Testimony of Michael I. Shamos
Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the
Census of the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform Committee
Oversight hearing on “The Science of Voting Machine Technology: Accuracy,
Reliability, and Security,” July 20, 2004
Mr. Chairman: My name is Michael Shamos. I have been a faculty member in the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh since 1975. I am also an attorney admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. From 1980-2000 I was statutory examiner of electronic voting systems for both Pennsylvania and Texas and participated in every voting system examination held in those states during those 20 years. In all, I have examined over 100 different electronic voting systems, used to count over 11% of the popular vote of the
United States in the 2000 election.
This hearing is about the science of voting machine technology. There presently is no such field of science, if by science we mean an organized experimental discipline with authoritative principles and published journals. The reason is that until the year 2000 it was difficult to interest scientists in a problem so apparently trivial as counting ballots. As we saw in Florida in 2000, it is not a trivial problem and we desperately need a field of voting science.
However, there is no systematic science of voting machine technology, no engineering journal devoted to the subject, no academic department, nor even a comprehensive textbook. There are no adequate standards for voting machines, nor any effective testing protocols. It is only a set of minimum statutory requirements, public budgets and the law of the marketplace that have shaped the development of voting machines. When a flaw is detected in a voting machine, there is no compulsory procedure for reporting it, studying it, repairing it or even learning from the experience. the voting machine industry is unregulated and it has not chosen to regulate itself. I do
not believe the public will long tolerate such a situation.
While recent newspaper articles and statements by certain computer scientists have shed doubt on the ability of direct-recording electronic machines (DREs) to count votes securely and reliably, it should be noted that in the 25 years these machines have been used in the United States, there has not been a single verified incident of tampering or exploitation of a security weakness. The concerns that have been expressed, and unfortunately taken up with unjustified gusto by the popular press, represent a hypothetical rather than a real threat to the electoral process. Various design flaws and
potential avenues of attack have been identified, and it is important to analyze and repair them, rather than flee to methods of voting that are even less safe.
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