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Faced with the way our societies come uncoded, codes leaking on every side, Nietzsche does not try to perform a recoding. He says: this hasn't yet gone far enough, you're nothing but children ("the equalization of European individuals is the great irreversible process: we should accelerate it still more.") In terms of what he thinks and writes, Nietzsche's enterprise is an attempt at uncoding, not in the sense of relative uncoding which would be the decoding of codes past, present, or future, but an absolute uncoding - to get something through which is not encodable, to mix up all the codes. It is not so easy to mix up all the codes, even at the level of the simplest writing, and language. The similarity I see here is with Kafka, what Kafka does with German, in accordance with the linguistic situation of the Jews in Prague: he builds a war-machine in German against German; through sheer indetermination and sobriety, he gets something through in the German code which had never been heard before. Nietzsche, for his part, wants to be or sees himself as Polish with respect to German. He seizes on German to build a war-machine that will be uncodable in German. That's what style as politics means. More generally, how do we characterize such thought, which claims to get its flows through, underneath the laws by challenging them, and underneath contractual relations by contradicting them, and underneath institutions by parodying them? Let me come back quickly to the example of psychoanalysis. In what respect does a psychoanalyst as original as melanie Klein still remain within the psychoanalytic system? She explains herself quite well: the partial objects that she tells us about, with their explosions, their flows, etc., are only fantasy. The patients bring lived experiences, intensely lived experiences, to specifically a contract: give me your lived experiences, and I will give you fantasies. And the contract implies an exchange, an exchange of money and words. In this respect, a psychoanalyst like Winnicott truly occupies the limit of psychoanalysis, because he feels that this procedure is no longer appropriate after a certain point. There comes a point where it is no longer about translating, or interpreting, translating into fantasies, interpreting into signifiers and signifieds - no, not in the least. There comes a point where you will have to share his experience. Is it about a kind of sympathy, or empathy, or identification? But surely it's more complicated than that. What we feel is rather the necessity of a relation that would be neither legal, nor contractual, nor institutional. That's how it is with Nietzsche. We read an aphorism or a poem from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. But materially and formally, texts like that cannot be understood by the establishment or application of law, or by the offer of a contractual relation, or by the founding of an institution. Perhaps the only conceivable equivalent is something like "being in the same boat." Something of Pascal turned against Pascal. We're in the same boat: a sort of lifeboat, bombs falling on every side, the lifeboat drifts toward subterranean rivers of ice, or towards rivers of fire, the nOronoco, the Amazon, everyone is pulling an oar, and we're not even supposed to like one another, we fight, we eat each other. Everyone pulling an oar is sharing, sharing something, beyond any law, any contract, any institution. Drifting, a drifting movement or "deterritorialization": I say all this in a vague, confused way, since this is a hypothesis or a vague impression on the originality of Nietzsche's texts. A new kind of book.
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