I just think (and I can't tell without the context) that you may have been misreading a couple of the ones you quoted.
But of that 6 billion, about 750 million are 'consumers' that actually buy the shit. The rest are breeders and serfs according to the anything goes if it serves the market philosophy.I think the author was quoting/paraphrasing someone else's views of "the rest", not stating his/her own. I'm not entirely clear on what the entire passage meant, but I do think that bit was misinterpreted.
And...if you think America will just wallow in misery while it holds the largest, most sophisticated military in history, you are going to be sadly mistaken.Again, without a context ... but I still wonder whether it isn't a prediction rather than a policy advocated by the author.
In any event, the whole problem being discussed is accurately described as "the race to the bottom". Capital simply moves to where costs are cheaper. Reducing the price of labour to prevent capital from fleeing doesn't mean that jobs will be preserved; it means that the labour force will be impoverished
and dumbed down, and the quality of the jobs created by capital will just get continually worse. Think: hamburger flippers and greeters.
The trick is not really to retain the lousy jobs that are being "taken" by all those foreigners (although yes, they are indeed the only jobs that the people losing them have). It is to stop the slide of the economy into oblivion; to create good jobs.
Allow me to offer one of my favourite little commentaries, again:
http://www.econ.usyd.edu.au/drawingboard/digest/0108/wilson.htmlTo begin, I consider a (crude) distinction between the ‘high’ and ‘low’ road options that policy makers face in accommodating changing domestic and international realities. The high wage, high skill option for most developed countries aims at ensuring both continuity of some kind of dynamic manufacturing core and strong growth in high skilled services.
The low wage, low skill route, by contrast, is premised on the argument that global economic realities create fewer options for successful public intervention and that the growth of low paid, low skill work — especially in services — is an unavoidable consequence of adjusting to the market-driven world.
The contrasting strategies of Sweden and the United States illustrate the logic of high and low road options in real economies. In the post-war period, the Swedish labour movement’s policy of ‘solidarity wages’ forced innovation on domestic business by imposing uniform wage costs, thereby reducing the viability of low wage, low skill industries. Although this wages model has been dealt some blows recently, powerful coalitions of interests continue to block the deregulation and retrenchment of Sweden’s employment and welfare systems (see Palan and Abbott, 1999, pp. 103–120). Relative wage compression and extensive decommodification in the labour market place clear limits on any downward adjustment type solutions. Swedish business thus continues to rely on high productivity, value-added industrial development. While commentators are right in stressing the breakdown of classical social democratic adjustment to global markets, at the very time that outside observers were proclaiming the ‘death’ of the Swedish model, domestic industry was remarkably well placed to enter new areas of economic growth, particularly in information technology. I believe that the institutional legacy of the Swedish model has been a decisive factor.
Developments in the American labour market since the end of the long boom stand in contrast to Sweden: the US provides archetype of the ‘low’ road, notwithstanding its high-tech sector. The United States allowed both the wage gap to increase and a huge growth in low skilled, low wage services to soak up the labour supply (see Mishel et al: 1999: 20). At the same time, average working hours have exploded, bucking OECD trends. The growth of low wage, low skilled services must be put in the bigger picture of institutional design: there are fewer macro limits on downward adjustment in the American model. Hence the growth in ‘low road’ industries, divergent productivity trends and a burgeoning current account deficit.
Without public intervention to regulate and manage ‘institutional design’, even strong economies default in part to the ‘low road’. This is clearly the case because the high road — as the Swedish experience demonstrates — is consciously premised on preventing the low wage, low-skill alternative taking hold.
Competing with the less developed world to retain low-wage, low-skill jobs is a losing proposition. US (and other) workers are being forced to engage in that competition, because so much of the US labour force is in that low-wage, low-skill pool. But the fact is that there is a bigger, lower-wage, if not lower-skill, pool outside the US.
I'm a little unslept right now to be putting this into words ... but I suppose I'd say (amateur econophile that I am) that the idea is that if the state creates the conditions for a higher-wage, higher-skill workforce -- high wage policies and an effective education/training program and incentives for creating secure, skilled, well-paid jobs -- there will be upward pressure to counteract that downward pressure. For instance, from that article:
While I stress here that preventing the low road option inevitably involves public intervention, government has also been an active ingredient in the new success stories of Finland and Ireland <i.e. supposedly market-driven economies> to which Australia and New Zealand are now turning in search of a way out of economic decline. The priority given to research in Finland, and the education and foreign investment strategies of Ireland are singled out as major factors in recent economic growth in these countries.
... a mix of offensive and defensive policies: labour market regulation that promotes innovation and weakens incentives for the low road; greater public investment and a combination of defensive protection for existing industries with intervention in developing new ones.
... A number of studies confirm that countries with high levels of social expenditures adjust more successfully to the world economy: those countries with the most ‘open’ economies (measured by the proportion of national product exported) are those with the most comprehensive welfare states ... . Social spending and social protections act as a buffer against the downside of adjustment to increased economic openness.
One could perhaps paraphrase by saying that solidarity -- the "welfare state", regulatory intervention in labour practices, public sector employment -- doesn't just help one's neighbour; it helps one's self by increasing the economic security of the entire society. It isn't just the neighbour's ability to put food on the table in the short term that's at stake, it's the survival of the economy, and everyone's ability to put food on the table in the long term. Without intervention, capital will just seek its lowest level, both domestically and abroad.
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