Where can I find active link to Bev H. and H. Dean exposing GEMS?

[GuvWurld]

I've seen this so many times and cannot find a copy of it now. Thanks.

[liberalnurse]

1. I think it is on the voter gate link......

I don't go to her site...ever anymore since she was such a whore with Andy.

Yes, I hate her.

[kster]

2. Not sure if this will help

HOWARD DEAN SHOWN IN 90 SECONDS HOW CHENEY BUSH ROVE AND DIEBOLD STOLE THE VOTE



Dean: All right, Bev, show me how to do this.

Harris: Well, What we have here is the central tabulator computer. Now in a voting system you have all these different voting machines at all the different polling places, sometimes, as in a county like mine, there's a thousand polling places in one county.

http://cleveland.indymedia.org/news/2004/11/13198.php

[Bill Bored]

3. I like this one:

http://www.crocuta.net/Dean/Dean_Host_TopicA_Aug8_2004.htm

But keep in mind that this a pretty lame hack. Precinct totals will not match tabulator totals and the whole thing can be detected that way. I'm glad it was demonstrated, but the truth of how the election was stolen is probably much different than this. And as soon as Kevin Shelley or some other well-meaning BoE type explains how easy it is to mitigate this particular threat, the issue is diffused.

[GuvWurld]

4. Thanks for the link. The reason I'm looking for this is...

I'm coordinating a Parallel Election for Humboldt County, CA. One of the people I'm recruiting to volunteer asked some questions about the voting equipment we use locally. I mentioned GEMS but she hadn't heard anything about it. She had a total "it can't happen here" attitude although she believes there is good cause for concern elsewhere and perhaps in general. This clip will bring it home for her and I'd really like to get it to her. I did send her the transcript link for now so thanks for that.

[Amaryllis]

10. Shelley was very much aware of how easy it is to hack. See this:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=132x2229726

[garybeck]

5. It is on the CD-ROM, why don't you have a free copy yet?

EVERYONE THAT READS THIS FORUM SHOULD HAVE A COPY OF THE CD-ROM.

GET YOUR FREE COPY TODAY:

http://www.solarbus.org/election/cd/

MAKE LOTS OF COPIES.
GIVE THEM AWAY.
GO FOR IT.

[garybeck]

6. about central tabulators....

when convincing people of electronic voting machine fraud, we should not get overly focused on central tabulators. Central tabulators can only be used to alter vote counts when precinct level numbers are NOT released publicly. If precinct results are public, it is my understanding the central tablutors (GEMS) can't be used to commit fraud because it would be too easy for people to add up the numbers themselves and detect the problem.

I can't speak for other states, but in VT we have precinct reporting.

the real problem is the voting machines, whether they are opscan or DRE, doesn't matter. that's where the crime is undectectable.

[Carolab]

13. But doesn't it also depend on how the precinct totals are reported?

I mean, if they are stored on memory cards/cartridges and those are taken to the central location and then downloaded there, along the way those cards could be swapped out, couldn't they? Or if the totals are transmitted via modem, how do we know the totals in the machines are accurate in the first place? As you say, the machines are the problem--they should be the first line of defense. We should know that they are not connected to a network, cannot be accessed remotely, and that the storage devices are clean (free of executable vote-switching programs). We should also have random audits throughout so that we can be assured that the machines are tallying properly. And the storage devices, if they are transported before the data is dumped and reported--must be handled with a tight chain of command just like evidence in a police investigation.

[Bill Bored]

14. You are correct, however those machines are programmed via the

central tabulators. You can screw up all the machines in the jurisdiction but their counts will still match the tabulator counts.

[Carolab]

15. I'm not sure I understand what you mean.

As I understand it, the precinct totals are collected on memory cards or cartridges. Those cards are hand carried and the results are uploaded into the central tabulators. Or, I think in some states the legislation allows modem transfer to the central tabulators. If the machines are preprogrammed to switch votes, how can you tell? The precinct totals have been corrupted from the start. Also, if the memory cards have been preprogrammed to swap votes or they are themselves swapped out with switched votes, how can you tell? The central tabulators don't control the precinct machines, from what I understand. The precinct totals are merely uploaded from the precinct machines or the totals are phoned in, or the memory cards are taken to the central location and uploaded there.

[Bill Bored]

17. Nobody understands this except the ones stealing our votes.

Here is the process:

1. Ballot Definition Programming is created on GEMS or a similar EMS for every election.

2. Ballot Definition Files (BDFs) are downloaded to every DRE in the jurisdiction FROM GEMS. I don't care if it's via dial-up, sneakernet, ethernet or Internet; the Ballot Definitions originate FROM GEMS.

3. Election. Vote switching can occur as a result of corrupt or incorrectly programmed BDFs. This is what shows up in EIRS reports, newspaper articles, etc. or sometimes may happen without the voters even knowing it.

4. Election results are uploaded BACK to GEMS.

5. GEMS aggregates already corrupted precinct results (tabulation). Precinct totals will always match tabulator totals, but they may be wrong at the precinct to begin with due to bad BDF programming.

In short, they aren't just tabulators -- they're Election Management Systems!

[Carolab]

18. Thanks for the detail Bill, BUT does this work for optiscans too?

Isn't the methodology different than with DREs/touch screens?

[Bill Bored]

19. Not much different with Diebold Op Scans.

They are still programmed from GEMS. It's more of a difference in the way the software is distributed. But as I said, a sneakernet can be just as good (or bad) as an ethernet. The point is that any mistakes or intentional corruption of the BDFs can cause either the Op Scanners or the DREs to miscount or to make certain combinations of votes difficult or impossible to cast (vote switching).

The big advantages of Op Scans are the ballots themselves, which are easily counted by hand, and that the scanners can be tested more rigorously in a given amount of time than DREs can.

[Carolab]

20. So what do the memory cards have to do with it?

Because I read about that research Bev's group did in Florida in which they found an executable program resident on the card and also created one on a card, right?

[Carolab]

21. To wit:

The Diebold optical scan system uses a dangerous programming methodology, with an executable program living inside the electronic ballot box. This method is the equivalent of having a little man living in the ballot box, holding an eraser and a pencil. With an executable program in the memory card, no Diebold opti-scan ballot box can be considered "empty" at the start of the election.

The Black Box Voting team proved that the Diebold optical scan program, housed on a chip inside the voting machine, places a call to a program living in the removable memory card during the election. The demonstration also showed that the executable program on the memory card (ballot box) can easily be changed, and that checks and balances, required by FEC standards to catch unauthorized changes, were not implemented by Diebold -- yet the system was certified anyway.

The Diebold system in Leon County, Florida succumbed to multiple attacks.

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/5921.html

[Bill Bored]

22. I can't comment too specifically about what they did....

But from just reading the Diebold manuals, one could infer that there have to be some executables in the scanners and DREs to correctly interpret and act on the information in the Ballot Definition Files.

For example, without executable code, how would a DRE or an Op Scanner know that a vote in a race for the "Democratic Party" (in a state where straight party voting is allowed) is actually telling the machine to cast and count a vote for every Democrat on the ballot? And without executable code, how would an Op Scanner know to return a ballot that contained overvotes or undervotes, to give the voter a chance to fix it?

All this and more is contained in the code that comes from GEMS for every election and is stored in the scanners' and DREs' memory cards. So the fact that someone with physical access to these cards could alter the way they function is no surprise, and I believe there are much easier ways to do similar things to lots of machines without jumping through all the hoops they jumped through in that report.

[GuvWurld]

7. I found a good version

http://whitey.gnn.tv/blogs/1123/How_to_Hack_the_Vote

Thanks for the suggestions.

[GuvWurld]

8. dupe. delete.

[althecat]

9. The original version is here....

http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0307/S00065.htm

the first and original version of the story.....

[petgoat]

11. The Department of Homeland Security issued an alert

about hacker vulnerabilies in GEMS.

http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/bulletins/SB04-252.html#diebold

The alert was issued in August of 2004. Brad Friedman did a piece on it.

http://www.bradblog.com/archives/00001838.htm

[hunter]

12. Homeland Security wouldn't know their asses from a hole in the ground.

The purpose of the site you linked to is to make it look like Homeland Security is doing something about "hackers." They are not. The link you gave is basically a Bulletin Board, and not a well moderated one at that.

The overall purpose of Homeland Security is to funnel money to friends of the Bush Administration and to make you afraid, so you will feel like they are protecting you. The victims of the hurricanes, especially in New Orleans, know that's not true.

This little rant aside, it is simply stupid for us to use anything but paper ballots. Electronic voting invites fraud. Nobody can see a vote stored as an electronic bit, and nobody can see when such a vote is changed.

[demodonkey]

16. Just for Everyone's Info, It is ANDY running the computer on that video.

It is actually ANDY pulling down the menus and doing the clicking while the close-ups of the laptop screen were being filmed.

It was also filmed on Andy's laptop.

Shortly before Andy had his surgery at Johns Hopkins, I watched all of "Votergate" with him in Baltimore on computer video, at which time he told me this.

:loveya: Andy! :loveya:

(Gosh I miss him, and I appreciate this chance to send him some floaty hearts again!)

Marybeth