<snip> The broad coalition is divided over whether to withdraw, and when. Many or those who feel the war was unwarranted, a mistake, promoted by fabricated evidence, still are worried that it would be a bigger mistake to withdraw from Iraq. Unfortunately, one big organizational coalition (Win Without War) was internally frozen in weeks of discussion, only recently releasing a complex statement that did justify withdrawal. More unfortunately, Move.On has decided to reduce its focus on ending the war, the primary issue that fueled Move.On’s membership growth last year. Move.On’s decision to “move on” from the Iraq crisis to Social Security, the Democratic Party, and other worthy endeavors means that its huge anti-war membership base is not being mobilized against Bush’s policies in Iraq. Other large progressive organizations, including the AFL-CIO, remain silent on Iraq, in keeping with their traditions. It should never be forgotten that of all the liberal dollars that went to 527s during last year’s presidential campaign, none were spent on organizing and educating against the war. There is good reason to feel alone these days. <snip>
A deeper reassessment is unlikely until after the Mar. 19-20 national demonstrations that UFPJ is pushing. Those demonstrations, while widespread, are unlikely to be large, but anything is possible.
The main point here is that the Bush policies, always directed at the political homefront, have given an incentive to Democratic liberals and moderates to play down their criticism of Iraq. The anti-war movement never prepared itself for the political effect of the Iraq elections, dismissing them as either phony or a momentary distraction. But the Bush plan calls for the Iraqi electoral process to continue all year , precisely to destabilize the anti-war movement and the Democrats by offering the possibility of a “stabilized” Iraq and a subsequent US troop withdrawal.
History provides little guidance here, but the same splits occurred during the Vietnam War between those who demanded “out now” and those who favored “negotiations now”, which was roughly a difference between radicals and liberals. We might remember that in the end these differences mattered little, except for the domestic posture of competing anti-war groups. Not even the Paris Peace Agreement saved the US from a humiliating collapse of its client regime in Saigon. We definitely should remember that the Number 2 diplomat during the Paris talks was John Negroponte, who opposed Kissinger’s attempt at a face-saving diplomatic “decent interval” and pushed a harder line. It should be assumed that Negroponte is acting out his Vietnam Syndrome through his Iraq policies today. <snip>
http://www.ilcaonline.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2077&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0