http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/07/the-everybodys-.htmlA lot of bloggers have been complaining about the recent American tendency to describe every insurgent attack in Iraq as "al-Qaeda". They are right to complain, simply on the facts. Al-Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq coalition continues to represent only a minority of attacks against American forces or Iraqi government targets. Consider this chart from the fascinating recent RFE/RL report on Sunni insurgency media, tracking claims of insurgency operations in March 2007:
The authors of the report tracked claims of responsibility for various operations on the insurgency internet sites during March 2007. The Islamic State of Iraq (al-Qaeda) claimed 13 attacks on US forces and 40 on Iraqi government targets. The Islamic Army of Iraq - the ISI's chief Sunni adversary - claimed 80 operations against US forces and 103 against Iraqi government targets. And the Mujahidin Army, another faction outside the ISI coalition, claimed 132 operations against US government forces (and another 4 against Iraqi government). Even Ansar al-Sunnah, whose position has been unclear with regard to the ISI, claimed 44 against US forces and 90 against the Iraqi government. (The 1920 Revolution Brigade is the one major faction which rarely posts claims on the internet.) This is only one of various ways that such operations could be tracked, but all of them produce similar results: the Islamic State of Iraq (al-Qaeda) does indeed carry out horrific, often spectacular, violent operations against the Iraqi government and US forces, but its number of operations are dwarfed by those claimed by the other, more nationalist, factions.
The architects of American counter-insurgency strategy know this: this team isn't stupid, and is doing its best to deal with the impossible situation bequeathed it by years of failure. So why the exaggeration of al-Qaeda's role? Most commentators have focused on its role in bamboozling American public opinion; I'll leave it to other to hash that out. There's another side to it, which fits the Petraeus method rather well: the 'al-Qaeda gambit' is part of an information operations strategy aimed at turning Iraqi opinion against the insurgency. By playing up the atrocities committed by the Islamist State of Iraq coalition and attempting to equate anti-US and anti-government violence with the unpopular al-Qaeda, the US (I'd wager) hopes do delegitimize violence which currently enjoys considerable support as "resistance".