assessments and. taxation upon the fences are separable from the rest of the assessment and taxation; and what was the effect of the record upon the rights of the State and the county.
One of the points made and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for defendants in error was that "Corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Before argument
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE said: The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/santa_clara_vs_southern_pacific.html<snip>
The provision of the laws of the Constitution and the laws of California…are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in so far as they require the assessment of their property at its full money value, without making deduction as in the case of railroads that are operated in only one county, and of other corporations, and of natural persons, for the value of the mortgages…
The Court found for the railroad. The Supreme Court Reporter, J. C. Bancroft Davis, wrote in the headnotes the following:
The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in section I of the Fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.the main – and almost only – questions discussed by counsel in the elaborate arguments related to the constitutionality of the taxes. This court, in its opinion passed by these questions, and decided the cases on the questions whether under the constitution and the laws of California, the fences on the line of the railroads should have been valued and assessed, if at all, by the local officers or by the State Board of Equalization…. One of the points made and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for defendants in error was that ‘Corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.’
The actual decision delivered by Justice Harlan begins by stating explicitly that the Supreme Court is not, in this case, ruling on the Constitutional question of corporate personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment or any other amendment.
http://www.authorsden.com/visit/viewarticle.asp?id=29128<snip>
That, however, wasn't the end of it. Corporations had a lot of money and a lot at stake, and they took case after case to court. In 1886, corporations gained a victory. Before the Supreme Court session to announce the decision in the case Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad, Chief Justice Waite said that the court wouldn't hear arguments on whether the Fourteenth Amendment clause on equal protection applied to corporations; they all believed that it did.
The case was decided on other grounds. But, the principle that corporations have Fourteenth Amendment rights was inserted by the Supreme Court reporter in a header in the published report of the case. A couple of years later, in the case Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad v. Beckwith (1889), the Court cited the Santa Clara case as the precedent for corporations having due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. With that, corporations became legal persons in the United States, and gained the ability to challenge in federal court regulatory actions at the state level.
http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2002/02oct-nov/oct-nov02interviewedwards.html
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