questions to ask of vendors:
http://avirubin.com/vote/questions.htmland questions I'd (from an earlier post by Bev) like to see posed to our election officials:
- According to Mark Radtke of Diebold, even though the SAIC report identified over 300 flaws, 26 of them critical, THEY ARE NOT FIXING THE MACHINES IN CALIFORNIA (read: a recall election in how many days using these riggable machines in 14 counties!) or GEORGIA or anywhere else they are using them.
- The SAIC tested a system that has NEVER been used in ANY election and is not even certified yet. They wanted to keep this a secret so they redacted the version number out! I believe what they tested was the touch screen AccuTouch TSx system and the high speed central count program -- There is no other reason to have redacted the version numbers, WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO BE ON THE NASED LIST.
- If there were over 300 security flaws and 26 critical ones (and that doesn't even include ANY of the optical scan systems by Diebold, which the memos show are making all kinds of errors, and it doesn't include the ballot preparation stage or the interface with voter registration) -- anyway:
--- How did this system get certified by Shawn Southworth at Ciber?
--- How did this system get certified by Wyle also?
--- How did this system get passed by Dr. Brit Williams?
--- How did this system get certified by all the state examiners?
--- If Diebold had over 300 security flaws, WHAT ABOUT ES&S which was apparently so similar they had patent lawsuits flying? What about Sequoia? What about Hart Intercivic?