The politics of protection

[unhappycamper]

The politics of protection
by Sidney Blumenthal | Aug 3 2007 - 8:18am


President Bush's political strategy at home is an implicit if unintended admission of the failure of his military strategy in Iraq and toward terrorism generally. Betrayal is his theme, delivered in his speeches, embroidered by his officials and trumpeted by the brass band of neo-conservative publicists. The foundation for his stab-in-the-back theory was laid in the beginning.

"Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists", Bush said in his joint address to Congress nine days after the 11 September 2001, attacks. And in the weeks that followed he repeated variations of his formula, reducing it to "for or against us in the war on terrorism." At the Charleston, South Carolina air force base on 24 July 2007, Bush resumed his repudiated habit of conflating threats, suggesting a connection between 9/11 and the Iraq war, and intensified his blaming of domestic critics for the shortcomings of his policy. His story line depends upon omitting his own part in the calamity. "The facts are" insisted Bush to his captive audience, "that al-Qaida terrorists killed Americans on 9/11, they're fighting us in Iraq and across the world, and they are plotting to kill Americans here at home again."

But how did it happen that "Al-Qaida in Iraq", sworn enemy of Saddam Hussein and his secularism, operating in isolation prior to 9/11 (though almost certainly with the connivance and protection of Kurdish leader and current Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani), has come to thrive under the United States occupation? And since al-Qaida in Iraq represents perhaps 1% or less of the insurgent strength, how can it be depicted as the main foe, capable of seizing state power? The other Sunni insurgent groups increasingly view it as an impediment to their own ambitions and have marked it for elimination. Rather than address these problematic complexities, Bush points the finger of blame at US senators who dare to question his policy. "Those who justify withdrawing our troops from Iraq by denying the threat of al-Qaida in Iraq and its ties to Osama bin Laden ignore the clear consequences of such a retreat."

Bush's accusation of betrayal anticipates the September 2007 report of General David Petraeus on the progress of the "surge" in Iraq. The absence of victory inspires a search for an enemy within. Bush's stab-in-the-back theory is the latest corollary to the old policy that military force will create political success. Bush is a vulgar Maoist ("Political power comes from the barrel of a gun", said Mao Tse-tung). But the surge is simply an endlessly repetitive reaction to the failure of the purely military. Somehow, in the political vacuum, additional US troops are supposed to quell the civil war, compel the sects and factions to lie down like lambs, and destroy al-Qaida in Iraq. US ambassador Ryan Crocker has begged that the Iraqi government not be held accountable for meeting political benchmarks, none of which have been realised; and at the same time he requested exit visas for his Iraqi staff, who obviously have no confidence in the Bush policy and do not wish to leave via the embassy roof. Crocker's actions speak louder than his words - and louder than Bush's.

Bush, however, clings to the rhetoric of conventional warfare, of "victory" and "retreat". The collapsed Iraqi state, proliferation of sectarian warfare and murderous strife even among Shi'a militias bewilder him; clear-cut dichotomies are more comforting, producing deeper confusion. The friend of his enemy is his friend; the enemy of his enemy is not his friend. Meanwhile, Bush seeks to displace responsibility for the potentially dire consequences of his policy on others.


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uhc note: Many of your favorites are mentioned in the article.