Did you know that HAVA does NOT require States to purchase e-vote machines

[helderheid]

Most people, myself included, thought/think HAVA requires we go electronic and IT DOES NOT. Please review the following document:

http://www.votersunite.org/MB2.pdf

Here is the table of contents which I have emailed to my State committee members but I think if we faxed them, we'd be in better shape as I did not receive one response. It should be faxed to your state elections offices as well:

Contents
Preface iii
Overview viii
1 Facts about The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) 1
HAVA Does Not Require the Use of DREs 1
HAVA Does Not Prohibit Punch Card and Lever Systems 1
HAVA Preserves States' Right to Use Paper Ballots 2
HAVA "Audit" Requirement is Not a Meaningful Recount 2
HAVA Allows Partial Replacement of Old Systems 3
HAVA Preserves States' Rights to Establish Voting Equipment Standards 3
2 E-Voting Problems in Recent Elections 4
Ten Common Electronic Election Problems 4
1) Electronic Voting Machines Lose Ballots 4
2) Electronic Election Equipment Inexplicably Adds Ballots 5
3) Tabulation Software Reaches 32,767 Votes and Counts Backwards 7
4) Votes Jump to the Opponent on the Screen 8
5) DREs Provide Incorrect Ballots 9
6) Election-Specific Programming Miscounts Votes 9
7) DREs Break Down During the Election 10
8) Electronic Voting Machines Fail to Start Up 11
9) Registration Data Transmission Fails 11
10) Memory Cards and Smart Card Encoders Fail 12
Other Electronic-Election Phenomena 13
1) Election Officials Provide a Default Presidential Candidate 13
2) Totals Dip into the Negative Numbers 13
3) Voters Cast Non-Existent Ballots 14
4) DREs Require Voters To Scroll Through The Ballot Backwards 14
5) Report Shows 300 Registered Voters For Every Precinct in One County 14
3 Breaking the Myths about Testing and Certification 17
Words from Experts 17
A Look at the Current Process 18
Inadequacy of the Standards 19
Secrecy of the Qualification Process 19
State Certification — Seeing if the Functions are There 20
The Myth of Pre-Election Testing 20
The Realities of Conducting Logic & Accuracy (L&A) Testing on DREs 22
If DREs Fail the L&A Test ... 23
How's it Working? 24
4 Election Complexities Increased by Electronic Voting 25
Software Complexities 25
A Word about Source Code and Programming 25
ES&S iVotronic — Case Study of a Tiny Programming Bug 26
Safeguarding Votes: Paper vs. Electronic Data 27
Complexities that Make Government Oversight a Myth 27
Officials Cannot Oversee the Vote-Counting Process in Electronic Elections
27
Election Directors Rely on Vendor Technicians During Elections 28
Lack of Information about Malfunctions Handicaps Election Officials 30
Illegal Use of Uncertified Software 32
Software is Uncontrollable 33
Electronic Data Has No Substance That Could Resist Alteration 34
Administration Complexities 35
Chain of Custody Complexities Increase Exponentially with Electronic Data 35
Increased Problems from Human Error in Electronic Elections 36
Violation of Ballot Secrecy with the Use of DREs 38
Running an Electronic Election - a Ballot Judge's Summary 38
Running an Electronic Election – an Election Official's Report 39
Management Complexities 41
Saving Money by Combining Precincts May Decrease Voter Turnout 41
Potential DRE Problems Inherent in Electronic Devices 41
Touch Screen Misalignment 41
Power Surges or Static Electricity Discharges 42
Electrical Outages and Inadequate Battery Charges 42
Maintenance Challenges 43
Rapid Obsolescence and Toxic Waste Disposal 43
5 HAVA-Compliant Alternatives to Paperless Voting 44
Voter-Verified Paper Ballots (VVPB) 44
Precinct-Count Optical Scan Systems 45
Ballot-Marking Devices for the Disabled 46
Tactile Ballot Templates for the Blind and Reading Impaired 46
Open Voting Consortium Software 47
DREs with Integrated Printer for Printing Voter-Verified Paper Ballots 48
Ballot Integrity Project Proposal 48
6 HAVA-Compliant Voting System Costs 49
DRE Systems 49
Increased Cost Per Ballot when DREs are Used 50
Hidden Costs of DREs 50
Precinct-Count Optical Scan System + Ballot-Marking Device 51
Precinct-Count Optical Scan System + Tactile Ballot Templates 52
Open Voting Consortium System 53
DREs with Integrated VVPB Printer 53
Estimated Capital Cost Comparison for Voting Systems 53
7 Distinguishing Truth from Misinformation 54
Reports by Computer Experts Discredit DRE Systems 54
Some Officials' Claims about Electronic Elections Don't Match the Facts 56
Some DREs Don't Provide Accessibility to the Disabled 58
Cleaning up Misconceptions about VVPB 59
No systems require voters to verify their ballots 59
No System Provides a VVPB for the Voter to Remove from the Polls 59
No system requires poll workers to assist voters in verifying their ballots
60
VVPB does not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act 60Financial Ties of DRE Advocates to Vendors Suggests Bias 60
Influential Advocate of Paperless DREs Received Large Donations from Vendors
60
ES&S Paid Commissions to Officials who Endorsed Their Products 61
Fortune's Worst Technology of 2003: Paperless Voting 61
Afterword 62

PLEASE FAX this table of contents to your representatives, to your election officials, and then please take copies of the actual document to their offices!

Edited because they have updated the document - see new link above