Former IDF chief sued in U.S. for Kafr Kana shelling

[Violet_Crumble]

A group of Lebanese nationals filed a civil suit yesterday against former Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Lieutenant General (res.) Moshe Ya'alon for war crimes and other human rights violations.

The class action suit, filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), is in relation to the hundreds of civilian deaths and injuries in the 1996 shelling by the IDF of a United Nations compound in south Lebanon's Kafr Kana.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/658615.html

[Englander]

1. A report from May '96 -

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Report dated 1 May 1996 of the Secretary-General's Military
Adviser concerning the shelling of the United Nations
compound at Qana on 18 April 1996

Introduction

1. On 18 April 1996, shortly after 1400 hours local time, the headquarters compound of the Fijian battalion of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) came under fire by Israeli artillery. At the time, more than 800 Lebanese had sought refuge inside the compound, which is located in the village of Qana. An estimated 100 persons were killed and a larger number wounded. Four United Nations soldiers were wounded. There was extensive damage.

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Survey of impact area

10. The technical survey of the impacts of the Israeli shells yielded the following information:

(a) Thirty-six impacts were found in the Qana area. Shell fragments of 155-millimetre calibre were found throughout the United Nations compound. The distribution of the impacts was uneven; there were two distinct areas where the impacts were concentrated and two "stray" impacts.

(b) The first concentration of impacts was centred about 100 metres to the south of the United Nations compound, on a group of houses some 75 metres north-west of the mortar firing point. In all, 17 shells (16 with impact fuses, 1 with proximity fuse) landed south of the United Nations compound.

(c) The second concentration of impacts was centred on the middle of the United Nations compound. Given the number and state of the casualties and the destruction caused by the shelling, a major clean-up operation had to be launched immediately after the end of the shelling. This resulted in the loss of important evidence. However, there was substantial evidence of multiple proximity-fused artillery ammunition detonating directly above the compound, covering a large portion of its area. While the exact number cannot be determined, the available evidence suggests that eight such projectiles detonated over the compound and one just outside it. There was also evidence that five high-explosive point-detonating projectiles detonated in the compound and three close to it. In sum, evidence was found of 13 detonations inside or directly above the compound and 4 very close to it.

(d) Almost all the proximity fuses were used in the area of the United Nations compound.

(e) Despite an extensive aerial and ground search, no impacts were found at the second target area identified by the Israeli forces (350 metres south-south-east of the United Nations compound), although evidence was found that rockets had been launched from a site nearby.


11. Several witnesses reported that during the shelling there had been a perceptible shift in the weight of fire from an area south-west of the compound (the mortar site) to the compound itself.

12. Several witnesses stated that they saw an RPV over the Qana area before, during and after the shelling. Two helicopters were seen 2 kilometres south-east of the United Nations compound during the shelling and one was observed close to the compound after the shelling had finished. The presence of one helicopter and an RPV was documented on a video tape, which covers the latter part of the shelling. It was taken by a member of the Force Mobile Reserve from a position overlooking the United Nations compound at Qana from a distance of about 1.5 kilometres. The RPV on the tape was of a type with a real-time data link capability.

Findings

13. The following are my findings:

(a) The distribution of impacts at Qana shows two distinct concentrations, whose mean points of impact are about 140 metres apart. If the guns were converged, as stated by the Israeli forces, there should have been only one main point of impact.

(b) The pattern of impacts is inconsistent with a normal overshooting of the declared target (the mortar site) by a few rounds, as suggested by the Israeli forces.

(c) During the shelling, there was a perceptible shift in the weight of fire from the mortar site to the United Nations compound.

(d) The distribution of point impact detonations and air bursts makes it improbable that impact fuses and proximity fuses were employed in random order, as stated by the Israeli forces.

(e) There were no impacts in the second target area which the Israeli forces claim to have shelled.

(f) Contrary to repeated denials, two Israeli helicopters and a remotely piloted vehicle were present in the Qana area at the time of the shelling.

http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/62d5aa740c14293b85256324005179be?OpenDocument