Showdown in Najaf: US Logic Hard to FollowThe claims and counter-claims make it hard to discern the strategies behind the showdown in Najaf, and the language that is used blurs the situation even more. U.S. military spokesmen, for example, always call the young men who are defending rebel Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr "anti-Iraqi forces," although not one in a hundred of them has ever been outside Iraq.
But you can guess why U.S. authorities in Iraq chose this moment to try to eliminate Sadr and his al-Mahdi militia.
From the start, the biggest obstacle to the creation of a compliant, pro-American regime in Iraq has been the fact that the Shias, who make up about 60 per cent of Iraq's population, could elect a majority government that could, and probably would, defy U.S. wishes if they voted as a bloc. Moreover, senior Shia clerics command great respect in the community, making it much likelier that the Shia would indeed vote en bloc. So, elections were too risky.
Retired general Jay Garner, the original choice as U.S. pro-consul in Iraq, was dismissed after a month because he called for early elections in Iraq: "The night after I got to Baghdad, (Defense Secretary Donald) Rumsfeld called me and told me he was appointing Paul Bremer as the presidential envoy. The announcement ... was somewhat abrupt."
Rumsfeld was worried that an elected Iraqi government would resist mass privatization of the economy, but he was equally worried that such a government would be Shia-dominated, and insist on an Islamic state.
The problem was compounded by the fact that Washington's favorite ayatollah, Abdul Majid al-Khoei, was killed the day after Baghdad fell. Khoei had become a personal friend of British Prime Minister Tony Blair during his long exile in London, and had strong U.S. backing. But a mob hacked him to death in the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf on April 10, 2003, the day after he arrived, leaving the field open to less pro-American rivals.
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