SHOW ME MY BALLOT THAT'S COUNTED!

[Kip Humphrey]

SHOW ME MY BALLOT THAT'S COUNTED!

The only real solution to insecure electronic voting is PAPER BALLOTS, HAND COUNTED. We all know this.

If we all know this, what's the problem? Why aren't we all pushing for this solution everywhere and why isn't it well received?


I surmise the reason is we all recognize hand counted paper ballots run contrary to American's insatiable taste for technological progress and will be deemed unpopular.

If this is true, achieving hand counted paper ballots will require significant education and time.

What do we do in the meantime? Let 2006 and 2008 be repeats of 2002 and 2004?

I propose an interim solution: a new campaign that makes a clear and compelling demand of elected officials; a new campaign most Americans can support and get behind; a campaign that directly assaults electronic voting; a campaign that will help build the movement; a campaign that has an intrinsic solution built in.

SHOW ME MY BALLOT THAT'S COUNTED!

Here's the basis:

Scanners and DREs operate by interpreting our ballot input and deriving a database data record which is then tabulated becoming the official ballot that is counted. It really doesn't matter what the input device is or how one votes. The ballot that is counted, and therefore, the ballot of importance is the vote data record residing in a database. Given this reality, my solution is simple transparency: Show me my ballot that's counted! Show me my data record. Allow me to verify the interpretation of my vote is accurate. Give me a means to challenge and correct an inaccurate data record. Let me and the world see the vote data records that are counted. Open the vote database to allow separate and confirming tabulations and analysis.

You see, I don't care how the data records are derived. I don't care about proprietary software. I don't care about the machine I vote on.

I care that my vote is recorded accurately and is counted accurately!

Furthermore, it is incumbent on the state to show me my ballot that is counted and to open the secret counting of ballots to public inspection.


How would this work, given ANY input device?

While my campaign doesn't require a solution, I have one:

Ingredients:

1. Paper receipts recording vote selections and a unique data record identifier

2. Open public access (read only) to all vote data records: i.e., the master vote processing database which is tabulated to produce the official vote totals

3. Open access for all voters to view their vote data record on-line or by kiosk

4. A process whereby voters may contest the accuracy of their data record. Easy to do: compare your receipt to the database data record that matches your unique ballot identifier. They either match or they don't. Give voters 10 days to contest the accuracy of their data record.

5. Open (read only) access to the master vote database (the one that's tabulated), enabling anyone to count the recorded votes.

6. Publish the precinct ballot count totals to ensure fictitious data records aren't added to the master vote database.


After inputing vote selections (whether by DRE, scanner, or Internet voting - it doesn't matter!):

Offer a paper receipt to the voter that records the votes with a unique data record identifier (ballot number). If the voter chooses to accept a receipt (and this must be optional to protect the vulnerable), the voter now has the means to check the data record at any time by given access to the master vote database (access is by precinct kiosks or mirrored Internet site).

Show the vote interpretation for voter confirmation: the data record as recorded in the master vote database; the voter's recorded data record

To ensure against stuffing the ballot database, each precinct counts, verifies and posts publicly the total number of ballots (data records) cast and the total number of voters processed through the polling place.

Open the master vote database (the one that's tabulated) to public examination and, therefore, independent tabulation.



(Available at The Protest Store: http://www.cafepress.com/theproteststore/552149)

SHOW ME MY BALLOT - The Ballot That's Counted!

Give me a numbered paper receipt AND access to the master vote database.

Let me verify the accuracy of my interpreted data record AND let me count the vote.

Give me a means to contest the accuracy of my data record and correct any inaccuracies


TRY TO STEAL MY VOTE NOW!!!

[MissWaverly]

1. Good summary!

I'm with you, I just read on another thread here that someone said that was no proof that the 2004 election was stolen, I saw the machine default to GWB 5 times when I pressed the button for Kerry,
aren't eyewitness accounts acceptable in murder cases. If the machine wasn't rigged, why was it doing that? If the voter could verify their vote,then the padded votes would dissappear because the numbers would have to be sequential just like checks. So me, registered voter, would have the number 3259 and if there are 2,000 votes between me and registered voter number 3260, then something is up!

[Andy_Stephenson]

2. Ingredients:

1. Paper receipts recording vote selections and a unique data record identifier

NO NEVER! Especially now. Vote here is trying hard to get a toehold as is populex. Frankly, I don't want them to engrypt my vote any further. With "reciepts" you get into an issue of vote selling or vote coersion. Imagine you work for a rat winger...to keep your job you have to show you voted for Bush...or whatever he wanted you to vote for. Sorry this has been floated before. Keep thinking though.

2. Open public access (read only) to all vote data records: i.e., the master vote processing database which is tabulated to produce the official vote totals

Why go through all that when paper ballots count as the same thing.

3. Open access for all voters to view their vote data record on-line or by kiosk

See above re vote selling and coersion.

4. A process whereby voters may contest the accuracy of their data record. Easy to do: compare your receipt to the database data record that matches your unique ballot identifier. They either match or they don't. Give voters 10 days to contest the accuracy of their data record.

Why go through all this? If a voter verifies his ballot at the time of the election there is no need for this step. It adds confusion...try telling this idea to an election administrator.

5. Open (read only) access to the master vote database (the one that's tabulated), enabling anyone to count the recorded votes.

Paper is easy to count. I don't want an interface between me and my ballot.

6. Publish the precinct ballot count totals to ensure fictitious data records aren't added to the master vote database.

This is already done in most states. They are called poll tapes.

Andy

[Kip Humphrey]

3. Andy: I knew I could count on you to step up

However, arguing against an interim measure until hand counted paper ballots become a reality is circular.

1. Paper receipts recording vote selections and a unique data record identifier

NO NEVER! Especially now. Vote here is trying hard to get a toehold as is populex. Frankly, I don't want them to encrypt my vote any further. With "receipts" you get into an issue of vote selling or vote coercion. Imagine you work for a rat winger...to keep your job you have to show you voted for Bush...or whatever he wanted you to vote for. Sorry this has been floated before. Keep thinking though.


I agree that any VVPR is subject to abuse by abusive people. However, lacking hand counted paper ballots, I still want to see my ballot that gets counted. If a voter is fearful, or can't stand up for themselves, don't take a receipt. But let me see my ballot that get counted!

2. Open public access (read only) to all vote data records: i.e., the master vote processing database which is tabulated to produce the official vote totals

Why go through all that when paper ballots count as the same thing.

The database already exists in most cases so "going through all that" is not much of an issue or argument. I suggest, given the opportunity, you would be first in line to verify your data record and check the count!

4. A process whereby voters may contest the accuracy of their data record. Easy to do: compare your receipt to the database data record that matches your unique ballot identifier. They either match or they don't. Give voters 10 days to contest the accuracy of their data record.

Why go through all this? If a voter verifies his ballot at the time of the election there is no need for this step. It adds confusion...try telling this idea to an election administrator.

I 'verified' my vote when I last voted, didn't you? That doesn't give me any comfort or any assurance my vote was recorded accurately or counted accurately. That's why I'm here! If you had an opportunity to verify your data record and found it to be inaccurate, would you 'bother' to get it corrected? I sure would. Election administrators (especially RNC types) likely will not like citizens checking the accuracy of the vote. SO WHAT!!! They are not likely to be early adopters of hand counted paper ballots either.

5. Open (read only) access to the master vote database (the one that's tabulated), enabling anyone to count the recorded votes.

Paper is easy to count. I don't want an interface between me and my ballot.

Until hand counted paper ballots are a reality, here's the fact: Paper is NOT counted. Another fact: if your vote is tabulated by computer, you already have an interface between you and your ballot that gets counted. Only you never get to see your ballot that gets counted.

6. Publish the precinct ballot count totals to ensure fictitious data records aren't added to the master vote database.

This is already done in most states. They are called poll tapes.

Agreed. I added this to forestall adding fictitious data records to the master vote database. Only make it every state. I might add, for 80% of us that database already exists too. It would not take a great deal of effort to convert systems with these proposed provisions. We are no longer fighting politically entrenched corporate interests, and we have the strong argument of transparency on our side.

What argument can opposition muster? NO, because Americans shouldn't have the right to see their ballots that get counted? Or your "Why go through all that" (when "all that" isn't very much given what's already in place)? I can deal with those arguments. Oh, and look: my solution even works with Internet voting! Or vote by mail. Or vote by coconuts!

If we are going to vote and count votes electronically - and we already do - make it open and transparent... Until we are voting and counting paper ballots.

Let's discuss this over a beer in Nashville.

[Kip Humphrey]

4. Kicking this in hopes of generating some serious consideration

NO HIDDEN BALLOTS - NO SECRET COUNTING