Bush Military History Project #^

[exlrrp]

Journal entry #6

This is being written as a journal in democraticunderground and cross posted on myleftwing and dailykos. To read the rest of the series, go to democraticunderground.com journals  exlrrp. Or click on my name at the other sites.

In BMHP #5 I showed how the statements Killian and Harris made on the Officers Effectiveness training Report of 1973, covering the year 1May72 through 30Apr73 were absolutely and inarguably false and that they knew they were false.
The report:
Page 1:
Page 2:
On the report they state that “Lt Bush has not been observed at this unit during the time of this report….He cleared this base on May 15th……”
Killian (and Harris and the others, including Bush) was well aware that those statements were false because Killian had suspended Bush on August 1st, 1972 and there was a paper trail to that effect. George Bush could not have cleared post on May 15th because he did not even put in for transfer until May 24, 1972-- —and that was turned down for being contrary to regulations. (note: Bush falsifies his MOS here saying it was 1125B, an obsolete F86 pilot. He was 1125D, an F102a pilot. Note the date; May 24, 9 days after he had supposedly “cleared post”) He was still in the 111th on 5 Sep when he applied to Jerry Killian—his commander!-- for a transfer out of the 111th:
There are 12 separate documents that show Bush being in the 111th FIS (or the 147th ftr grp of which the 111th is a part) (pages 251—263, Unfit Commander) until at least the 6th of September—the day his commanders—Jerry Killian (111th) and Bobby Hodges (147th) signed his transfer approval. Untill that time, he was indubitably and inarguably in the 111th and part of the 147th.
Yet Killian and Harris allowed an official report to go out over their names with falsified information—that Bush had left their unit 4 months earlier than the record shows he did.

The regulations demanded that George Bush stay in his assigned job and not go playing politics in Alabama. As it says in the disallowal of this request “… A review of his Master Personnel File shows he has a Military Service Obligation until 26 May 1974…..Under the provisions of 30d 4 AFM 35-3 an obligated Reservist can be assigned to a specific Ready Reserve position only. Therefore he is ineligible for an assignment to an Air Reserve Squadron….” Clearly the regulations quoted demanded that he stay in his assigned job—so how did he get the transfer on the second request? (illegally--it wasn’t sent through channels and did not get the necessary ARPC approval—this will be covered soon)
Killian and Harris falsified this official report, backdating his real exit from their unit, because they were trying to show that George Bush had left the 111th before they were required to convene the flight board. And they did not rate him, as required.
This was sheer and willfull dereliction of duty. It was Killian’s, Harris’s, Hodges, Staudt’s and everybody else in the chain of comand’s DUTY to convene a flight evaluation board and determine the reason for Bush’s refusal to take the physical. Read the regulations, they are very clear: http://www.glcq.com/regs/35-13_1971.pdf They ran away from their duty for political reasons—there is no other explanation.
Among the most curious facts about this document is that neither Killian or Harris SIGNED this document, nor did Hodges sign an acceptance of it, like they’d done on the previous 2 OETR’s. Killian, Harris and Hodges knew that it was a false statement—that’s why none of them signed it, like they had before so unctuously complimentary.
So why is Bush’s command saying he left 4 months before he did? Because they were trying to show he had left their unit before they were required to discipline him. What further illustrates this is that his pay records show him going missing for 6 straight months: http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/gwb72-73milpay-p1.html from April 16th to Oct 28th 1972.
This is because if his pay records showed him at the 111th or 147th after May 15th, it would give the absolute lie to the statement that he left on May 15th. Killian and Harris could have no trace of Bush at all in their unit after making a statement like that and sure enough—there’s no trace at all of Bush in their unit’s records after that date. But at least 1 day for sure: August 1st, the day he was suspended, should have been a duty (paid) day for Bush and that day should show Bush at the 111th in its personnel records. It does not.

So as you can see, Killian (and Harris) backdated Bush’s exit from their unit from September to May 15th and refused to rate him. How could they when they said they hadn’t seen him all that year?
Now lets look at the last of the CBS memos—the CYA document. : http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-09-09bushdocs.pdf page 7. Actually all the memos should be considered as Killian’s CYA , its what he would have kept to cover his ass in case the falsifications came out. Don’t forget when they did this no one in their right mind would have expected George Bush to be President and his record to get close scrutiny 30 years later—so they made mistakes.
Killian was no dummy and he knew what he was doing was illegal ( so did the rest). A military commander can’t falsify documents, he could lose his whole career, everything—go to jail.
So Killian would have kept copies of documents that showed he did, or tried to do, his duty towards Bush as Bush’s commander. And the CBS memos, if real, are just what he would have kept to show his side of the story and incriminate his superiors. And he did a good job, he was a real pro, although a real corrupt one.
In the final document, Killian writes just what happened to him, who put pressure on him, what they wanted him to do: “sugarcoat” Bush’s OETR of 72-73 referred to above.
“I will not rate….I’ll backdate but I won’t rate…” Jerry Killian. Underneath the “sugarcoating” killian is confessing to a crime here: agreeing to falsify bush’s documents, and any conversation he had about it with his superiors was conspiracy to falsify dopcuments. That’s the importance of memo #6, the “Sir, we can’t rate” memo. Whoever got that memo’s goose is cooked: any talk among Bush’s superiors in which Killian is ordered or “suggested” to “Backdate but not rate” is conspiracy to commit a crime—a crime that DID happen and that Killian DOES confess to.A commander can’t enter information on an official form he knows to be false. And the falsification he confesses to here is in Bush’s records—Killian DID “backdate but not rate” George W Bush, just as he confesses to in the CYA document. When he says he’s having ”…trouble running interference and still doing my job…” it means he’s caught in a bind between his official duty and saving Bush’s sorry ass. Helen Knox said that Killian was pissed at Bush (Hodges said he was “miffed”) and he sure was—Bush’s antics could have cost him his whole career. (Which says a lot about Bush’s willingness to put other people’s lives and careers at risk to get his little peccadilloes settled.)
So now we come to the most crucial question about this: if these are forged, how did the forger know that’s what Killian did? How did the forger know the intimate details of a small conspiracy to falsify official papers and defraud the government? He would have had to know exactly the part each played and he would have had to have complete and comprehensive understanding of Bush’s records. There’s nobody in the world who could have done this that wasn’t an intimate to the situation. And there’s nobody who was intimate to that situation that had the talent—or motivation -- to do the extensive forgery of 6 different documents AND Jerry Killian’s signature.
Understanding the CBS memos takes knowledge of Bush’s papers enough to know that Killian and the others were guilty of crimes including falsification of official documents and defrauding the USAF and the whole government. And what the CBS papers represent is evidence and explanation of those crimes as given through the eyes of Jerry Killian.
Are they forged? Well, we know that the people who know for sure—Bush and his people—won’t say. And we know for sure they’d say it if it exonerated them.
More to come.