5/17 L.A. Board of Supes Meeting-we need people there

[JunkYardDogg]

Tuesday, May 17,
We will present the following agenda to the Board of Supes-
I will be making the following Presentation before the L.A. County Board of Supervisors
This is the second stage of our program to hold Conny McCormack accountable and to get the Supes more active in controlling and monitoring the RoV and raise their Election Integrity awareness
the location is the Hall of Administration Building, 500 W. Temple
Parking is across the street at the Church Garage, $16 for the day
This is our 2nd appearance before the Board
I wasn't able to post earlier, as I have had a bunch of computer problems

CALIFORNIA ELECTION PROTECTION NETWORK
Subject: L.A. County Inka Vote HAVA Enhancement RFP
To: L.A. County Board of Supervisors



We are requesting these nine (9) items be acted upon by the L.A.
County Board of Supervisors, in order to Promote and Preserve
the Integrity and Sanctity of Fair and Secure Elections in L.A. County.

The first three items we hereby request be officially made part of the Inka Vote RFP.
The following five (5) items, numbers 4 through 8, we hereby request be adapted as
L.A. County Regulations and/or Statutes. Item number 9, we hereby request that the
Registrar of Voters office provide the requested details.

TO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE INKA VOTE ENHANCEMENT RFP:
1. The RFP calls for a Precinct-Based Ballot Reader (PBR) at EACH Polling Site.
The purpose and function of the PBR is to read the ballots and alert the voter to any over or undervotes. The PBR will also electronically record the voters’ choices on a removable media storage device, i.e. memory card or disk. The PBR is networked, via easily removable data transmission cables, to EACH voting station. There are, on the average, six voting stations per each polling site. The PBR unit has software to receive, transmit, and record data. The data being the electronic record of all the votes cast at the polling site.
PROBLEM:
The use of unsecured, easily removable data transmission cables severely compromises the integrity of the voting data and therefore is an EXTREMELY vulnerable security risk.
At the voting station, a person can, easily, without any tools, by hand, disconnect the data transmission cable from the voting station That same person, can then connect the end of the cable into a hand held computing device, such as a PDA, and transmit electronic data into the PBR unit, thus corrupting and altering the electronic programming and voting data.
Solution:
The PBR Unit data transmission cables must be firmly and securely attached at each end, one end at each individual voting station and the other end to the PBR unit. Each end/connection
must be encased within an enclosure to block any attempt to disconnect the cables. This is an extremely weak point.
2. PBR Software: There must be some form of Firewall and security program written into the software to prevent tampering.
3. Section 11.0, Exhibit D, page 20:
Requiring Wireless Connections and Capabilities-
This MUST BE REMOVED from the RFP.
There CANNOT be ANY Internet connectivity or Electronic Data Transfer whatsoever, of any type.

REGULATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS:
4. PBR Memory Disks-i.e. removable media storage devices-
A. These must be transported, along with the ballots, to the County’s HQ.
B. The memory disks must comply with the same 22 month holding period as the ballots after an election.
5. Posting of Results at Each Poll Site-after closing of the Polling Sites-
A. When will the totals and results be posted at each Polling Site?
B. We request that the totals/results be taken from the PBR at EACH Polling Site and posted prior to transport to County HQ. This serves as an auditing tool to compare to the computer generated results from the County’s Central Tabulator

6. An Onsite Log must be maintained at Each Polling Site, which must show all the details of each and every person who accesses and performs work on the PBR Unit and OptiScanners – the log must list the date, time, description of work performed, ID of person accessing the Equipment, name, drivers license number, employer, signature, and witness of work performed.

7. At EACH Polling Site-Copies of the State Certifications and the Federal Qualifications MUSTbe posted for all components of the Voting System, in much the same manner as a business posts for public viewing their business licenses and legal permits.

8. The County Registrar of Voters Office must provide at each polling site, available to all voters, an Error and Incident Report form, which can be filled out by any voter who has encountered an error or a problem while attempting to vote.. Such reports are to be made public.

9. We hereby request that the County Registrar of Voters Office fully identifies ALL of the Computer components of the vote counting process used by L.A. County, including but not limited to:
A. Micro Tally System (MTS)-EACH individual component
B Tally Computers
C Summary Computer
D. Mainframe Computer System
E. Central Tabulator
F. OptiScan System

Identification includes: Vender, Supplier, Manufacturer, writer of software, firmware and
Software versions, dates of purchase

[Wilms]

1. LA calling. n/t