From the IEEE, not Rense:
EET: What, then, would the ACLU like to see in the e-passport spec? Is personal data encryption good enough?
Steinhardt: At a minimum, the RFID chip is an invitation to disaster. Any identity document that's going to be carried, including a passport, ought to be protected in the most robust way. One way is to require it to make physical contact with a reader, so you avoid the problem of eavesdropping, of unknowing interceptions. Why shouldn't we require contact with a reader so that at least there is some actual notice that data is being collected?
There are huge volumes of data eventually being collected, both because of data stored within the card itself and because of the database that the card will be linked to. It will enable essentially universal monitoring and tracking. It hurtles us down the path toward the surveillance society, where you will not be able to engage in any transaction without having your actions recorded, your background checked,
violated.
EET: Is it true that there are no laws or regulations governing the requirement that you show an ID to get into a building or controlling what is done with data that is collected?
Steinhardt: In the United States, there's no regulation on what data is collected, what is done with it or how it's stored. We do not have the fair-information principles that exist in the rest of the developed world.
http://worldnewstrust.org/modules/AMS/article.php?storyid=257
Note: If this does not scare the waste matter out of you, you are over-medicated.