(last one, I promise)
Promoting Impunity
The Israeli Military’s Failure to Investigate Wrongdoing
James Miller
British cameraman James Miller was shot to death in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, on May 2, 2003. He and his colleagues had made themselves conspicuously visible when they left the house in which they were staying. There had been no shooting in the area for at least an hour. Miller was the sixty-fifth journalist to be injured or killed in the Occupied Palestinian Territories since September 2000. He was experienced in conflict conditions and had spent sixteen days in the area.
Miller and three colleagues visited a house in the al-Brazil area of Rafah to interview one of the subjects, a child, for a documentary they were preparing. For several hours Israeli soldiers in nearby armored personnel carrier had been playing Arabic music loudly and shouting at them in Hebrew and Arabic. Miller’s co-producer, Dan Edge, told Human Rights Watch, “They had been playing Fairuz, asking us if we liked it, telling us to go to bed. They were in high spirits, they sounded like kids.” Although there had been occasional shots fired earlier in the evening, by 11 p.m. the situation had been quiet for at least an hour. Miller, his colleague Saira Shah, and translator `Abdullah Rahman `Abdullah decided to leave the house by the most visible manner possible. The three left by the front door, wearing protective clothing with “TV” marked in fluorescent letters. Rahman held a white flag, Miller shined a flashlight on the flag, and Shah held a British passport in her upraised hands. Much of the incident was filmed by Dan Edge and viewed by Human Rights Watch. The three walked towards where they believed the nearest armored personnel carrier (APC) to be, shouting in English and Arabic that they were journalists. An unseen Israeli soldier fired once towards the group. Shah cried out, “We are British journalists.” Thirteen seconds later, a second shot hit Miller. Five more shots followed.
The next day the IDF Spokesperson’s office said Miller had walked into an exchange of gunfire, and “most likely been shot in the back by Palestinian terrorists.” He said IDF soldiers had risked their lives to go Miller’s assistance. “An IDF doctor who was on the scene shortly after Miller was shot stated that the bullet entered into Miller's rear left shoulder.” Three days later, the autopsy results established conclusively that Miller had been shot through the front of the neck.
Miller’s friends, family, and employers worked to gather all possible relevant evidence. Within three days, they had met with the U.K. ambassador, retained a prominent Israeli human rights lawyer, hired an independent military expert to examine all evidence, and sent out an independent pathologist to witness the autopsy, accompanied by a police photographer. On May 15, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw raised the case with his Israeli counterpart, Silvan Shalom. Two weeks later the Miller family sent ballistics expert Frederick Mead to examine the fatal bullet – a 5.56 mm shot at short range. The family, via their lawyer, asked the JAG on June 2 to secure the weapons of the unit operating in the area the night of the shooting. After several reminders, the JAG ordered the weapons be secured three weeks later, on June 24. Ballistics tests were due to be carried out on July 13, when Mead discovered that only nine of fifteen guns had been secured. The family halted the tests until they could be sure that the correct weapons had been secured for testing. The international media reported regularly on the case throughout this period.
The IDF conducted an “operational investigation,” although it is not clear whether it was ever officially completed. The JAG opened a Military Police investigation at the end of August 2003, three-and-a-half months after Miller’s death. Senior army officials outside of the JAG office followed the issue closely. By mid-November, Maj.-Gen. Giora Eiland had reportedly received an “interim” Military Police report, but said the authors “had not considered all the available evidence” and so the investigation would require more time. Saira Shah and Daniel Edge were officially interviewed in January 2004, some six months after a first “unofficial” meeting with JAG staff. Miller’s family had been informed that they would not receive a copy of the final investigation report – a rule that applies to Israelis as well as foreigners. After ambassadorial intervention, Maj.-Gen. Giora Eiland reportedly agreed to let the family read a copy of the investigation report in an IDF office in Israel.
Miller’s family, friends, and colleagues went to enormous lengths, with abundant credible evidence, to ensure that Miller’s death was investigated. Few Palestinians have such resources, contacts, or journalistic skills. Nor should anyone have to go to these lengths to ensure that a disciplined military force take the first and most basic step towards accountability: namely, investigate.
On March 9, 2005, the IDF released the JAG conclusions regarding Miller’s death. Miller’s family said that Brig. Gen. Avihal Mandelblitt had told them that because there was no match between the fatal bullet and an IDF weapon, the officer involved would not be prosecuted, although he would be disciplined for breaking the rules of engagement and for changing his story during the investigation. The IDF’s public statement said that the investigation found that an IDF lieutenant and commanding officer at the site “allegedly fired his weapon in breach of IDF Rules of Engagement,” but that the forensic evidence “leads to the conclusion that the evidence available does not provide a reasonable chance for conviction as required under criminal law.” Miller’s widow, Sophy, criticized the investigation, saying, “although they strongly suspect one soldier, they cannot make a ballistics match. This is not surprising to us, as they failed to collect the weapons for eleven weeks.” The family said they would request an Israeli court to review the findings.
In a subsequent disciplinary hearing, the officer, a first lieutenant in the Bedouin Desert Reconnaissance Battalion, was acquitted of charges that he had violated open-fire regulations. The IDF said that Brig. Gen. Guy Tzur decided the shooting was “reasonable” in light of prevailing conditions, including “frequent terrorist attacks, thick darkness and earlier that same day the soldiers were fired at by anti-tank missiles.” Ha’aretz quoted the IDF Spokesperson as saying that the investigation into the shooting was “unprecedented in scope,” and included ballistics checks, examinations of satellite imagery, and polygraph tests. Prior to Brig. Gen. Tzur’s decision, on April 7, a 79-page report by the chief lawyer of the IDF Southern Command reportedly stated that soldiers questioned in the investigation had changed their testimonies during the inquiry, and that the barrel of the rifle alleged to have been used in the shooting had been changed. The report also said that May 3, 2003 videotapes from the IDF observation system that may have filmed the shooting had disappeared and that attempts to locate them had not been successful.
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/iopt0605/8.htm#_Toc106249197 
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