It REQUIRES conditions be met, that WERE NOT MET...so in no way can this resolution can be used to support Bush's going to war WITHOUT meeting the conditions. Read it...it does not say, you can go to war unilaterally but must meet strict conditions before congress will support Bush doing so. VERY strict conditions... "ENFORCE THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL..."
"AND ENFORCE THROUGH ALL RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS..."
Which also includes the council resolution that no nation unilaterally can attack another nation unless it is under direct threat of attack by that nation.
So this resolutions was no "Vote for War", but an insistance that Bush must folllow international laws and treaty obligations to the U.N. before going to war. In that case it would be the U.N. going to war with legitimate international reasons, and nothing else, with a U.S. contingency to support the U.N.
You have proven that Congress NEVER supported the Bush attack on Iraq.
It approved the U.S. going to the U.N. to ask the U.N. to do so, and for permission to take part in the war if the U.N. decided war was the ONLY way to gains compliance.
Now show the sections that state that Bush can go to war without meeting ALL criteria set up in the act, and prove that BUSH MET THE CRITERIA..and then the act IS a vote for war...Until then It is not. Even the courts who heard the case in which the resolution was used to try to STOP the war agrees on that:
In this zone of shared congressional and presidential responsibility, courts should intervene only when the dispute is clearly framed. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228-29; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. An extreme case might arise, for example, if Congress gave absolute discretion to the President to start a war at his or her will. Cf. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 423, 425 (describing President's broad explanations for use of cancellation authority). Plaintiffs' objection to the October Resolution does not, of course, involve any such claim. Nor does it involve a situation where the President acts without any apparent congressional authorization, or against congressional opposition.
The mere fact that the October Resolution grants some discretion to the President fails to raise a sufficiently clear constitutional issue. The plaintiffs argue that Congress is constitutionally forbidden from deciding that certain conditions are necessary to lead to war and then yielding to the President the authority to make the determination of whether those conditions exist. (12) The President, in this view, has power to make such determinations only in the context of repelling sudden attacks on this country or its allies. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court recently and forcefully reiterated that, notwithstanding the Constitution's vesting of "all legislative power" in Congress, U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added), enactments which leave discretion to the executive branch are permissible as long as they offer some "intelligible principle" to guide that discretion. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). War powers, in contrast to "all legislative power," are shared between the political branches. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has also suggested that the nondelegation doctrine has even less applicability to foreign affairs. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (when delegating authority over foreign relations, Congress may leave more details to the President than in domestic affairs, short of granting "totally unrestricted freedom of choice"). The reference to nondelegation is thus of little help to plaintiffs in trying to present the type of serious issue necessary to overcome judicial restraint in the adjudication of war powers cases.
Nor is there clear evidence of congressional abandonment of the authority to declare war to the President. To the contrary, Congress has been deeply involved in significant debate, activity, and authorization connected to our relations with Iraq for over a decade, under three different presidents of both major political parties, and during periods when each party has controlled Congress. It has enacted several relevant pieces of legislation expressing support for an aggressive posture toward Iraq, including authorization of the prior war against Iraq and of military assistance for groups that would overthrow Saddam Hussein. It has also accepted continued American participation in military activities in and around Iraq, including flight patrols and missile strikes. Finally, the text of the October Resolution itself spells out justifications for a war and frames itself as an "authorization" of such a war...
http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03-1266.01AThe courts indicate that this act spells out conditions for a war with Iraq, and that the state of affairs when the court decision was made were not sufficient to order a restraint, as the president was still engaged with the U.N. and so trying to meet the terms of the resolution. It states directly that Congress in no way
"abandoned its right to declare war" as so many Dean supporters try to state, and states that the act spells out conditions for justifications of a war. The courts have stated that this act did not give the president absolute power to start the war at will.
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(1000+ posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
