http://thinkprogress.org/2007/02/27/lieberman-iran-intel/Lieberman: Criticism Of Administration’s Iran Intelligence Is ‘Unwarranted’
Sen. Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) said today that he is upset that critics have been questioning the administration’s intelligence on Iran, calling the reaction “unwarranted.” Lieberman said the “danger point” learned from the criticism is that the media and politicians reacted with “suspicion.” “I wouldn’t start with suspicion,” Lieberman said.
Lieberman also encouraged the intelligence community to push their conclusions further and complained that there has been a reluctance of people in the administration to do so. He spoke out against what he sees as “a kind of defensiveness — I dare not call it timidity” of the intelligence community due to incorrect judgments made in the lead-up to Iraq.
Watch it at link:
Skepticism is entirely justified. The White House stated without evidence that the highest levels of the Iranian government were responsible for weapons transfers to Iraqi insurgents, but later conceded that the intelligence went “a little too far.” Prodded by bloggers, the media has begun to assert “intelligent skepticism” on Iran.
A Senate Intelligence Committe inquiry on pre-war Iraq intelligence found that more action was needed to “challenge assumptions and group think.” Lieberman’s approach dooms Congress to repeating its previous failure.
Transcript:
LIEBERMAN: I thought that the reaction to the briefing first given in Baghdad, and then later here, about Iranian involvement in Iraq showed two danger points.
The first was that a lot of people responded both in government and the Congress and in the media with a suspicion to the intelligence that came out that I thought was unwarranted. We give a lot of money to the intelligence community, taxpayer money to the intelligence community. Doesn’t mean you are flawless. You make mistakes, but I wouldn’t start with suspicion towards what you are recommending.
And the other part which was troubling what Senator Levin referred to before is the reluctance by the people in the administration to draw a conclusion that I would call highly probable. In other words, a kind of defensiveness — I dare not call it timidity — based on previous criticism of conclusions drawn from intelligence.
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So it would be, to me, shocking if the Quds force was carrying out this mission in Iraq without Ayatollah Khamanei knowing it. And I think we have to count on you on moments like that to tell us what may not be certain, but is highly probable based on everything we know.