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From my book:
PITT: Why were the UNSCOM inspectors pulled out in 1998? What happened there?
RITTER: In August of 1998, Richard Butler, the head of UNSCOM, took a delegation to Baghdad to have discussions. The Iraqis were fairly fed up with what they felt to be foot-dragging and deliberately provocative issues. They felt that the inspectors were probing inappropriately into areas that dealt with the sovereignty if Iraq, the dignity of Iraq, and their national security. They were trying to get these issues clarified, and Richard Butler came in with a very aggressive program. The Iraqis made the announcement that they weren't going to deal with Richard Butler anymore. They felt he was no longer a fair and objective implementer of Security Council policy, that he was little more than a stooge for the U.S., and they said they were not going to deal with him. Butler withdrew, and the Iraqis said they were not going to deal with UNSCOM. This led to Richard Butler ordering the inspectors out in October.
Actually, the Iraqis said they were not going to deal with American inspectors to begin with, and then they expanded it to, we're not going to let you do anything other than ongoing monitoring because we don't feel there is anything left. At that point, Richard Butler pulled the plug and got all of the inspectors out. So now the inspectors are out, and the U.S. is getting ready to bomb Iraq. There was actually a point in time when we had bombers in the air. The Secretary General's office was able to get the Iraqis to agree to have the inspectors return without precondition, and because of that the bombers were called back. But there was a lot of frustration in the Pentagon and in the White House about being jerked around by the UN, so a decision was made that they weren't going to let themselves be jerked around anymore.
So, the inspectors were due to go back in. On November 30th of 1998, Richard Butler met with Sandy Berger, who was the National Security Advisor. They met at the U.S. mission to the United Nations in New York in what they call 'The Bubble,' the secret room where you can have a conversation protected. The fact was laid out that the U.S. was going to bomb this time. The timeline of the bombing campaign was laid out, and it was indicated that because of an upcoming religious event in December, the bombing campaign had to be initiated by a given date and terminated by a given date. They had to coincide the bombing campaign with inspection – the inspections were to be used as the trigger. So Richard Butler was encouraged to develop an inspection plan of action that met U.S. strike timelines.
Based upon these conversations with the U.S., Richard Butler decided that they would send the inspectors in to carry out very sensitive inspections, inspections that had nothing to do with disarmament, but had everything to do with provoking the Iraqis. These kind of inspections – not the provocative nature – but when you do sensitive sites like that, they're called 'sensitive site inspections. This was something that Iraq came up with in 1996, after several inspection teams that I was involved in tried to get into special Republican Guard and other sensitive facilities around Baghdad.
The Iraqis said, this is very sensitive, we don't like forty intelligence officers running around here. Rolf Ekeus flew over to Iraq in June of 1996 and worked out an agreement called the 'Modalities for Sensitive Site Inspections.' So when inspectors came to a site, and the Iraqis declared the site to be sensitive, the Iraqis had to facilitate the immediate entry of a four-man inspection element that would ascertain whether or not this site had anything to do with weapons of mass destruction, or if it was indeed sensitive. If it was sensitive, the inspection was over.
PITT: These 'Sensitive Site Modalities' came under the rubric of the Security Council inspections framework, part of the international laws that governed the process?
RITTER: Yes, these modalities were accepted by the Council and became part and parcel of the framework of the operating instructions. And they worked, not perfectly, but they worked and enabled us to do our jobs from 1996 to 1998. What Richard Butler did, in close coordination with the United States, was that when the inspectors went in that December, he ordered them to make null and void the Sensitive Site Modalities. He did this without coordinating with the Security Council. The only nation he coordinated this with was the United States.
So the inspectors went in, and went to a Ba'ath Party headquarters in downtown Baghdad. The Iraqis said it was a sensitive site but they were welcome to come in, but the inspectors made null and void the Sensitive Site Modalities.
PITT: How did they do that?
RITTER: They said, we're not doing it as part of the modalities, we're going in with everybody. The Iraqis said, no, you come in with the small group. In fact, the Iraqis actually allowed a six-man inspection element into the site to do a survey, and the team went in and found nothing. They came out, and still the chief inspector, under orders from Richard Butler, demanded that a much larger team be given access. To which the Iraqis said, only under the Sensitive Site Modalities will you be allowed back inside the site. The inspectors withdrew, reported to Richard Butler, and Richard Butler cited this as an egregious violation of the Security Council mandate, that the Iraqis were not cooperating with the team and infringing on the ability of the team to do their inspections.
Then, he withdrew them under orders from the United States. He received a phone call from Peter Burleigh, deputy U.S. ambassador, and withdrew the team even though Butler had promised the other members of the Security Council that he would never again withdraw inspectors unilaterally, that if they were to be withdrawn, he would go through the Security Council, inform them, and get their permission. The inspectors work for the Council. But Richard Butler took the telephone call from the United States, executed their instructions, withdrew the inspectors, and two days later the bombing campaign started, using Richard Butler's report to the Security Council as justification – his report saying, of course, that the inspectors weren't being allowed to do their jobs by the Iraqis.
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