Israel's army forgets 1967 lessons

[bemildred]

In 1967, a combination of military intelligence, strong leadership and an unwavering belief in its cause led Israel to one of the most spectacularly successful operations in military history.

In less than a week it routed its Arab neighbours, taking over East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

Nearly 40 years on, as it fought Hezbollah in Lebanon, the same army was to ultimately fall short in the very areas that had previously brought it victory.

Instead, it was Hezbollah which used the same combination to humble what had been seen as one of the world's most formidable modern armies.

http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/CFBF7CB5-23B5-49C6-A649-2D11BA1AC441.htm

[Lithos]

1. Sgt Pepper: 40 years ago today...

The album which has been lauded as the most influential ever - The Beatles' Sgt Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band - is celebrating its 40th birthday.

The groundbreaking record was a watershed for the Fab Four who, for the first time, ditched the matching suit look. It also marked a rethink in the way the band made records having tired of touring and with Beatlemania on the wane.

Sgt Pepper was recorded at Abbey Road studios in London and was the Beatles' eighth offering. Its release ushered in an unforgettable season of hope, upheaval and achievement culminating in the 1967 summer of love.

-- More --

[bemildred]

4. Man, now you have got me thinking back all those years.

Although I have always been mostly a Dylan person, that was the first Beetles album I cared a fig for.

[Lithos]

7. Ironic to say the least...

Sgt Pepper and Magical Mystery Tour were my introductions to the Beatles, so they both hold a place for me.

The three events of the Six Day War, Sgt Pepper and the Summer of Love, four if you count Vietnam's escalation, all being so close to each other and how they still resonate today quite strongly today in so many ways.

Sort of reminds me of the imagery in Thompson's Wave speech.

San Francisco in the middle sixties was a very special time and place to be a part of. Maybe it meant something. Maybe not, in the long run . . . but no explanation, no mix of words or music or memories can touch that sense of knowing that you were there and alive in that corner of time and the world. Whatever it meant. . . .

History is hard to know, because of all the hired bullshit, but even without being sure of "history" it seems entirely reasonable to think that every now and then the energy of a whole generation comes to a head in a long fine flash, for reasons that nobody really understands at the time — and which never explain, in retrospect, what actually happened.

My central memory of that time seems to hang on one or five or maybe forty nights — or very early mornings — when I left the Fillmore half-crazy and, instead of going home, aimed the big 650 Lightning across the Bay Bridge at a hundred miles an hour wearing L. L. Bean shorts and a Butte sheepherder's jacket . . . booming through the Treasure Island tunnel at the lights of Oakland and Berkeley and Richmond, not quite sure which turn-off to take when I got to the other end (always stalling at the toll-gate, too twisted to find neutral while I fumbled for change) . . . but being absolutely certain that no matter which way I went I would come to a place where people were just as high and wild as I was: No doubt at all about that. . . .

There was madness in any direction, at any hour. If not across the Bay, then up the Golden Gate or down 101 to Los Altos or La Honda. . . . You could strike sparks anywhere. There was a fantastic universal sense that whatever we were doing was right, that we were winning. . . .

And that, I think, was the handle — that sense of inevitable victory over the forces of Old and Evil. Not in any mean or military sense; we didn’t need that. Our energy would simply prevail. There was no point in fighting — on our side or theirs. We had all the momentum; we were riding the crest of a high and beautiful wave. . . .

So now, less than five years later, you can go up on a steep hill in Las Vegas and look West, and with the right kind of eyes you can almost see the high-water mark — that place where the wave finally broke and rolled back.

L-

[Solo_in_MD]

2. Is that is the best Aljazeera can do the 40th anniversary of the most decisve war in modern history.

A loss that has been blamed for everything from political turmoil to male impotence in the Middle East muslim world

[bemildred]

3. Yep, them israel-haters are all alike. nt

[Solo_in_MD]

5. Its not so much the anti Israel attitude, but the total unwillingness to look realistically

at what happened. Some still believe that at least the planes were flown by US or UK pilots and refuse to acknowledge that they were beaten so handily by *Jews*. These are the same people who call the 1973 war a great victory, so perhaps we should not be surprised.

[bemildred]

8. The OP seems to give Israelis a good deal of credit for their accomplishments in that war. nt

[Igel]

26. But only after the Jews were humbled.

Honor is important in some cultures, even if English culture and its daughters have no use for the idea (Sumarokov's "Hamlet" nicely juxtoposes two different ideas of honor lurking in mid-18th century honor ... one conception, internal honor, survives somewhat in the West; the other, external honor, survives only vestigially in some subcultures).

The point: You can admit defeat *after* you've shown yourself better than your enemy. Honor regained is, after all, honor--and if you can build up your foe and show him viler than first thought, all the better, it just means more honor for you. Rulers hate God's Party; the hoi polloi like it, because they've restored Arab honor, at least in part.

Note that AJ nicely makes the Arabs innocent victims--no talk of Egyptian tanks in the Sinai, military agreement with Jordan, no word of the false intelligence given by the USSR to its allies, no talk of the blockade. For all the buildup of Israel, it's to make the Arabs look more wronged, their cause more right, and the victory over Israel even more honor-garnering. The slugs.

Note that a man--or a state--with no honor at all is in a very dangerous position. One doesn't have to deal honestly with him, agreements with him are meaningless--and breaking agreements isn't only an ok thing, it's a *good* thing--and if he dies, no one much cares.

[Lithos]

10. 73 was interesting

Israel came very close to losing the war in the initial stages. 73 was when the Israeli army lost the mantle of being 'invincible'. It also I think earned Egypt the respect (from both Israel and other Arab countries) and right to go to the peace table in 76 when earlier tentative efforts were rebuffed in 71.

L-

[Solo_in_MD]

13. The 1973 war was the one that validated wire guided missiles

And gave the Egyptian infantry a chance, however, it the end it was a serious defeat for Egypt once they ran out of missiles. The IDF was clearly bloodied, but it adapted and still produced a major victory.

It wasn't so much an earning of respect as much as the final realization that Nasser's pan-arab nationalism was a dead end, and that serious peace talks were the only way forward. The results have indeed been positive. Egypt has their land back and there is peace and prosperity on both sides of the border. Both sides realize this and are doing what is necessary to preserve the peace.

Syria is another story. They did not have nearly the anti tank missile capability of Egypt. They again suffered a major defeat for backing Egypt. Relations have between them have never been the same since. Unlike in 1967, there were serious indications that the IDF would attack into Damascus until the US made them back off.

Of more interest is that in the land for peace process neither Egypt or Jordan wanted Gaza or the West Bank back. They abandoned the refugees of their own making and IMO bear as much responsibility for the current situation as Israel.

Given that the pre 1967 borders were not recognized by the Arab nations, and based on the maps before the Israeli war of independence, I have favored having the West Bank, and Gaza formally becoming part of Israel. I believe a property settlements and ownership issues could be worked out. In the end it would be better for all concerned including the so called Palestinians except the corrupt organizations profiting from the conflict such as the PLO. It may be too late for that now, but it could have and should have been done in the 80s.

[Lithos]

19. Disagree

The Egyptian infantryman stood his ground well and fought like a soldier as opposed to a concript. They had never done that before.

The reason they lost was not due to a lack of ATG rockets as they still had plenty at the time of the IDF operations by Adan and Sharon, but the Soviet style training which did not reward initiative, but rather adherence to well scripted plans. Because the Egyptians had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams by the end of the first few days, they had NO plans to expand further and so they sat. Their lackluster attempts to push out using armor was beaten back with severe losses by the holding force the Israeli's had left. The Israeli's had taken the opportunity of the lull to effectively smash Syria back.

I also think without the extremely competent leadership of General Adan, the IDF probably would have failed to cross the Suez and win as decisively as they did. It was Adan who managed to get the bridging equipment in place - something Sharon neglected to do. Sharon had a history of being politically motivated, but a poor tactician whose reckless behavior constantly required others to bail him out. The bridgehead was no exception and probably would have been ultimately ground down without the backing armor brought across Adan's pontoons. Adan also was the one who cut off Suez City. Course Sharon is the one who received the laurels.

I disagree about the motivations of Egypt and Jordan releasing their territorial claims to West Bank or Gaza as somehow being an abandonment of the refugees and an abrogation of responsibility. Jordan, the primary partner here, only released its claims in conjunction with the negotiated formation of a Palestinian state. Further on the issue of abandonment, I will simply state that Jordan has changed their citizen demographics as a result of the refugee exodus. They have probably done more than any other country including Israel with integration of Palestinians into the mainstream.


L-

[Solo_in_MD]

21. Then we will have to agree to disagree

In 1973 the Egyptian infantry held up only as long as they had the initiative. They lasted longer due to the WGATMs, but once they faltered, they were unable to cope. One excuse used was indeed was Soviet style doctrine. However no modern Arab army has shown the ability to adapt in field, regardless of training or tactical doctrine. Furthermore their officer corps remain hobbled by an overall lack of professionalism, especially in the middle and upper ranks. This is not just limited to Egypt. Look how both Iraq and Iran have purged the ranks of the military over the years, preferring *reliability* over competence.

Adan v Sharon is an interesting discussion that I have heard both sides of. Regardless, by the time the IDF had bridged the canal, Egyptian supplies, especially Sagger AT missiles were heavily depleted. Tactics may win battles, but logistics win wars, and the Egyptian did not have adequate logistics in place.

Overall the inability of Arab armed forces to perform well in the field is a complex situation, and simple answers are rightly suspect. One school of thought is that the Arab nations have not yet matured enough as a culture to break the clan/extended family/bloodline loyalties and assign them to larger and virtual organizations like nations, or for that matter the USMC. There are also different views of virtue, honor, and vice. Those arguments are not without some merit, but taken too far results in a dismissive mindset that could be disasterous. There is also a historic lack of flexibility in Arab society, including the military, something that predates Soviet tactics manuals. The Arab military leadership is a product of the same culture and as the Brits say, they are at times too bloody minded for their own good. Then again, the same could be said of Bush/Cheney.

[Lithos]

27. Then we will disagree

The Egyptians held up well as soldiers throughout the campaign. Their leadership provided excellent advice which was ignored by Sadat on several occasions - the final blunder being Sadat's unwillingness to recommit otherwise pinned Egyptian armor assets back to the Western side of the Canal to counter the bridgehead. To your statement about how well they held up, only look to the ferocious battles at Chinese Farm and the associated 'Missouri' which were long after initiative had passed to the Israeli's. This was far from a fluke when you also note that Sharon only moved 5km towards Ismailia from the stiff resistance offered and the heavily outnumbered garrison at Suez City held off the ferocious assault by Adan in the final days of the war.

The Saggers represented only one of several anti-tank components and remained quite plentiful through the end of the war, the other being RPG's which were also quite plentiful. Given the lack of armor on the West bank, it was the Saggers which accounted for most of the several hundred tanks lost there. The Egyptians used Saggers to defend the SAM batteries and were prevalent in the defense of Suez City. I believe the Saggers and RPG's accounted for something like 60-70% of the tank losses of the IDF.

As for logistics, if the US hadn't committed their extremely extensive resupply campaign. Without Nickel Grass, the IDF would have run out of tank/artillery rounds, missiles, bombs and even aircraft themselves the latter of which had cases where the planes flew scant hours after delivery with pre-existing US camouflage paint scheme. The IAF was down to something like 90 Phantoms before Nickel Grass.

To the story about Sharon and Adan. Sharon had to be bailed out at Chinese Farm, failed at 'Missouri' and proved inconsequential when given his own area of independent operation - the thrust towards Ismailia. His one possible success, the initial bridgehead would have failed had not Adan been able to backfill and secure a route for his Laskov bridge to be moved and erected. Without it, the paratroopers would have run out of supplies due to their inability to provide enough via inflatable raft. Adan did win the later battle at Chinese Farm, got the bridgework into position, and managed to isolate the Egyptian Third Army which provided the strategic breakthrough necessary to allow the US to broker a peace deal and keep the Soviet Union at bay.

[elias7]

6. my understanding of history may be wrong, but...

the article states,"Israel argued that it had to make a pre-emptive attack on its Arab neighbours in order to defend itself and its actions were overwhelmingly supported by its citizens."

I believe the pre-emptive attack was because its' neighbors were massing their armies around Israel's perimeter in preparation for war. Egypt was massing in the Gaza strip and Sinai peninsula, Jordan gathering in the west bank, Syria and Lebanon massing in the Golan Heights. Contingents arrived from other Arab countries including Algeria and Kuwait. Israel was confronted by an Arab force of some 465,000 troops, over 2,880 tanks and 810 aircraft. It was either attack or be destroyed, pre-emptive in name only, as attack was imminent.

[bemildred]

9. At a minimum, that version is in dispute.

My own view is that the Arab threat was real enough, but that there was no imminent attack in preparation, that was sort of the whole point of the exercise, to catch them flat-footed.

[elias7]

11. may want to brush up on your history and get back to me

[bemildred]

12. Then again, I might just ignore your baseless innuendos. nt

[Shaktimaan]

16. No, bemildred is right on this one.

No one believed that an attack was imminent. But they did believe that it was inevitable. The coming war was understood to be a certainty, when exactly was not known, it is true. The idea was that the longer Israel waited, the greater the chance was that they would lose the initaiative, which was their greatest single weapon. If they waited too long and allowed the Arab armies to attack first there was a good chance that the war would be fought on Israeli soil and against fully prepared Arab armies attacking in concert.

There was also the issue of how long Israel's army could stay mobilized. Their whole economy closed down when the army was mobilized, it was/is a citizen army. Israel could not afford to fight long, drawn out wars or even just stay mobilized for weeks at a time.

It was a defensive war, yes. But Dayan had to exert a lot of pressure on the minister of defense to OK it beginning as early as it did. Don't get me wrong... had Israel waited the outcome may have been very different. And no one thought that war was NOT coming. But Israel chose to strike before the Arab armies could get fully mobilized. PBS had a thing on this just last night.

[bemildred]

18. Thank you.

The only reason I take the time to belabor this issue is because some parties try to use it to justify the seizure of lands that occurred in the war. Militarily, they did the right thing by attacking first.

[Shaktimaan]

20. you're welcome.

credit where it's due.

[Solo_in_MD]

22. I got a different take on the PBS show

That indeed the Arab were planning to attack and that it was imminent. That is also in concert with what I have read and understood in the past.

I do wish I had taped the PBS show to review it and get more on the creators to understand what view they were portraying.

[Shaktimaan]

23. Remember that

Eshkol wanted to wait and Dayan and the generals convinced him otherwise?

[pelsar]

24. it was called the waiting period...

when the reserves were called up......the economy was at a standstill and the population was on edge, having no idea whats going to happen next......

israelis still "shiver" when they recall that period: the UN left, massive armies lined up on their borders, calls for their destruction.....

[Douglas Carpenter]

17. certainly the broad consensus of critical Israeli and Zionist historians would agree with you

I do not now of any credible and critical Israeli or Zionist historian who believes that Israel was facing an imminent attack. Although many do believe that their was a legitimate threat. Avi Shlaim of Oxford for instance maintains that the war was still defensive in nature although there was no serious threat of imminent attack.

In the past, on the one side Israel claimed that other Arab countries led by Egypt were planning an imminent attack. On the other side Palestinians viewed the war as a planned war of conquest. Most critical Israeli and Zionist historians now agree that neither were the case. But a state of escalating belligerency arose over a period of many years in which both sides are not blameless.

These points are documented by several Israeli and Zionist histories and supported by the record of Israeli and U.S. government archives. One excellent book on this matter is by Israeli historian Avi Shlaim of Oxford in his book, "The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World". Amazon link: http://www.amazon.com/Iron-Wall-Israel-Arab-World/dp/0393321126/ref=pd_bbs_2/102-8701952-4352901?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1180427457&sr=1-2
Two other books by prominent Israeli/Zionist historians which support this consensus of historic opinion are "Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001" - by Benny Morris -- Amazon link:
http://www.amazon.com/Righteous-Victims-Zionist-Arab-Conflict-1881-2001/dp/0679744754/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/102-8701952-4352901?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1180429051&sr=1-1 And the work by former Israeli Foreign Minister and Israeli historian Shlomo Ben-Ami; "Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy" by Shlomo Ben-Ami -- Amazon link: http://www.amazon.com/Scars-War-Wounds-Peace-Israeli-Arab/dp/0195325427/ref=pd_sim_b_5/102-8701952-4352901?ie=UTF8&qid=1180427457&sr=1-2
_________

Actually Salon.com had an article on the subject just yesterday:

"Rethinking Israel's David-and-Goliath past
Little-noticed details in declassified U.S. documents indicate that Israel's Six-Day War may not have been a war of necessity.

By Sandy Tolan

snip:"A key discrepancy lay between U.S. and British intelligence reports and those conveyed to the administration by the Israelis. On May 26, the same day Eban met with Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, the secretary of state, relayed a message from Israel indicating "that an Egyptian and Syrian attack is imminent." In a memo to the president, Rusk wrote: "Our intelligence does not confirm this Israeli estimate." Indeed, this contradicted all U.S. intelligence, which had characterized Nasser's troops in the Sinai as "defensive in nature" and only half (50,000) of the Israeli estimates. Walt Rostow, the national security advisor, called Israeli estimates of 100,000 Egyptian troops "highly disturbing," and the CIA labeled them "a political gambit" for the United States to stand firm with Israelis, sell them more military hardware, and "put more pressure on Nasser."

As for the Egyptian president, there was a huge difference between his public and private signals. He had threatened Israelis with "annihilation," causing fear bordering on paralysis for a population devastated by the Holocaust. He had closed the Straits of Tiran, a source of less than 10 percent of Israel's shipping, but nevertheless a casus belli as far as Israel was concerned. He had expelled the U.N. peacekeepers from Sinai, further raising fears of war. (Israel, however, refused to accept those same peacekeepers -- a move that would have diminished the chance of war.) And, as the leader of the "Arab nation," Nasser was under great pressure from other Arabs to cut short Israel's nuclear ambitions and deliver the Palestinians back to the homes they had fled and been driven out of in the war of 1948.

But privately Nasser was sending strong signals he would not go to war. On May 31, he met with an American emissary, former Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson, assuring him that Egypt would not "begin any fight." Two days later, Nasser told a British M.P., Christopher Mayhew, that Egypt had "no intention of attacking Israel." The same day he met again with Anderson, agreeing to dispatch his vice president, Zakariya Mohieddin, to Washington, in an apparent last-ditch attempt to avoid war. (Anderson and Johnson had also spoken of a visit to Cairo by Vice President Hubert Humphrey.)

Rostow decided that Israel should know about the secret visit. In a June 2 note to the president, the national security advisor urged that the United States inform Israel of Mohieddin's impending trip to the White House: "My guess is that their intelligence will pick it up." The same day, Nasser sent a telegram to the American president indicating that Egypt would not attack Israel, but that "we shall resist any aggression launched against us or against any Arab state."

the full article does require a subscription to salon.com . But I believe that they will give you a free trial subscription for one day.

link to full article:

http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2007/06/04/six_day_war/index.html?source=newsletter

[bemildred]

25. Yes, I am familiar with those materials.

In some respects I am reluctant to bring them up, which I why I merely said "in dispute" (and laziness of course). The larger point is the refugees and the occupied people. The fact that from an Israeli military point of view the war was justified and very successful does not somehow also justify the forty years long occupation, colonization, and oppression of the people that happened to be living on that land at the time. Those peoples' legal and human rights were not abrogated by the war, and nothing that has happened since has that effect either.

[Solo_in_MD]

14. there was an interesting documentary on some of this on PBS last night

saw it, but did not tape it. Without reviewing it several times, it would be hard to fairly describe its POV or reseach its creators, but it did discuss in some detail the war preparations of the Arab nations and generally supported your position

[bemildred]

15. Here is one from todays's news:

Israel provoked Six-Day War, says former Dutch UN observer

Amsterdam - A former Dutch UN observer has said Israel was not under siege by Arab countries preceding the Six-Day War, the 40th anniversary of which falls Tuesday, and that the Jewish state provoked most border incidents as part of its strategy to annex more land. Speaking on a Dutch current affairs programme late Monday, Jan Muhren, who was stationed interchangeably at the Golan Heights and the West Bank in 1966-67, says neither Jordan nor Syria had any intention to start a war with Israel.

Meanwhile, it was announced Tuesday that Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Verhagen will take 10 Dutch teenagers with him on his upcoming trip to the Middle East. The 10 are Christian, Muslim, Jewish and atheist.

A foreign affairs spokesman told Deutsche Presse-Agentur dpa the initiative was motivated to learn more about history but also about the challenges of multicultural society and peaceful coexistence.

http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/69413.html