Excellent testimony against e-voting systems by NY citizen activist

[Amaryllis]

This is the testimony of a citizen activist before the NY Assembly Committee on Election Law against E-voting systems. She also recommmends alternatives. This is excellent.

www.wheresthepaper.org

Statement Against the Acquisition and Use of

Electronic Voting Systems in New York

Before the Assembly Committee on Election Law

December 20, 2004


Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Teresa Hommel. I have been working as a citizen activist on the subject of electronic voting for the last 18 months. My professional credentials are that I have worked with computers since 1967 as a programmer, technical writer, corporate trainer, and consultant.

I will address the selected issue “What lessons should New York take from the experience of the 2004 election to ensure electoral access and participation, particularly with regard to the implementation of HAVA and NVRA?

I caution New York against passing any law that would allow our state to move forward with the purchase and use of electronic voting systems that are either unverifiable, or allowed to be used without verification.

I recommend two alternatives to electronic voting: One is to keep our old lever machines, and add one accessible ballot-marking device per polling place. The other is to switch to paper ballots and precinct-count optical scanners, with one accessible ballot-marking device per polling place. Electronic voting systems already in use should be required to add printers to produce voter-verifiable paper ballots, and Boards of Election must be required to audit each computer’s work by counting the voter-verified paper ballots and reconciling differences between the computer and paper tallies.

My comments are organized as answers to several questions.

A. What are the requirements for legitimate, democratic elections?

B. What happened in New York state on November 2 in regard to computerized elections?

C. Can computers serve the requirements for legitimate, democratic elections? If so, how?

D. What are the problems with surprise random recounts?

E. Can Boards of Elections manage secure computerized voting and vote tabulating systems?

F. Should all voters use the same exact voting technology?

G. What are the alternatives to computerized elections?

Entire testimony:

http://www.wheresthepaper.org/ElectionLawDec20.htm

[Melissa G]

1. Thanks Amaryllis! great reading! n/t

[Amaryllis]

2. This reinforced my belief that we need to demand what we want, and quit

accepting when they tell us "Face it, you're stuck with e-voting, and all you can do is try to put a bandaid on a festering wound."
(Stomping my feet and throwing a tantrum) END secret vote counting! It is illegal! That's what Chuck Herrin says, and I know it is in Oregon. We have a law that says that all steps in the process need to be open to citizen scrutiny or some such thing.

[marions ghost]

3. Excellent--another computer specialist against DREs

I particularly appreciated this section:

Teresa Hommel:
6. Most disturbing to me, as a computer professional, is that electronic voting and vote tabulating systems are being treated as an exception to professional Information Technology standards. In my work with hundreds of companies and governmental agencies since 1967, every comparable computer system that I have seen or heard about in professional use is 100% audited, and discrepancies are reconciled for 100% accuracy.

It may be useful to compare the security that we imagine is needed for elections and banking.

Suppose you find an error on your bank statement, and you go in with your records, and the bank officer says, "we didn't audit your account this month, because our statistically significant random check said we were accurate enough." That is ridiculous.

Many people understand that 100% audits with 100% accuracy are needed to prevent or detect financial fraud, but don't carry this idea over into the world of elections. In my professional opinion, audits are needed in both worlds for the same reason.

We face an unspoken argument here.

It is that elections CANNOT be held to ordinary, routine Information Technology standards. This idea is based on the unspoken acknowledgement that Boards of Election in real life cannot perform such audits. They lack not only the intention or will, but the legal mandate, expertise, staff, and funding.

Moreover, the need for a secret ballot eliminates the use of most auditing techniques used by banks, such as tracking numbers. The secret ballot is the reason why audits of elections need to use voter-verified non-electronic records of the votes, in other words, voter-verified paper ballots.

[NationalEnquirer]

4. This is awesome!

There are plenty of reasons and people WHO SHOULD KNOW who are against e-voting, just have to get their voices heard.

[marions ghost]

5. PAPER BALLOTS

Yes, I agree Amaryllis, this gives more weight to the PAPER BALLOTS
and nothing else (or at least nothing else except scanners verified by hand counts) argument. wheresthepaper.org states very clearly:

"It is far simpler, more accurate, and less costly to conduct an election using hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots than to use a computer system and then have to audit the computer. Everyone understands the use of paper, but only a few people understand the use of computers and how to audit them."

"The technology we use for voting should not arouse the massive outcry, controversy, and lack of voter confidence that unverifiable electronic voting systems have generated. To ensure confidence in our elections we should not use unverifiable computers. Instead, simple paper ballots should be used."

(Duh).

[Amaryllis]

7. Check out this thread I just started on Diebold-they PROMOTE open software

for their ATMs as a selling point!!!!

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss//duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x328130

[Wilms]

6. kick n/t