ANALYSIS / Egypt's Gaza truce plan is mostly bad for Hamas

[Fozzledick]

By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff , Haaretz Correspondents

After 19 days of fighting and more than 1,000 Palestinian fatalities, the first significant signs that Hamas is breaking could be seen Wednesday night. Hamas representatives to talks with Egypt announced an agreement in principle on Wednesday to the Egyptian cease-fire proposal. They also demanded several clarifications, primarily from Israel.

The war in Gaza isn't over yet. The final days of the Second Lebanon War show that it's best to be wary of agreements that come too early. But the way things looked on Wednesday, Hamas seems to be willing to accept the Egyptian initiative, which is almost a kind of surrender agreement for it.

The Egyptian proposal is mostly bad for Hamas. It doesn't let the organization bring the Palestinian public any political achievement that would justify the blood that has been spilled, and even forces on it the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, in the form of its renewed presence at the Rafah crossing (as a condition for its reopening).

Once the cease-fire is reached, the IDF will withdraw from the positions it captured in Gaza, and only then will the two sides begin to discuss the opening of border crossings and removal of the blockade, which was the reason Hamas gave for waging war. The most that Cairo is offering is a timetable for the opening of the crossing points, and even that depends on negotiations due to begin after the cease-fire is reached, and it's tough to know how or when they will end.

Hamas representatives did say on Wednesday night they had not yet accepted the Egyptian proposal, but in the same breath they said it was the only proposal on the table. In other words, they have to accept it if they want to maintain their rule in Gaza. It was no coincidence that two representatives of the Hamas leadership in Gaza who traveled to the Cairo talks are the ones who held the official press conference, while the Hamas political leadership was already on their way home to Damascus. When concessions are necessary, Hamas prefers to show the public the face of their true representatives rather than the ones living elsewhere, who are not living in Gaza during the Israeli offensive.

The tremendous destruction Israel caused in Gaza significantly increases the level of hatred directed at Israel, but Gazans are also angry at Hamas leaders for dragging the Strip into an unnecessary and poorly considered war. Hamas is already working on its narrative. There's no doubt that when the war does end, it will claim victory. But the destruction in Gaza, which looks like the victim of a massive earthquake, will tell a different story. Perhaps that is why Hamas wanted to make it clear yesterday that it wants to make certain Gaza will be rebuilt and its residents will be compensated for suffering and property damage.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1055543.html

[Zynx]

1. We can only hope. Hamas and Likud both should lose out in this conflict.

Unfortunately, it is hard to see how Likud directly loses out since they are in the opposition. Ideally, somehow an increased Kadima majority will be the result while Hamas' hand is weakened.

[Idealism]

2. Mostly bad for Hamas is the understatement of the year

They essentially are giving up ruling the government, unless I misread that Israel is putting the PA in power of Gaza...

I knew it would not be favorable for Hamas, but good lord this won't help Israel or Gaza ultimately. You are just oppressing these people more, against their obvious wishes.

[Fozzledick]

3. Peace will help Israel and Gaza, just not Hamas

But then Hamas doesn't care about Gaza, just war.

[Idealism]

5. Stop painting with a broad brush.

This isn't peace, it is a cease-fire, lets get that straight right off.

This won't keep the peace in the region because Palestinians will see themselves even more oppressed by Israel by all the concessions being forced down their throats. You will not get rid of Hamas by killing them, or putting the PA in power, because next election (and the next election will happen soon once this cease-fire happens and the PA is installed in Gaza) Hamas will win yet again because the people appreciate the resistance to being imprisoned. Whatever you believe about the situation, at least see reason that this cease-fire will not do Israel nor Palestinians much good. The problem is still there, and after the 1000 deaths in this offensive, the people of Gaza became more sympathetic to anyone who raises their voices (or guns) on their behalf against an invading army.

[Fozzledick]

6. What do you have against peace?

[Idealism]

7. You really are worthless to try to reach, keep being obstinate

If you think this will make either side more safe, you are quite foolish and simple-minded. Then again, knowing what I know from how you think and react to events, this makes much sense.

[Fozzledick]

8. I just don't like war

and I don't like the lies used to try to justify it.

You obviously disagree with me.

[Idealism]

9. Again, your simplicity betrays you.

To criticize the latest truce offering as the cyanide pill it is (and all sides agree on this, it seems) does not mean one is for war or not for peace. Those whose minds can not comprehend more than a "yes" or "no" answer to a complex equation, nor realize the consequences for their decision in the future, have no place in discussing that situation.

[azurnoir]

11. does this Peace allow the population of Gaza to receive aid?

[Fozzledick]

12. It does if Hamas stops firing the rockets

That's been their main objection to every cease-fire proposal, they just don't want to cease firing.

[azurnoir]

13. So that is what this means

Once the cease-fire is reached, the IDF will withdraw from the positions it captured in Gaza, and only then will the two sides begin to discuss the opening of border crossings and removal of the blockade, which was the reason Hamas gave for waging war. The most that Cairo is offering is a timetable for the opening of the crossing points, and even that depends on negotiations due to begin after the cease-fire is reached, and it's tough to know how or when they will end.

I thought the part about Hamas waging war was a particularly "nice" touch

However it sounded more like Israel will think about it maybe sometime here

[azurnoir]

4. So in essance it turns the clock back to December 28

with the crossings still blocked and aid allowed at Israel's digression hey but at least mo one will be shot at may be

[Alamuti Lotus]

10. Egypt, which has supported this assault from the beginning..

comes up with something unfavorable? S-s-s-s-s-s-hocking.... The only surprising fact here is that Hamas is still dealing with those kept dogs.

[okiru109]

14. in other words - mostly bad for the Palestinian PEOPLE

same as it ever was :cry:

[Fozzledick]

15. Only if you think peace is bad

[okiru109]

16. i don't consider state sponsored Israeli TERRORISM peace

just the opposite.

[shaayecanaan]

17. Interesting article....what happens next?

1) It is likely that Iran, via Hamas, will be the major donor of aid to those who had relatives killed or that suffered property damage, as was the case with the 2006 Lebanon war. There are some noises from Israel that they would like to prevent this from happening, but given that they're unwilling to put up the money themselves there does not seem any alternative. In light of that it is unlikely that there will be any lasting animus between Gazans and Hamas.

2) There is a growing Pakistan/Bangladeshi disconnect between the Gazans and West Bankers. Gazans have always been poorer, more crowded, and more intransigent. It is a miserable, almost ungovernable place and it was only malice that persuaded the Israelis to occupy it. The mood in the West Bank during the last two weeks has been almost acquiescent. One can only assume that Fatah has not become any more popular in the Strip over the last couple of weeks.

3) Even allowing for its unenviable position Hamas performed very poorly in this war in military terms. It attempted to fight an semi-conventional war against the Israelis the same way that Hezbollah did in 2006, rather than a classical guerilla wait-and-bleed strategy. The difference was that Hezbollah was much better organised, prepared and armed. Hamas was none of those things and its fighters have deserted and died in large numbers.

4) Broadly, it is looking very unlikely that there will be any two-state solution in the foreseeable future. The next elections will still see a strong showing for Likud. The recent banning of Arab political parties in Israel shows a very strong lurch towards the right. The likelihood of another left-leaning Israeli leader such as Eshkol or Sharrett ever being elected is essentially nil.

5) The Israelis have also grown increasingly masochistic in terms of international criticism. It was unusually indifferent to even American concerns in this conflict. It seems to have formed the opinion that it has already lost support amongst those who are concerned for the lives of Palestinian civilians and that whatever international supporters it still has will tolerate essentially any level of Arab death and destruction.

6) In concert with this both Israel and its foreign supporters have adopted an almost Serbian-style level of paranoia. Serbs are convinced the world is against them even though most of the world cannot tell the difference between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. Likewise, Israelis are increasingly convinced that the four-fifths of humanity that would be unable to distinguish a Jew from a Hottentot are rabidly anti-semitic and that any concern for the Palestinians is motivated by anti-semitism only.

7) Public support for Israel in Europe has softened significantly and there has even been a measurable drop in US public support, although it remains strong. US press coverage of the event was still partisan but it was a lot less one-eyed in its support of Israel than it has been previously. It is hard to say at this point whether this is a short-term phenomenon or whether it is due to US war fatigue, a growing disconnect between younger US Jews and Israel, etc.