And before I start I feel it's important to point out that Israel has a long and illustrious record of avoiding negotiating with other countries in the region. And as you are claiming that the PLO was dedicated to wiping out Israel, I feel it's equally important to point out that Israel was just as dedicated to wiping out any prospect of a Palestinian state. In exactly the same way that you can acknowledge reasons for why Israel didn't negotiate in the past, you should also in the interests of fairness acknowledge the reasons for why the Palestinians didn't negotiate with Israel in the past. Negotiations and why they do or don't get off the ground can be complex things to look at, and an understanding of how the three no's came about on a political level is essential when discussing Khartoum. Totally ignoring that it came hot on the heels of the humiliation meted out to the Arab states in 1967 which resulted in Israel taking territory from Syria, Egypt and Jordan, and refusing to take that into account is an exercise in subjective ignoring of facts. I understand in some circles there's a desire to simplify the conflict by labelling everything 'Arab Intransigence' and blaming the Arabs or Muslims or whatever punching bag for everything, but I don't think anyone learns anything from that sort of nonsense. The problem with supplying soundbytes from Wikipedia is that they don't really give much of an insight into much apart from letting the world know that any twit with a computer can contribute to articles there. Much has been written on Khartoum so there really is no need at all to resort to simplistic crap from Wikipedia in instances like this...
Here's some more on Khartoum...
From the Iron Wall by Avi Shlaim(p258-9)
An Arab summit was held in Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, between 28 August and 2 September. It was the first meeting of the Arab leaders since their defeat in the June War. Israel's leaders watched with keen anticipation to see what conclusions the Arab leaders would draw from their military defeat. The conference ended with the adoption of the famous three noes of Khartoum: no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel. On the face of it these declarations showed no sign of readiness for compromise, and this is how Israel interpreted them. In fact, the conference was a victory for the Arab moderates who argued for trying to obtain the withdrawal of Israel's forces by political rather than military means. Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no formal peace
treaty, but not a rejection of a state of peace; no
direct negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no
de jure recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state. President Nasser and King Hussein set the tone at the summit and made it clear subsequently that they were prepared to go much further than ever before toward a settlement with Israel. At Khartoum, Nasser and Hussein reached a genuine understanding and formed a united front against the hard-liners. King Hussein later gave a glimpse of the debate that went on behind the scenes:
At Khartoum I fought very much against the three noes. But the atmosphere there developed into one where all the peopel who used to support Nasser...turned on him and turned on him in such a vicious way that I found myself morally unable to contine to take any stand but to come closer to him and defend him and accuse them of responsibility in things that happened. That was the first collision I had with many of my friends in the Arab world.
But then we talked about the need for a resolution and the need for a peaceful resolution to the problem. And his approach was that "I feel responsible. We lost the West Bank and Gaza and that comes first. I am not going to ask for any withdrawal from the Suez Canal. It can stay closed forever until such time as the issue of the West Bank and of Gaza is resolved and the issue of the Palestinian people is resolved. So go and speak of that and speak of a comprehensive solution to the problem and a comprehensive peace and go and do anything you can short of signing a separate peace." And I said in any event I am not considering signing a separate peace, because we want to resolve this problem in a comprehensive fashion.
The Khartoum summit thus marked a real turning point in Nasser's attitude to Israel. At Khartoum, Nasser advised, and indeed urged, King Hussein to explore the possibility of a peaceful settlement with Israel. This was, of course, not known in Israel at the time. As far as Israel was concerned, the Khartoum declarations closed every door and every window that might lead to a peace settlement. On October 17 the cabinet took a decision that amounted to an official cancellation of the decision of 19 June (conditional offer of Israeli withdrawal). The new decision, which was adopted by the Knesset following a statement by the prime minister on 30 October, said, "The Government notes with regret the fact that the Arab states adhere to their position of not recognizing, not negotiating, and not concluding peace treaties with Israel. Faced with this position of the Arab states, Israel will maintain the situation fixed by the cease-fire agreements and reinforce its position by taking into account its security and development needs." On the same day that the Knesset adopted this decision, the cabinet took a further decision, which remained strictly secret and was not communicated to the US government. This decision cancelled the principle of seeking peace with Egypt and Syria on the basis of the international border. The decision did not specify the areas that Israel needed for security and for settlements. It simply stated that the agreements with Egypt and Syria must give Irael secure borders.