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Edited on Fri Feb-19-10 01:25 AM by kristopher
Dude, you have GOT to start reading the shit YOU write!
Why the hell do you think you get all those ROFL smileys? It's because no one can believe anyone could be so disassociated from reality and the fact that they are is simply hilarious.
BTW, have you read this? Posted with the author's permission:
Nuclear Nonsense
I have known Stewart Brand as a friend for many years. I have admired his original and
iconoclastic work, which has had significant impact. In his new book, Whole Earth Discipline:
an Ecopragmatist Manifesto (Viking), he argues that environmentalists should change their
thinking about four issues—population, nuclear power, genetically modified organisms (GMOs),
and urbanization. Many people have asked me to assess his 41-page chapter on nuclear power, so
I’ll do that here, because I believe its conclusions are greatly mistaken.
Stewart recently predicted I wouldn’t accept his nuclear reassessment. He is quite right. His
nuclear chapter’s facts and logic do not hold up to scrutiny. Over the past few years I’ve sent him
five technical papers focused mainly on nuclear power’s comparative economics and
performance; he says he’s read them, and on p. 98 he even summarizes part of their economic
thesis. Yet on p. 104 he says, “We Greens are not economists” and disclaims knowledge of
economics, saying environmentalists use it only as a weapon to stop projects. Today most
dispassionate analysts think new nuclear power plants’ deepest flaw is their economics. They
cost too much to build and incur too much financial risk. My writings show why nuclear
expansion therefore can’t deliver on its claims: it would reduce and retard climate protection,
because it saves between two and 20 times less carbon per dollar, 20 to 40 times slower, than
investing in efficiency and micropower.
That conclusion rests on empirical data about how much new nuclear electricity actually costs
relative to decentralized and efficiency competitors, how these alternatives compare in capacity
and output added per year, and which can most effectively save carbon. Stewart’s chapter says
nothing about any of these questions, but I believe they’re at the heart of the matter. If nuclear
power is unneeded, uncompetitive, or ineffective in climate protection, let alone all three, then
we need hardly debate whether its safety and waste issues are resolved, as he claims.
In its first half-century, nuclear power fell short of its forecast capacity by about 12-fold in the
U.S. and 30-fold worldwide, mainly because building it cost severalfold more than expected,
straining or bankrupting its owners. The many causes weren’t dominated by U.S. citizen
interventions and lawsuits, since nuclear expectations collapsed similarly in countries without
such events; even France suffered a 3.5-fold rise in real capital costs during 1970–2000. Nor did
the Three Mile Island accident halt U.S. orders: they’d stopped the previous year. Rather,
nuclear’s key challenge was soaring capital cost, and for some units, poor performance.
Operational improvements in the ’90s made the better old reactors relatively cheap to run, but
Stewart’s case is for building new ones. Have their economics improved enough to prevent a
rerun?
On the contrary, a 2003 MIT study found new U.S. nuclear plants couldn’t compete with new
coal- or gas-fired plants. Over the next five years, nuclear construction costs about tripled. Was
this due to pricey commodities like steel and concrete? No; those totaled less than one percent of
total capital cost. Were citizen activists again to blame? No; they’d been neutralized by
streamlined licensing, adverse courts, and Federal “delay insurance.” The key causes seem to be
bottlenecked supply chains, atrophied skills, and a weak U.S. dollar—all widening the cost gap
between new nuclear power and its potent new competitors.
Today’s main alternatives aren’t limited to giant power plants burning coal or natural gas.
Decentralized sources provide from one-sixth to more than half of all electricity in a dozen
industrial countries and, together with more efficient use, deliver the majority of the world’s new
electrical services. Booming orders did lately raise wind-turbine and photovoltaic prices too, but
they’re headed back down as capacity catches up; PVs got one-fourth cheaper just in the past
year, and reactor-scale PV farms compete successfully in California power auctions. New U.S.
windfarms—“firmed” to provide reliable power even if becalmed—sell electricity at less than
typical wholesale prices, or at a third to a half the cost utilities project for new nuclear plants.
Rather than viewing nuclear power within this real-world competitive landscape, Stewart simply
waves away its competitors. He praises efficient use of electricity, but rejects it because he says
it can’t by itself replace all coal and power all global development. He also dismisses wind and
solar power, and omits small hydro, geothermal, waste/biomass combustion, all other
renewables, and cogeneration. Yet worldwide these sources make more electricity than nuclear
power does, and for the past three years, have won about 10–25 times its market share and added
about 20–40 times more capacity each year.
The world in 2008 invested more in renewable power than in fossil-fueled power. Why? Because
renewables are cheaper, faster, vaster, equally or more carbon-free, and more attractive to inves-
tors. Worldwide, distributed renewables in 2008 added 40 billion watts and got $100 billion of
private investment; nuclear added and got zero, despite its far larger subsidies and generally
stronger government support. From August 2005 to August 2008, with new subsidies equivalent
to 100+% of construction cost and with the most robust nuclear politics and capital markets in
history, the 33 proposed U.S. nuclear projects got not a cent of private equity investment.
Nonetheless, Stewart rejects all non-nuclear options, for four fallacious reasons:
• Baseload: Wind and photovoltaics can’t keep the lights on because they can’t run 24/7.
• Footprint: Photovoltaics need about 150–175 times, and windfarms from 600+ to nearly
900 times, more land than nuclear power to produce the same electricity.
• Portfolio: We need every tool for combating climate change, including nuclear power.
• Government role: The climate imperative trumps economics, so governments everywhere
must and will do what France did—ensure that nuclear power gets built, regardless of
economics or dissent.
I believe each claim is unsupportable:
• Baseload. The electricity system doesn’t rely on any plant’s ability to run continuously;
rather, all plants together supply the grid, and the grid serves all loads. That’s necessary
because no kind of power plant can run all the time, as Stewart says they must do to meet
steady loads. I repeat: there is not and has never been a need for any particular plant or
kind of plant to run all the time, and none can. All power plants fail, varying only in their
failures’ size, duration, frequency, predictability, and cause. Solar cells’ and windpower’s
variation with night and weather is no different from the intermittence of coal and nuclear
plants, except that it affects less capacity at once, more briefly, far more predictably, and
is no harder and probably easier and cheaper to manage. In short, the ability to serve
steady loads is a statistical attribute of all plants on the grid, not an operational
requirement for one plant. Variability (predictable failure) and intermittence (unpredic-
table failure) must be managed by diversifying type and location, forecasting, and
integrating with other resources. Utilities do this every day, balancing diverse resources
to meet fluctuating demand and offset outages. Even with a largely (or probably a
wholly) renewable grid, this is not a significant problem or cost, either in theory or in
practice—as illustrated by areas that are already 30–40% windpowered.
• Footprint. Stewart understates nuclear power’s land-use by about 43-fold by omitting all
land used by exclusion zones and the nuclear fuel chain. Conversely, he includes the
space between wind or solar equipment—unused land commonly used for farming,
grazing, wildlife, and recreation. That’s like claiming that the area of the lampposts in a
parking lot is the area of the parking lot, even though 99% of it is used for parking,
driving, and walking. Properly measured, per kilowatt-hour produced, the land made
unavailable for other uses is about the same for ground-mounted photovoltaics as for
nuclear power, sometimes less—or zero for building-mounted PVs sufficient to power
the world many times over. Land actually used per kWh is up to thousands of times
smaller for windpower than for nuclear power. If land-use were an important criterion for
picking energy systems, which it’s generally not, it would thus reverse Stewart’s footprint
conclusion.
• Portfolio. The one paper he cites as proof that we need all energy options actually says
the opposite. There is no analytic basis for his conclusion, and there’s strong science to
the contrary. We can’t afford to stuff our energy portfolio indiscriminately with some of
everything, and we shouldn’t: some options are less worthy and effective than others. The
more you fear climate change, the more judiciously you should invest to get the most
solution per dollar and per year. Nuclear flunks both these tests.
• Government. If nuclear power isn’t needed, worsens climate change (vs. more effective
solutions) and energy security, and can’t compete in the marketplace despite uniquely big
subsidies—all evidence-based findings unexamined in Stewart’s chapter—then his
nuclear imperative evaporates. Of course, a few countries with centrally planned energy
systems, mostly with socialized costs, are building reactors: over two-thirds of all nuclear
plants under construction are in China, Russia, India, or South Korea. But that’s more
because their nuclear bureaucracies dominate national energy policy and face little or no
competition in technologies, business models, and ideas. Nuclear power requires such a
system. The competitors beating nuclear power thrive in democracies and free markets.
Stewart’s reputation and his valuable prior contributions to clear thinking for a better world may
win his nuclear views some attention. Yet judged on its merits, not his history, this nuclear chap-
ter’s assertions can only worsen climate and security risks.
—Amory B. Lovins
Chairman and Chief Scientist, Rocky Mountain Institute (www.rmi.org)
13 October 2009
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