Learning counterinsurgency: observations from soldiering in Iraq

[spindrifter]

Military Review, Jan-Feb, 2006 by David H. Petraeus

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What follows is the distillation of a number of observations jotted down during that time. Some of these observations are specific to soldiering in Iraq, but the rest speak to the broader challenge of conducting counterinsurgency operations in a vastly different culture than our own. I offer 14 of those observations here in the hope that others will find them of assistance as they prepare to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan or in similar missions in the years ahead.

Observation Number 1 is "Do not try to do too much with your own hands." T.E. Lawrence offered this wise counsel in an article published in The Arab Bulletin in August 1917. Continuing, he wrote: "Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is. It may take them longer and it may not be as good as you think, but if it is theirs, it will be better." (2)

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Observation Number 2 is that, in a situation like Iraq, the liberating force must act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an Army of occupation. The length of this half-life is tied to the perceptions of the populace about the impact of the liberating force's activities. From the moment a force enters a country, its leaders must keep this in mind, striving to meet the expectations of the liberated in what becomes a race against the clock.

<snip>

Observation Number 3 is that, in an endeavor like that in Iraq, money is ammunition. In fact, depending on the situation, money can be more important than real ammunition--and that has often been the case in Iraq since early April 2003 when Saddam's regime collapsed and the focus rapidly shifted to reconstruction, economic revival, and restoration of basic services. Once money is available, the challenge is to spend it effectively and quickly to rapidly achieve measurable results. This leads to a related observation that the money needs to be provided as soon as possible to the organizations that have the capability and capacity to spend it in such a manner.

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http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_1_86/ai_n16346153

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Lt. General David Petraeus is the former commander of the 101st Airborne Division. His article is lengthy, but based on observations and thought and well worth the time it takes to read and consider it. Of course, it is highly unlikely that the article would form the basis for any real discussion among members of BushCo.

[Selatius]

1. I think we lost the race against the clock according to point two

We have become in the eyes of Iraqis the "army of occupation." There's too much blood to rinse away at this point.

[Warren Stupidity]

2. Uh what army of liberation would that be?

"the liberating force?" Say what? We were the conquering force and until David Petraeus gets a grip on the half life of bullshit his observations are tainted by his delusional starting point.

[MercutioATC]

3. No money, but can't we just use the flowers they threw at us instead?

You know, the flowers ...