30 pages, 56 footnotes.
Nuclear Power, Energy Markets, and Proliferation
By
Henry Sokolski
When security and arms control analysts list what has helped keep nuclear weapons
technologies from spreading further than they already have, energy economics is rarely, if
ever, mentioned. Yet, large civilian nuclear energy programs can -- and have -- brought
states quite a way towards developing nuclear weapons;1 and it has been market
economics, more than any other force, that has kept most states from starting or
completing these programs. Since the early 1950s, every major government in the
Western Hemisphere, Asia, the Middle East and Europe has been drawn to atomic power’s
allure only to have market realities prevent most of their nuclear investment plans from
being fully realized.
With any luck, this past will be our future. Certainly, if nuclear power programs continue
to be as difficult and expensive to complete as they have been compared to their
nonnuclear alternatives, only additional government support and public spending will be
able to save them. In this case, one needs to ask why governments would bother,
especially in light of the security risks that would inevitably arise with nuclear power’s
further proliferation. On the other hand, if nuclear power evolves into the quickest and
least expensive way to produce electricity while abating carbon emissions, little short of a
nuclear explosion traceable to a “peaceful” nuclear facility would stem this technology’s
further spread -- no matter what its security risks might be.
Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand, then, could well determine just how far civilian nuclear
energy expands, and how much attention its attendant security risks deserve. Certainly, if
nuclear power’s economics remain negative, diplomats and policy makers could leverage
this point, work to limit legitimate nuclear commerce to what is economically competitive,
and so gain a powerful tool to help limit nuclear proliferation. If nuclear power finally
breaks from its past and becomes the cheapest of clean technologies in market
competitions against its alternatives, though, it is unlikely that diplomats and policy
makers will be anywhere near as able or willing to prevent insecure or hostile states from
developing nuclear energy programs to help them make atomic weapons.
What follows is a deeper explication of these points. The first section, “Costs,” examines
what the economics for nuclear power have been and are projected to be. The second,
“Justifications,” examines the environmental, energy security, and political reasons why
nuclear power’s relatively poor economic performance has been downplayed. The third
section, “Concerns,” explores the reasons why continuing to do this is risky, and the final
section “Economics As A Way Out,” examines how market economic competitions could
be used to help steer us towards cheaper, safer forms of energy.
1. See, e.g., Albert Wohlstetter, et. al., Swords from Plowshares: The Military Potential
of Civilian Nuclear Energy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. vii-32;
Matthew Fuhrman, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear
Cooperation Agreements,” International Security, Summer 2009, pp. 7-41, available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3401_pp007-041_Fuhrmann.pdf; and Victor
Gilinsky, et al., “A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water
Reactors,” in Henry Sokolski, editor, Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), available at
http://www.npec-web.org/node/886.