Some Questions for the Iraq Study Group

[Time for change]

The Iraq Study Group Report of December 2006, written to provide recommendations on how the United States should deal with the aftermath of its ill-conceived, mismanaged, and ill-fated invasion of Iraq, contains several recommendations upon which I believe the good majority of Americans can agree: It strongly recommends that the United States engage in intense diplomacy, both with numerous nations that are concerned with the fate of Iraq, and with all influential factions within Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda; it recommends that the United States make it clear that its presence in Iraq is not motivated by Iraqi oil and that it does not intend to establish permanent military bases there; it recommends that all expenses related to the war in Iraq be included within the normal U.S. budgetary process, so as to ensure adequate review; and, it recommends that substantial U.S. financial and other assistance should be made towards reconstructing the Iraqi infrastructure that was destroyed by the U.S. invasion and subsequent war (though the Study Group does not frame that recommendation in such pejorative words).

Nonetheless, aside from raising such obvious questions as why its authors believe there’s a snowball’s chance in hell that George W. Bush will engage in productive diplomacy, I find much of the report’s discussion and recommendations to be confusing, disturbing or both. Therefore, I think that it would be very helpful if they could clarify the following points:


The role of U.S. presence in encouraging the violence

The study group strongly recommends against either an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq or a withdrawal based upon a timeline, favoring instead a partial withdrawal based on the establishment of certain conditions (more on that later). The reason given for recommending against the establishment of a timeline for withdrawal is that the fate of Iraq is too important for us to walk away from it. Yet nowhere in their discussion is a consideration of the role that the U.S. presence in Iraq plays in encouraging the violence there.

The report itself acknowledges that role implicitly but not explicitly. For example, starting on page 3, the report acknowledges four sources of violence in Iraq, including the Sunni insurgency, al Qaeda, Shiite militias, and organized criminality. It notes that “most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency”. Regarding Shiite militias, it says: “The Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, may number as many as 60,000 fighters. It has directly challenged U.S. and Iraqi government forces, and…” And the role of the U.S. presence in Iraq in encouraging violence from al Qaeda and al Qaeda recruitment is well known, though the report does not acknowledge that. Thus, all of the major sources of violence in Iraq are directed, against U.S. troops (in addition to other targets). So my question to the study group is:

Given your acknowledgement of the importance of Iraq’s fate to Iraqis, The United States, and the world, shouldn’t the role of the U.S. presence in Iraq in encouraging violence in Iraq be taken into account in determining how long we should stay there?


The question of how long we will stay in Iraq

Though the report gives a lot of lip service to the need to withdraw from Iraq as soon as feasible, I found its formula for doing so to be terribly confusing and on the whole suggesting that we will be there for many years to come, if not forever. At one point (page 60) the report appears to say that we will leave if Iraq doesn’t make adequate progress:

It should be unambiguous that continued U.S. political, military, and economic support for Iraq depends on the Iraqi government’s demonstrating political will and making substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance.

Yet nowhere else in the report is there any indication that the Study Group recommends that the U.S. leave Iraq if Iraq fails to make adequate progress. On the contrary, it states (p. 66):

The point is not for the United States to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an approach that we oppose. The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi forces take on the security mission. A successful national reconciliation dialogue will advance that departure date (emphasis added).

So, my question for the study group is:

Are you really recommending that failure of Iraq to demonstrate adequate progress should result in the withdrawal of U.S. support, as you say on page 60? Or, are you recommending that failure of adequate Iraqi progress prolong U.S. presence in Iraq, as you imply on page 66?

And furthermore, the Study Group also makes it clear that mere substantial progress will not warrant a U.S. withdrawal either (page 61):

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress… the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces, and to continue (emphasis added) political, military, and economic support for the Iraqi government.

And even then it is unclear to me whether or not the Study group intends to recommend that we ever leave Iraq (page 70):

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. We should continue to maintain support forces, rapid-reaction forces, special operations forces, intelligence units, search-and-rescue units, and force protection units.

That sounds to me a lot like the early stages of our involvement in Vietnam, at the time when we were still pretending that we were just helping out. My question to the study group is:

Do you recommend the scenario that you describe above (on page 70) only until Iraqi forces make sufficient progress (whatever that entails), or do you recommend that as a permanent condition, until the war is over or beyond that?


The voice that Iraqis should have in our continued occupation of their country

Though the report is filled with altruistic references to our “commitment” to Iraq and the Iraqi people, nowhere in the whole report is there a word about the possibility of considering the wishes of Iraqis in determining our course in Iraq or for how long we will occupy it. And this despite the fact that the report acknowledges (page 34) that “79% of Iraqis have a mostly negative view of the influence that the United States has in their country” and 61% have such a negative view of us that they approve of attacks on U.S. led forces. And furthermore, according to a World Public Opinion Poll, 71% of Iraqis, including 74% of Shiites and 91% of Sunnis, want the US-led forces to leave within 6 months. So my question to the Study Group is:

Since you so frequently speak in your report about the commitment we have to the Iraqi people, do you think that it would be appropriate in considering our future course of action in Iraq to consider the wishes of the Iraqi people?


Various requirements that the report recommends putting on Iraq

Speaking of taking the wishes of the Iraqi people into consideration, one thing that I found odd about the Study Group recommendations is the requirements they suggest putting on Iraq as a condition of our support (or leaving their country, depending upon how one interprets them). For example, the report recommends (though they attribute these recommendations to Prime Minister Maliki) that “The Central Bank of Iraq will raise interest rates to 20% … to combat accelerating inflation”, and “Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleum products and sell imported fuel at market prices” (page 63). Moreover, there are numerous prescriptions in the report to the effect that Iraq must continue to control al Qaeda, as on page 19: “The Iraqi government and Sunni Arab tribes must aggressively pursue al Qaeda”. So, my question to the Study Group is:

Are your recommended requirements for Iraq regarding such things as interest rates, their pricing of oil, and aggressive pursuance of al Qaeda part of our commitment to the Iraqi people, or are they based on U.S. interest or the interest of U.S. corporations? And if the former, can you explain how these requirements benefit Iraqis?


Torture

Can there be any question that our numerous instances of the torture of Iraqi citizens, in most cases based on nothing more than a misguided suspicion of wrong doing, is a major reason for the afore mentioned negative view that Iraqis have of our country and their approval of attacks on our soldiers? Or, can there be any doubt that the insurgency in Iraq is largely fueled by our torture policies, as discussed here?

It seems to me that this is a particularly important issue in view of the fact that the recently signed Military Commissions Act given George W. Bush the sole power to determine when his perceived enemies may be tortured. Yet, the Study Group report never once mentions this issue. So my question to them is:

Shouldn’t you add some recommendations pertaining to our policies regarding the torture of Iraqis? And more specifically, shouldn’t you recommend that the Military Commissions Act be revised to comply with international law and generally accepted international standards of morality?


The role of al Qaeda in Iraq

The Study Group makes numerous references in their report to the importance of our presence in Iraq to our war against al Qaeda – as if a primary purpose of the report is to resurrect long discredited Bush administration talking points. Yet nowhere in the report is there any explanation to the American people as to why the war in Iraq is important to our fight against al Qaeda or terrorism in general. And the report even acknowledges (page 4) that the total number of foreign fighters in Iraq is only about 1,300. More important still is the fact that, as referenced above, not only is there no evidence that our presence in Iraq is useful to our “War on Terror”, but it actually assists al Qaeda in the recruitment of new terrorists. So my question to the Study Group is:

Why do you imply that our presence in Iraq is important to our “War on Terror”, what evidence do you have for that, and shouldn’t you discuss how our presence in Iraq is likely to hurt us in our efforts to combat terrorism?


Reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure

To be fair to the Iraq Study Group, they do deal in some depth with the need to reconstruct the infrastructure of Iraq (pages 86-90) that was destroyed during our invasion and bombing of Iraq and during the subsequent war. Yet nowhere in the report is there any discussion of the handing out of no-bid contracts to Bush administration friends, their subsequent negligence and fraud, or the failure of the Bush administration to pursue that problem. My question to the Study Group is:

In addressing the reconstruction of Iraq (which you agree is necessary), isn’t it essential to investigate and take action against those corporations who have been given contracts for that reconstruction and who have defrauded the U.S. government and the Iraqi people? And isn’t it also necessary to recommend ways to prevent future occurrences of such fraud?


Permanent military bases and oil

In discussing the need for diplomacy, the report states (page 60):

The United States can begin to shape a positive climate for its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq, through public statements by President Bush that reflect the notion that the United States seeks to control Iraq’s oil, or seeks permanent military bases within Iraq.

That’s all very well and good. And certainly it is important to negate the perception that the U.S. involvement in Iraq is motivated by its own financial interests, as indicated by the above mentioned World Opinion Poll, which shows that 80% of Iraqis believe the U.S. intends to establish permanent military bases in Iraq. But certainly the Study Group doesn’t believe that all we have to do to convince Iraqis and the world of our good intentions is for George Bush to make a statement to that effect?

It is U.S. actions, not U.S. words, that most influence public perception of our intentions. For example, the fact that almost immediately upon our invasion of Iraq we secured its oil supplies while allowing everything else to go to hell, certainly did nothing to convince world or Iraqi opinion of our pristine intentions. Nor, it seems to me, does the frequent reference of the Iraq Study Group to oil, as on page 86:

The United States should provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updating professional training programs for management and technical personnel.

So my question to the Study Group is:

What concrete actions do you recommend, as opposed to mere words, to convince the Iraqi people and the world that our presence in Iraq is not based mainly on national or corporate interest?


Oil subsidies

On page 85 the report says that we “should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector” in order to ensure that Iraqis pay ‘market prices’ for oil. I don’t have any problems with that, but

How can we in good conscience make such demands upon Iraq, when we have similarly recently passed an energy bill that is full of pork barrel subsidies for the energy industry?


Attacks by U.S. forces on journalists

Arthur Neslin at The Guardian has written in great detail about how U.S. forces in Iraq have made aggressive efforts to prevent coverage of the Iraq war by foreign journalists who write things about the war that meet with the dissatisfaction of our pResident, and even how we have threatened, jailed, tortured, and killed journalists for reporting things that we didn’t want reported.

The Iraq study group says nothing about any of this. Given all the references in the Study Group report to our commitment to the Iraqi people, my question to them is:

Don’t actions such as those described above do a great disservice to the Iraqi people (as well as the American people) by preventing them from learning about what is going on in their own country? And if George Bush is so interested in bringing Democracy to the Iraqi people, doesn’t the aggressive censoring of news about the war pose a great barrier to that goal?


A veiled threat to the American people?

Last but not least, perhaps I’m being paranoid, but on page x of the introduction to the report, in the form of a “Letter from the Co-chairs”, the co-chairs warn:

Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debate within a democracy. YET (emphasis added), U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure – as is any course of action in Iraq – if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus.

It seems to me that they’re saying that dissent against their report by American citizens will doom our efforts in Iraq – and by extension, will doom our “War on terror” to failure, since the Study Group considers the two to be so closely related. And since our Military Commissions Act gives George Bush the power to declare as an “enemy combatant” anyone acting against what he deems to be U.S. vital interests, that could make those who dissent against the Study Group’s report an “enemy combatant”, subject to indefinite imprisonment without even the right to habeas corpus. Therefore, I think that it is important to ask the Study Group:

Do you believe that vocal dissension against your report could qualify a person as an “enemy combatant”?