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Edited on Sun Nov-07-04 10:10 AM by scottxyz
Everyone's talking about how to make sure the vote tallies are accurate.
To check that something's accurate, you need something to check it AGAINST. This means you need more than one copy of it, stored at more than location.
Currently, the only thing we can check against is the exit polls (historially pretty accurate - but this time around, in non-paper-ballot locations only, they're raising suspicions about officially reported Bush "wins"). We have the right idea checking against exit polls, but what we really need is something more "official" to check against.
To make a voting system that's verifiable, we need to create something to check against right when the voter casts their vote. The voter needs to cast their vote as multiple copies, at multiple locations. Later these separate independent copies can be tallied (and hopefully corroborated) by separate, independent (and possibly even partisan) entities.
This could be as simple as using carbon paper in paper ballots, and casting them into separate urns - to be publicly tallied by independent groups (which could even be partisan). Or it could involve producing a paper ballot in addition to an electronic blip recording the vote.
All vital information in the world has a backup copy. ATM transactions are displayed on the screen and printed on a paper record, databases are mirrored on separate hard drives, people dupe their favorite music and keep photocopies of important documents and hide a spare copy of their front-door key.
Until we hammer home the idea that in a democracy, every ballot is vital information which must be securely stored in multiple copies at multiple locations, we're going to keep going through this charade of never really knowing who won the elections.
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