What threat does Iran pose?
The problem I have with the debate about uranium enrichment
in Iran is the characterization of the perceived threat. Most
people agree that the threat is serious, but the opinions are
split on how to deal with the problem. These opinions range
from the alarmist’s push for immediate military action to the
self-described moderate’s demand for: “let’s find the root
causes of poverty and cultural misunderstanding and then apply
good diplomatic efforts to arrive at a solution.”
On this issue I am not a moderate. Nor am I an alarmist. To
be frank, I would describe myself as borderline freaked out!
I hold alarmists responsible for my condition because in my
opinion they understate the threat. Yes, that’s right, I used
the word “understate.”
Virtually everything I have read characterizes the future
nuclear threat from Iran as 1) construction of a bomb, 2)
delivery of the bomb with a missile (short range for Israel,
long range for Europe). The alarmists end the threat scenario
there and assume that it's enough to awaken people to action.
The moderates, however, carry the scenario a step further and
take some edge off the immediacy. They add, 3) massive
retaliation by the international community. With step three
added to the scenario they argue that Iran will see that steps
one and two are futile and therefore diplomatic settlement of
the issue will ultimately be successful.
The alarmists like to recall the 1930’s when the failure of
diplomacy and postponement of early military confrontation
took the world directly into the worst human catastrophe in
history. The moderates like to recall the 1970’s and ‘80’s
when diplomacy and postponement of military confrontation
succeeded in staving off another equally devastating human
catastrophe.
These older generations of alarmists and moderates, I am
afraid, are at great risk of confusing themselves with two
major contradictory examples from the 20th century. They want
to apply their favorite feel good lessons that they think they
have learned in the past to the present day situation.
Refreshingly, I am finding that many in the younger generation
are seeing the future more clearly through the undiluted lens
of current events. They’re watching and they’re listening,
but they are not stupid and I hope they won’t be as confused
as their elders.
In my opinion we are in a completely new world. It’s not the
‘30’s, nor the ‘70’s, nor the ‘80’s, much as drawing parallels
makes us feel comfortable. Instead, we are in post 9/11,
post-Madrid, post-Bali, and post-London, to name a few. This
new world is introducing us to new violent strategies and
tactics and it requires new insights into scenarios of the
future that, according to my reading, are not fully discussed
in the popular press at all.
Why do I emphasize strategic and tactical scenarios? Because
I believe great wars throughout history are undertaken, not
for reasons of failed diplomacy, but rather when one side
believes it has a significant military advantage over the
other side. And I believe the current Iranian leaders think
they can build a military advantage despite all the power that
we think we have arrayed against them. Let me show how.
Let’s start with a different scenario than the nonsense
that’s in the press or implied in public debates as mentioned
above: 1) Iran refines weapons grade uranium and safely
stockpiles it. 2) Iran announces a nuclear capability to the
world which will be used for peaceful purposes AND (they will
add this later) be “available” for self-defense. 3) Iran
expands conventional covert terrorist activity without playing
the provocative nuclear card and spreads this campaign over
years and in some cases decades. (We can take the current
Baghdad situation as a blueprint for this phase.) They will
use the world media to defuse and confuse the origins of the
terrorist activities, and they will endeavor to stay just
below a provocation threshold that would trigger a direct
military retaliation from the outer world. (Take the
Lebanon/Israeli war of August 2006 as the example.) Their
future nuclear umbrella will enhance this strategy immensely
and allow them to raise the threshold of provocation higher.
Objectives:
First: The destruction of Israel. When Iran acquires its
nuclear cover, look for it to begin pumping terrorists into
Israel. The destruction of Israel would be a great energizer
in the Middle East and a set-up to focus people on the next
objective.
Second: Accelerated terrorist attacks on weaker Arab and
Muslim states with vulnerable dictatorships (witness Somalia
and Darfur). Essentially, this phase will aim to swamp the UN
and Western democracies with crisis situations, both
financially and militarily. Any successfully toppled
government in the Arab League of Nations will be replaced with
a pro-Iranian government. This organization will steadily
coalesce into a radical Islamic entity with Iran at the
nucleus. Granted this organization could suffer stresses from
the Shiite/Sunni rift, but I still think Iran would be able to
gather considerable control over a large portion of the Middle
East power block.
Third: Withering away of the western world by terrorist
pressure on our free, open and ultimately indefensible system
of society.
What would the Western response be to this kind of scenario
as it unfolded year in and year out? Iran will hope for and
encourage the following answer: CONFUSION! 1930's style
confusion. Probably, the most ancient of all animal dilemmas
is how to respond when faced with a threat—stand and fight, or
turn and run. Each strategy carries its own valid/invalid
chances for success depending on the circumstances.
Confusion, though, gives the greatest advantage to the
aggressor.
What options would be available to the Western world?
A) More diplomacy? Iran will be happy to talk forever about
anything or nothing. Meanwhile, the uranium refinement will
relentlessly continue. And, as the tensions mount, so too
will the price of oil. More money for Iran and more money for
Hezbollah.
B) An Israeli strike? Against what? After the first Gulf
War in Iraq it took inspectors a year to uncover Saddam's
nuclear program. After that experience, Iran became much
better prepared. Their production facilities and stockpiles
will be well distributed and hidden deep in the vast
mountainous terrain of Iran. There won’t be a single, obvious
target like there was in Iraq on 7 June 1981 when Israel
destroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor.
C) A Western conventional invasion into Iran? Which
democratically elected politicians are going to send columns
of tanks up the deep valleys in Iran (look at Google Earth)
where they can be cut-off and vaporized by the 1000s with
small defensive Iranian nuclear devices? Would Afghanistan
have been so easy if the Taliban had a nuclear threat in their
pocket in 2001? Tell me how many European nations are going
to volunteer for that operation--or Americans either.
D) A massive nuclear air threat by the West against Iran?
Suppose Iran counters with its own threat. Let's examine this
one in detail.
If I were the president and/or military planners of Iran, I
would prepare for a Western nuclear threat long before I
aroused their anger with my serious terrorist campaigns. I
wouldn't make the same stupid mistake that Saddam made of
entering Kuwait without a nuclear capability that was only a
few months away from fruition. (Saddam said it was the
biggest mistake he ever made.)
What would I, as the president of Iran, propose doing?
We must get technical for a moment. The U-235 mass in the
first nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima only weighed 60 kilos
(about 130 lbs)--roughly the weight of my wife, a small bomb
in herself! The device was so simple, they didn't even test
it. Anyone can build a nuclear bomb; it's only a matter of
slamming one small chunk of U-235 into another small chunk to
create one super-critical mass with a self sustaining chain
reaction of splitting atoms that will blow your hat off faster
than you can even think the word, "nanosecond.” (See,
"Scientific American" magazine, February 2006.)
Making the bomb is almost literally child’s play; getting the
U-235 to make it is the total challenge. Uranium appears
mostly in nature in the form of the heavier, non-fissionable
U-238 isotope. To extract the 0.7% of lighter, fissionable
U-235 a laboratory must convert the raw material into a toxic
gas, and then run it through a cascade of highly delicate gas
centrifuges. Thousands of the small centrifuges are required
to gradually improve the purity of the U-235. When it is 30%
pure Iran can light-up their streets, houses and hospitals
from their power plants. Spin the centrifuges some more and
they can eventually arrive at 90% purity, otherwise know as
weapons grade.
How many centrifuges Iran has is a matter of speculation.
People working sometimes covertly during the Clinton
administration managed to thwart efforts by the Russians and
Chinese to sell centrifuges to Iran; but now it is believed
that Iran may be building their own; they have blueprints from
various sources. Expert projections for Iran’s success range
from two months (Israelis) to 15 years. The US projection is
placed at five to ten years, but British Intelligence places
their bet at only one and a half years. I have taken this
information from a highly informative article in the Sunday
New York Times 3 May 2005. Counting from that date, the BI
projection would be on target right about now. A further
note: Iran announced last year that by the end of 2005 they
would install 3000 centrifuges that experts admitted, if true,
could produce up to ten bombs a year. (By the way, it’s also
possible to steal refined U-235 from supplies that were
produced and distributed by the US and USSR during the past
half century. That supply amounts to 50 tons residing in
civilian research reactors at 140 locations around the world;
but let’s not talk about that.)
Once acquired, the U-235 can be packaged in various ways for
transportation. In a large quantity it would have to be
surrounded by some kind of heavy shield, and anyway would be
highly detectable. Be aware, though, that one Russian
facility packaged small quantities of U-235 in hand sized
disks that could easily be carried in the pocket with no risk.
The facility has tens of thousands of these wafers on site and
it's a security nightmare.
By further illustration, I have a very good friend that has a
PhD in metallurgy and he recently told me that in his early
days he carried weapons grade uranium in his pocket. (I might
add that he now has three, healthy grown daughters that are
married and have their own children.)
The point here is this: As president of Iran, if I can
produce some refined U-235, I believe I can package this in
small quantities and find a way to transport it undetected to
various strategic places around the world. It could be
pre-positioned out of detection range and then if some country
threatened me with a nuclear attack, I could direct a quick
assembly and make a Hiroshima/Nagasaki type of demonstration
that led instantly to the resignation of Japan from WWII.
With this kind of block to Western nuclear threats in place, I
can then proceed with my systematic terrorist activities as I
wish, and in fact expand my operations far more aggressively.
I am convinced that high diplomats and indeed even
journalists that are aware of this scenario will only speak
about it in very vague terms, if at all. They are vague
because the possibility is so nightmarish. For this reason,
the general public has not yet been adequately informed. If
you think, though, that this scenario is far fetched, listen
to the words of Jacques Chirac in a speech at L'Ile-Longue
nuclear submarine base in the western region of Brittany on 19
January 2006:
"Leaders of states who would use terrorist means against
us, just like anyone who would envisage using, in one way or
another, arms of mass destruction, must understand that they
would expose themselves to a firm and fitting response from
us," he said. "This response could be conventional.
It could also be of another nature." He went on to say:
...there should be no doubt "about our will and our
capacity to use nuclear arms" if the country's vital
interests are threatened.
Presumably, he would act BEFORE he received an anonymous note
on his desk informing that Leon would disappear that night,
and Paris the next night. (By the way, it's ironic to
contemplate what the French press would have said if Donald
Rumsfeld would have made such a speech.)
I'm sorry to be so macabre about this issue, but I think it
is not the moment to paint over any part of this scenario. To
complete our picture there is another type of threat worse
than an attack on cities. The worst nightmare presently
haunting security experts around the world is that a container
ship may arrive at some major port with a nuclear device on
board, perhaps assembled during the entry. If you think
cancellation of a few dozen flights because of a terrorist
threat is serious, then think about a major port being
devastated by a nuclear attack. Immediately, all container
ships would be blocked from entering ports around the world
for some unspecified amount of time. That kind of disruption
to the modern world’s supply system would be unprecedented in
all of history.
We generally measure the tragedy of a terrorist attack by how
many people are killed and injured. I'm sorry to say,
however, that in my mind, I think more of the economic impact.
It may not be fashionable to say that, but think about 9/11.
Less men than you can count on your hands and feet ruined the
air industry, tourist industry, bank and insurance industries,
closed down the world's largest stock exchange for the first
time in history, brought down the two biggest buildings in one
of the world's largest cities, made a direct hit on the
world's most powerful military headquarters, and would have
decapitated the US government capital except for a few brave
souls over Pennsylvania.
I ask any reader to examine this scenario as carefully as you
can, and if you find an improbability anywhere in it please
give me the good news. My mental health depends on it.
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